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ABSTRACT 
 
Institutional Change in Urban Environmentalism: 




This study examines how community development and mainstream environmental groups form 
coalitions in state-level urban environmental legislation and the effect these coalitions have upon 
larger processes of institutional change. I argue that the alignment of community development 
and environmental interests is essential in the efforts to flatten the existing power hierarchy 
around land use decision-making and open up new possibilities for urban form. It helps to form a 
“counter-institutional” response which combines “pragmatic” and “purist” interests to resolve the 
social and environmental dilemmas of land use. This study begins by establishing the extent of 
the institutional divide between community development and environmentalism through an 
archival analysis of the 1970s debate over national land use legislation. It then presents two case 
studies of policies which seek to close this divide: (1) the New York Brownfield Opportunity 
Area Program of 2003 which was initiated by community groups and (2) the California Senate 
Bill 375 of 2008 which was initiated by environmental groups. The case studies employ 
interview data, surveys of organizations, observations of public meetings, and document review. 
The cases examined provide examples of attempts to expand potential governance outcomes by 
forming “heterarchic” alliances across policy silos in order to make land use regulation 
responsive to the wider concerns of urban environmentalists. I find that heterarchy is achieved in 
the California case, but not in the New York case. The varying degrees to which urban and 
environmental advocacy groups are able to bridge the institutional divide between them is 
determinant of these outcomes. The extent to which heterarchic governance is achieved, in turn, 
impacts the ability of each policy to change the institutional structure of land use regulation. 
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focus than is usual. My advisor, Robert Beauregard, stuck with me throughout the long 
development stage and always challenged me to sharpen my thinking, be direct in my writing, 
and rigorous in the data and analysis that I present. I am a different, and far better, researcher 
now than when I began as a result of his careful guidance.  
I could not have gotten through this research without the support and love of my family 
and the willingness of my friends to encourage me. I strive to thank them regularly through my 
actions. As well, the inspiration with which my fellow students at Columbia and the faculty of 
the Urban Planning Program provided me was essential.  
This project was generously supported by a Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from 
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There are countless advocates, planners, activists, volunteers, policymakers, and legislators 
working to make cities more ecologically sound and socially just. In the course of this research, I 
gained an appreciation for the difficulty of making these goals happen at once. This dissertation 
is dedicated to those who engage in this work. The greatest compliment I could receive is that 
this research has in some way been of use in their efforts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Institutional Challenge of Urban Environmentalism 
 






1.1| Statement of Purpose 
 
In the United States, urban environmental practice includes a loosely tied set of actions 
carried out by individuals and organizations working at the intersection of community 
development and environmentalism. Especially since the 1960s, the community development 
field has built a large base of professionalized organizations with a focus on urban problems such 
as residential segregation, neighborhood reinvestment, and housing affordability (see Halpern, 
1995). Also since the 1960s, environmentalists have built their own institutional structure with a 
focus on ecological issues such as habitat preservation, watershed management, and greenhouse 
gas reduction, some of which are concerned with cities and some of which are not (see Thiele, 
1999). In recent years, a subset of community development activists has focused on the 
connection between the well-being of local communities and healthy natural ecosystems (see 
Hillman, 2002). As well, some environmentalists have focused on the connection between urban 
development practices and global warming, leading to greater engagement with local 
communities and urban issues (Gonzalez, 2005; Solecki and Oliveri, 2004). In this context, 
urban environmentalism has emerged as a hybrid set of practices that leverage the institutional 
structure of both community development and environmentalism in order to work on issues such 
as environmental justice, urban environmental stewardship, and sustainability. 
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However, the growth of urban environmentalism has been contested. While both 
community development and environmental activists have increasingly recognized the 
inseparable character of social and ecological issues, the two sides are often pitted against one 
another in local land use debates. For example, when the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection sought to limit the permits for new wastewater infrastructure to 
ecologically sensitive areas in 2008, community development activists were concerned with how 
such a move would impact the ability to generate affordable housing and challenged the action.
2
 
Similarly, in California, state housing advocates have long fought against environmental claims 
that affordable housing should not be built in sprawled urban areas. California housing groups 
argue that wealthy suburbs are precisely where affordable residences are most needed because 
that is where the best schools and greatest economic resources exist.
3
 Community development 
organizations faced similar challenges in Boulder, Colorado, where affordable housing 
developers met resistance due to anti-growth activism on the part of environmental groups 
(Gardner et al., 2003). And in New York City, arguments on the part of mainstream 
environmental organizations for high cleanup standards at “brownfield” sites in low-income and 
minority neighborhoods have been one factor leading to large, formerly industrial areas lying 
dormant for decades.
4
 The outcome of these battles, which neither side sees as desirable, is often 
to prolong and even fuel sprawled development patterns. The institutional question that must be 
resolved is not whether affordable housing or ecological preservation is more important, but how 
                                                 
2
 Taken from interview notes with a housing activist in New Jersey regarding the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection’s rules excluding wastewater service provision to environmentally sensitive lands. 
 
3
 Taken from notes of interview with affordable housing activists in California.  
 
4
 Taken from notes of interviewees with local environmental justice activists in New York City. 
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growth in all types of urban and suburban communities throughout the nation should account for 
the needs of the natural environment.  
The separation between environmentalists and urban reformers that the local land use 
battles demonstrate is derived from a policy system at odds with itself. At the federal level, laws 
that direct transportation funding and the mortgage tax credit encourage suburban areas to spread 
further into undeveloped land, reducing habitat for other species and potentially contaminating 
water sources. Meanwhile, other federal laws protect these same endangered species and 
waterways and there is no institutional capacity to bring the two policy arenas together. The 
division between natural and social regulatory regimes, as well, was institutionalized when urban 
reformers and environmentalists formalized their efforts into professional fields meant to 
regulate the negative effects of growth. Urban reform activism professionalized into the fields of 
urban planning, social work, public health, and, more recently, community development. 
Environmentalists developed specializations in law, ecosystem management, and lobbying.  
These professional and policy fields operate in distinct political geographies for “natural” 
and “social” issues. Environmentalists are rooted geographically and politically outside of the 
city while urban reformers are concerned mainly with affecting the internal functions of the city. 
This political geography reinforces the “obscured…connections to the countryside around them” 
(Cronon 1991: 349) upon which urban commodities markets have always relied. As a result of 
the different political geographies for environmental and social regulation, economic interests 
have avoided the need to respond to the social and ecological impacts of their actions at the same 
time. Thus, as long as natural and social interests remain spatially and institutionally divided, a 
true urban environmentalism is impossible.  
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how activists build urban environmental 
institutions (i.e. laws, norms, rules and regulations) that embody both social and environmental 
goals. It focuses on two case studies of state-level legislation in New York (2003) and California 
(2008). The New York law, entitled the Superfund and Brownfield Act, established an “area-
wide” strategy for remediating contaminated formerly industrial land and water within cities 
throughout the state. The California law entitled the Sustainable Communities and Climate 
Protection Act mandated more compact regional growth patterns in all major urban areas in order 
to reduce the need for car trips and, thus, reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In each case, 
community development and environmental organizations attempted to bridge the historic divide 
between social and environmental regulatory regimes.  
Within the case analyses, the focus is upon the extent to which inter-organizational 
alignments create conditions for “heterarchic governance”. In the literature on political and 
organizational sociology, the concept of heterarchic governance attempts to explain how 
organizational alignments form across institutional divisions as the result of a temporary 
flattening of traditional power hierarchies formed to deal with conditions of uncertainty. The 
alliances that form during these periods follow a logic which is “neither market nor hierarchy” 
(Powell 1990) and enable established institutional arrangements to be altered (Stark 1996, Jessop 
1997). While this literature has mostly focused on the institutions that govern private 
corporations, a few authors have applied the concept to urban development processes (see 
Grabher, 2001; Jessop, 1998; McQuarrie, 2010). I extend this literature to the study of urban 
environmental policy.  
This research examines institutional change in urban environmentalism. My main 
research questions are: (1) What is the extent of the institutional divide between community 
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development and environmentalism? (2) Why do alliances form across community development 
and environmental interests in land use policymaking? (3) How do these alliances alter land use 
institutions? My argument, in brief, is that the extent to which organizations in the policymaking 
process successfully create heterarchic alliances determines the ability to create long-term 
institutional changes. When community development and environmental issues were 
successfully combined, the traditional power hierarchy around land use regulation was 
temporarily flattened. As a result, the ability to build a single socio-ecological institution that 
supports the emerging work of urban environmental practice increased. The case studies, then, 
highlight how urban environmental planners can recognize, create, and leverage opportunities for 
changing the institutional structure that has resulted in unsustainable patterns of growth.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I develop the background for my study through an 
examination of the history of urban environmentalism along two tracks: community development 
and mainstream environmentalism. At times the two sides emphasized their connections, but the 
history of urban environmentalism in the United States is mainly about the formation of separate 
institutional structures around social and ecological issues. Urban environmentalism, in fact, 
would have seemed an oxymoron to many of the early proponents of each field. The desire to 
undo this divided institutional structure has only recently become incorporated into practice. 
In Chapter 2, I describe in detail my research methodology. I rely upon qualitative 
methods to analyze the institutional challenges that underlie my cases and the dynamics that 
determine outcomes. I utilize archival analysis of federal documents related to the 1970s debates 
over national land use policy to establish the extent of the divide between community 
development and environmental institutions. As well, I employ NVivo software to analyze data 
from sixty-five semi-structured interviews with the heads of organizations and key informants 
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involved with my case studies. Finally, I use survey-based organizational network analysis of the 
groups working to implement the New York State policy to further support and contextualize my 
findings.  
Chapter 3 presents a review of the contemporary literature on urban environmentalism 
and how the fields of sociology, economics, political science and planning have viewed 
governance, institutions and institutional change. The urban environmentalism literature 
demonstrates the extent to which the focus has been on the technical rather than institutional 
challenges faced by planners and policymakers—a direction I seek to depart from by 
incorporating the literature on institutional change. The governance and institutional literatures 
highlight how organizations enforce and maintain established norms, but also how they can be 
vehicles for institutional change. 
In order to demonstrate the extent and effect of the institutional divide between 
community development and environmentalism, Chapter 4 presents the results of my archival 
analysis of the failed effort between 1970 and 1975 to create a national land use policy in the 
United States. Numerous bill proposals were presented in the United States House of 
Representatives and the United States Congress for a national land use policy, some representing 
community development interests, some environmental interests, and some attempting a 
compromise between the two sides. Generally, all proposals sought to encourage states to 
develop growth plans that preserved ecologically sensitive areas and established guidelines for 
regional growth. The failure to pass any of the bills, despite strong support from across the 
political spectrum, expressed the tensions between the newly developing urban and 
environmental federal regulatory structures and, ironically, cemented the institutional divide that 
followed. All efforts since this time to create more sustainable and socially just land use patterns 
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have had to contend with the national institutional structure that resulted from this period. My 
archival analysis relied on materials contained within the National Archives of the United States 
including congressional, presidential, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
and Department of Interior (DOI) documents.  
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings from my two case studies of contemporary state-
level urban environmental land use legislation. Chapter 5 focuses on the creation of California’s 
Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act (2008) and Chapter 6 focuses on New 
York State’s Superfund and Brownfield Law (2003). The key analytic distinction between these 
cases is that the California policy was formulated within the normal political process of bill 
negotiation while the New York policy was formulated through a formal consensus-building 
effort. The different capacities for achieving long term institutional change in each case are 
highlighted. The California case achieved a greater degree of heterarchic alignment amongst 
interests through the policy negotiation process. The two case studies offer important lessons 
about the role that land use planning can play in efforts to build new institutional arenas that 
combine community development and environmental goals. The case studies rely on interviews 
with elite representatives from relevant community development groups; mainstream 
environmental organizations; environmental justice organizations; state, regional and local 
agencies; and private developers.  
Chapters 7 and 8 summarize my findings and present my conclusions. Chapter 7 argues 
that urban environmentalists must not only create conditions of heterarchic governance that 
result in new organizational alignments, but must also link those alignments across functional 
policy silos and multiple geographic scales. Chapter 7 describes the emergent structure of 
counter-institutions in the cases and demonstrates how they enable the multi-scaled and flexible 
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institutional structures that are required. In Chapter 8, I present an overview of my findings. I 
reiterate the evidence that there is an institutional divide which creates distinct policy silos 
between community development and environmentalism at all levels of government in the 
United States. I argue that this divide is the greatest institutional hurdle faced by the field of 
urban environmental policymaking. I then compare the findings from my cases to argue that 
there is a need to create heterarchic governance moments in order to open up the possibility for 
institutional change around land use that reflects the goals of urban environmentalism. Finally, I 
present some limitations of my research and offer some recommendations for policy and 
directions for future research. 
 
1.2| Background 
1.2a: Building in a Divide: Urban Environmentalism in the United States 
The internally contradictory system of land use regulation in the United States is one 
reason why the effort to create sustainable urban development programs by environmentalists 
and urban reformers alike has generally failed at the national level (see Bulkeley and Betsill 
2003). In the postwar years, there was a simultaneous push toward urban sprawl (i.e. low density 
land uses) and pull toward protection of undeveloped areas. On one hand, federal lawmakers 
regularly direct transportation funding, affordable housing, and the home mortgage tax credit 
toward financial and infrastructural incentives for suburban areas to spread further into 
undeveloped land, reducing habitat for other species and potentially contaminating water 
sources. On the other hand, some federal legislators work to continually strengthen laws such as 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) to 
protect these same species and waterways. The legislative forces for growth and environmental 
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protection generally work in isolation from one another with limited capacity to reconcile the 
two conflicting policy arenas.  
Recent efforts to create sustainability policy have met with similar difficulties. On the 
local level, state and city initiatives such as Smart Growth and transit-oriented development 
programs, have highlighted the potential for urbanization to be part of the solution rather than the 
cause of social and ecological degradation. However, localities seeking to implement these 
policies are faced with a larger context of urbanization that is not necessarily conducive to their 
success. A good example of local difficulties is found in efforts to construct New Urbanist 
developments that proclaim to bring both social and environmental benefits but often generate 
car-oriented, socially segregated neighborhoods with little more than neo-traditional design 
finishes to differentiate them from typical suburban sprawl. In this case, explicit social and 
environmental goals on the part of New Urbanist land use planners are blocked by existing 
institutional norms (see Meredith, 2003, p. 487). Unless the institutional issues that lead to 
sprawled and segregated developments are addressed, design-oriented projects like New 
Urbanism cannot succeed in reducing the environmental impacts of urban growth.
5
 
A number of explanations have been developed for why this internally contradictory 
federal system of land use regulation has developed in the postwar years. Urban historians have 
detailed the extent to which certain federal policies, such as the Federal Highway Act of 1956 
and the lending policies of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), worked against 
environmental goals (Jackson, 1985, pp. 163-71; Rome, 2001, Chapter 1). As well, 
environmental economists focus on the role of a decentralized tax structure in making localities 
                                                 
5
 To be fair to the New Urbanist perspective, the need to address institutional issues has been acknowledged in their 
push to change zoning and regional land use goals. However, while the form-based zoning codes that they advocate 
can address some of the local issues with sprawl development, they do not address the more difficult regional 
patterns of development that dictate the types of infrastructure that that locality has accessible. 
10 
 
compete to attract business by loosening their environmental regulations (see Revesz, 1992). 
Other urban researchers examine the role of city boosterism, frontier mentality, and the 
individualistic character of U.S. culture as a cause of unsustainable economic growth policies 
that push cities ever-outward (see for example Beauregard, 2006, pp. 87-97; Cronon, 1991). As 
well, authors have looked at the effects upon land use of a social psychology rooted in a 
generalized sense of fear derived from an increasing sense of risk. They have focused on the role 
that fear of disease, bombs, infrastructural failure, and crime has played in driving people toward 
suburban and fortress-like lifestyles (see Melosi, 2008, Chapter 14; Davis, 1998; Beck, 1992).  
In addition to the political, cultural, and practical roots of the inability to create balanced 
urbanization in postwar America, some authors have explored structural explanations that 
examine the impacts of modern capitalist democracies. These authors highlight the unsustainable 
nature of commodities production and its relation to urban growth (see Cronon, 1991, Part II). 
Harvey (1996) argued that the early development of industrial capitalism characterized by 
demands for commodification of labor, land, and natural resources mixed with Enlightenment 
era notions of man’s domination over nature created a political-economic system that 
subordinates nature to the needs of capital. This system, Harvey argued, remains the ideological 
foundation of contemporary industrial urbanization and constrains the ability of environmental 
regulations to create ecologically sustainable cities. He argued as well that this ideological base 
has become global. He writes (p. 131), “The practice and theory of capitalistic political economy 
with respect to the environment has consequently become hegemonic in recent world history.” 
As several authors have pointed out, this hegemonic position and the worldview it supports is 
often blind to the ecological base upon which society is built (see Foster, 2002). The result from 
a structuralist perspective is that existing institutional arrangements which enforce the norms and 
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rules for urban development are deeply entrenched and will always prioritize economic growth at 
the expense of the natural environment (see Marsh, Porter, and Salvesen, 1996, p. 130) and local 
communities (see Logan and Molotch, 1988).  
However, efforts to challenge the hegemony of institutional priorities that subordinate 
social and environmental concerns to urban growth have always been a part of U.S. politics.
6
 As 
such, environmentalism and urban reform comprise two of the most enduring and contentious 
“counter-attacks” against the urban industrial order.
7
 Though these two political movements 
formed at roughly the same time and have always had threads of connection they comprise 
distinct arenas of action with their own organizational infrastructures. In order to understand the 
challenges faced by the contemporary urban environmental movement it is necessary to examine 
the development of the two major building blocks of the movement: community development 
and environmentalism. 
 
1.2b: From Urban Reform to Community Development: A Brief History 
Since its formation as a modern professional field in the 1960s, community development 
has focused on improving the quality of life for local residents (Halpern 1995, 127-148). The 
mainstream trend amongst community development organizations in recent decades has been to 
leverage public subsidies and resources to enable real estate development and programming in 
disinvested communities, including affordable housing development, cooperative housing 
programs, and communal land trusts. They have done so in order to encourage reinvestment in 
declining neighborhoods that are often inhabited by low-income minority residents. These 
neighborhoods are frequently characterized by concentrated poverty; high crime; poor public 
                                                 
6
 Such efforts are documented as early as Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835 and 1840) 
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health and education outcomes; and deteriorating physical infrastructure. As well, community-
based organizations work to fight displacement of low income residents from areas during 
periods of reinvestment (see Marwell, 2004).    
While the social goals of these programs are imperative to the neighborhoods where 
groups work, limited time and resources means that there is little capacity to consider the impacts 
that urbanization processes have upon the natural environment (see Bradshaw et al., 2005, p. 22; 
Roseland, 2000). The inability to account for environmental impacts has led at times to tense 
relations between community developers seeking to create new affordable developments and 
environmentalists seeking to limit the ecological impact of urban growth.
8
 While there is a 
growing set of interests working to bring the goals of environmental sustainability and 
community development together such as the Enterprise Foundation and the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation (LISC),
9
 the institutional barriers for doing so remain formidable. 
The exclusive focus on quality of life and social issues in cities has not always been a 
characteristic of community development in the United States. Community development 
organizing can be traced back to the late nineteenth century as part of the Progressive Era urban 
reform movement. One of the earliest and most effective strategies was developed by mid-
nineteenth century housing advocates in New York City who were motivated by high levels of 
disease and social unrest that came with the unsanitary and unsafe conditions of poor urban 
ghettos. Nineteenth century housing advocates sought to address these issues by generating ideas 
for healthier models of housing through experimental projects and design competitions. They 
translated ideas for a better urban environment into practice first by engaging sympathetic 
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 For example, in California environmentalists and affordable housing advocates have been at odds for decades over 
the proper location for affordable housing. 
 
9
 Bothe Enterprise and LISC have recently begun green building and sustainable design initiatives. 
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developers and later by improving building codes and statewide legislation which was 
subsequently adopted across the country (Plunz, 1990). Taken as a whole, this nineteenth century 
activism around slum upgrading served as a catalyst for the creation of many thousands of 
improved tenement buildings that came to dominate the built form of early twentieth century 
American cities. It also established a model for community development which combined the 
work of the public, private and civil society actors in an effort to improve social and 
environmental conditions (Davis, 2000). 
Nineteenth century housing reformers were soon joined by other Progressive organizers 
from the Settlement House and the urban parks movements to address social and environmental 
ills in the city. The urban parks movement emerged following the creation of Central Park in 
New York City in the 1850s. At this time, prior to the formation of the professional fields of 
planning, public health and community development, the natural environment and the social 
conditions of the city were indivisible for urban reformers. A leader of the parks movement and 
one of the most prominent early advocates for planning in the United States, Frederick Law 
Olmsted, sought to create parks that were accessible to all classes. In so doing, he infused a 
social agenda of democracy and equality into open space planning for cities. He specifically 
designed his parks as respites from the industrial urban environment, which he thought necessary 
for the health of citizens (Schuyler, 1986). For Olmsted, the trees in the park would “supply the 
lungs with air screened and purified” (Olmsted, 1870, p. 304). He argued for trees to be planted 
throughout the city and for the creation of designated natural areas accessible for the recreation 
of all.  His designs “embraced Romantic ideals—rejecting the grid system in favor of wandering 
paths” (Short and Short, 2008, p. 60). For parks and later playground advocates, the virtues of 
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recreational spaces within the city were self-evident and the ideas and practices that Olmsted 
espoused spread to cities throughout the United States (Walker 2007, p. 60). 
Parks and housing advocates of the late nineteenth century were joined by activists from 
the Settlement House movement in their push to formulate a new set of Progressive Era 
institutions. They worked to ameliorate the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, inadequate 
schools, and poorly maintained infrastructure that resulted from decades of rapid and disorderly 
urban growth. For settlement house workers, social ills were both cause and consequence of 
environmental ills in the industrial city (see Carson, 1990; Corburn, 2005). As a result of their 
comprehensive approach, settlement house workers were among the earliest practitioners of 
several modern professions including social work, community development, occupational health, 
and public health (Abramovitz, 1998; Reisch, 1986).  
The neighborhood-based community organizing strain of Progressive Era activism that 
grew out of the combination of settlement house, parks, and housing activism served as the 
historical root of a professionalized field of community development that eventually became 
linked with the federal policy system (see O’Connor, 1999). Beginning with the Housing Act of 
1949, which authorized urban renewal, slum clearance, and the creation of public housing, the 
federal government funded and organized large-scale “brick and mortar” programs to address 
neighborhood decline in cities. Initially, these programs were an extension of the philosophy that 
developed during the Progressive Era. Inspired by European public housing models, the Act was 
meant to be comprised of both social and physical programs to address the slum conditions that 
Progressive Era activists had been working on for decades. The Housing Act was supported and 
partially designed by housing reformers such as Edith Elmer Wood, settlement house workers 
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such as Louis Pink, and progressive activists such as Catherine Bauer (Von Hoffman, 2000, p. 
301).  
These programs were administered through municipal housing and development 
authorities created to funnel urban renewal money into local redevelopment plans for disinvested 
neighborhoods that were often near downtowns. Soon, though, local political and economic 
interests began to focus their attention on Title 1 of the Act, which provided federal funds and 
legal support for slum clearance. Growth-oriented municipal interests saw Title 1 as a means for 
generating new economic development opportunities. This focus on “urban renewal” began to 
look like “a form of class and race warfare” for those that were being displaced (Von Hoffman, 
2000, p. 318). As urban renewal reached its peak in terms of actual demolition and construction 
during the 1960s, communities began to organize against the top-down directive style of the 
program that was displacing large low-income and minority communities (Halpern, 1995). The 
social goals that Progressive Era activists sought had largely been supplanted by economic 
development goals on the part of local governments. In the end, the localized system of planning 
in United States which Progressive reformers supported as a good governance strategy (see Weir, 
2000) proved to have the unintended consequence of fueling competition for economic growth at 
the expense of low-income and minority communities. 
In this context, the federal government built its next round of large-scale, anti-poverty 
initiatives which centered on political empowerment of disadvantaged communities rather than 
on direct provision of housing. The Community Action Program (CAP) section of the 1964 
Economic Opportunity Act enabled the creation of Community Action agencies based upon what 
came to be a controversial premise of engendering “maximum feasible participation” on the part 
of community residents (see Moynihan, 1969). The CAP program would prove to be politically 
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infeasible, but was essential for developing the organizational base of the modern community 
development field (O’Connor, 1996).  
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed a bill authorizing the creation of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and appointed Robert Weaver as the 
first black cabinet secretary in the nation’s history to head the agency. From the start, urban 
activists sought to use the agency as a way of affecting “the integral relationship of the physical 
and social environments” (Pritchett, 2008, p. 282). Many argued that HUD should be a vehicle 
for empowering communities. While the agency was focused on connecting federal programs 
with local-level planning, it quickly became clear that HUD would be a bricks-and-mortar 
agency that supported development rather than employing the controversial empowerment 
strategy supported by CAP (see Dreier, 1996; Weaver, 1985). One of the first major programs 
developed by HUD was based on a proposal from the President’s Task Force on Urban Affairs 
and Housing for a “Demonstration Cities” initiative. The initiative targeted federal funds to 
selected urban areas for comprehensive renewal. For participating cities that developed 
comprehensive plans, the Demonstration Cities program concentrated resources from urban 
renewal, public housing and other federal programs as well as nearly two billion dollars in new 
funds for redevelopment (Taylor and Williams, 1966).  
The new bureaucracy and professional policy field that HUD created emphasized 
physical development over social programming. By this time, the CAP program had raised the 
considerable ire of many local governments which saw the federal support of local activist 
groups as an intrusion (O’Connor, 1996). HUD did not take control of CAP and the agency’s 
early leaders were not eager to stoke the political fires that the CAP program had created. As a 
result, by the time that President Richard Nixon dissolved the CAP program in 1973, the focus of 
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federally-funded community development programs had moved entirely toward physical 
construction rather than social programming. Nixon was a supporter of devolving federal policy 
down to local levels and did not want to be seen as supporting a system that created difficulties 
for local government. As a result, the organizations supported by HUD and the federal 
community development apparatus were increasingly professionalized with skills that allowed 
them to work within, rather than in opposition to, existing local development regimes (Bratt and 
Keating, 1993).   
Before Nixon came into office in 1969, the Economic Opportunity Act was amended to 
provide grants to non-profit Community Development Corporations (CDCs). CDCs initially 
focused on neighborhood organizing and job creation. They complemented CAP groups, Civil 
Rights organizations, and locally-funded community service agencies, as well as tenant and labor 
organizations. In the post-CAP era, the Nixon administration put CDCs under the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and in 1974 linked their funding to Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBGs) administered by city governments. This forced CDCs to 
become single-purpose service organizations that municipal governments could easily classify in 
their budgets (Stoutland, 1999). By the 1980s, CDCs became the dominant organizational form 
for local community development due in large part to the ability of the leaders of these 
organizations to alter their agendas based upon funding availability (Vidal 1992). At this time, 
CDCs began to adopt the brick-and-mortar focus that federal programming supported and many 
groups became affordable housing development agencies. This organizational structure forced 
groups into narrow niches specialized in physical development—a role far divorced from the 
broad-based activism of the Progressive Era roots of the field.  
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 At roughly the same time that CDCs were adjusting to the CDBG funding structure, 
politically-oriented community based organizations (CBOs) formed a national movement aimed 
at fighting spatially targeted disinvestment on the part of banks. This movement resulted in the 
creation in 1975 of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) which required banks to actively 
lend in all communities in which they did business, including traditionally disinvested areas. 
This requirement eventually led most large banks to create community investment offices geared 
toward meeting CRA mandates. As a result, CRA helped create a new industry of Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) which funnel money to local development projects. 
Large scale CDFIs, such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise 
Foundation successfully lobbied in 1986 for the creation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
(LIHTC) to finance affordable housing construction. The LIHTCs were sold to investors by 
CDFIs specialized in tax credit “syndication” and the proceeds were funneled to CDCs 
(Benjamin et al., 2004). The result of this complex system of financing and development of 
affordable housing has been to make community development a field which leverages resources 
from the public, private and non-profit sectors, but requires a high degree of sophistication and 
specialization to do so.  
The community development field has become embedded in a complex network of civil 
society, state, and private market organizations, as well as intermediaries and “public-private 
partnerships” that connect these organizations (see for example, McQuarrie 2010). Today, high 
profile CDCs such as The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago and The Bedford Stuyvesant 
Restoration Corporation in New York use “creative financing” methods to raise money for 
housing and small business projects forcing them to become increasingly responsive to demands 
for “short-term returns from subsidized property investments” (Weber 2002, p. 529). This 
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situation narrows the focus of these groups, limiting their capacity to include a wider base of 
issues in their everyday work (see Stoecker, 2003). 
The funding connection between community development groups and dominant 
institutions such as state and local governments and banks reveals what DeFilippis and Saegert 
(2008) label the “difficulties and contradictions in the field” (p.43). In part, these contradictions 
stem from the fact that community development groups seek self-determination for 
neighborhoods through institutionalization of pro-community policies. The need to address 
problems even while seeking support from state and market sources means that community 
development organizations must fight to change that which they also must seek to be a part of in 
order to maintain funding. Randy Stoecker (2003) has described the contradictory nature of 
community development as an “organizing versus development” problem. He argues from a 
political economy perspective that CDCs ultimately hurt the cause of participatory governance 
for communities because they internalize the interests of capital and radicalize the more 
politically-oriented efforts at community-based organizing. Meanwhile, CDC advocates argue 
that such groups represent an improvement from private market developers because they offer a 
connection to development processes for poor residents. Stoecker disagrees and asks: “How does 
the CDC interact with the contradictions of urban capitalism? What are the political-economic 
forces impinging on the CDC, potentially hindering effectiveness?” In answer to his own 
questions, he argues that CDCs occupy a middle ground between the interests of use and 
exchange values. This, he says, is the “internalization of the capital-community contradiction and 
it leads to trouble” (p. 5).  
Progressive Era activists might have found it difficult to comprehend the organizing 
versus development debate and the specialized treatment of social issues in the city as separate 
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from environmental issues. Settlement house workers were directly engaged with the producers 
of urban space, and they sought better practices in the form of both more rational physical 
development and higher power regulatory agencies and control. Only in recent years, as the 
environment has become more correlated with quality of life in the minds of urban residents, as 
evidenced by the rise in local environmental stewardship activities and the environmental justice 
movement (described below), has the lost focus on the related ecological and social issues of 
urban life been re-discovered within the community development field. In recent years, 
community groups nationwide have made urban environmental issues part of their agenda once 
again. It is too early to say if this increased attenntion will lead to alterations in the structure of 
the community development field, but it is clear that the divide between urban and 
environmental issues within the profession is breaking down. 
 
1.2c: The Growth of Mainstream Environmentalism  
 When Henry David Thoreau wrote, “With such huge and lumbering civility the country 
hands a chair to the city” (1854, p. 186) he was drawing a direct connection between the 
commodities taken from nature and the urban economies that those commodities supported. As 
Cronon (1991, pp. 55-147) observes, early conservation strategies developed in the mid-
nineteenth century in response to the devastation of forests and grasslands that came when new 
urban infrastructure enabled mass production methods to be applied to commodities production. 
As a result, classic environmentalist concerns from land preservation to species protection and 
pollution regulation are ultimately about how cities and markets for goods and resources impact 
natural processes. Despite this connection between the disruption of natural processes and urban 
growth, mainstream environmentalists have avoided the kind of direct engagement with built 
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form that urban reformers have used to affect social conditions in cities. Rather, conservation 
strategies have focused on preserving rural land and shrinking the geography of allowable 
resource extraction.  
  One reason why the environmental movement has rarely engaged directly with processes 
of urbanization is because of an internal conflict present from the earliest days between the 
protectionists who sought separation of nature from society and the conservationists who sought 
integration of nature with society (Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 19-29). Both perspectives were concerned 
with controlling the extraction of natural resources that fueled rapid urban development during 
the rise of the industrial city in the late 1800s. The problem of how to best go about doing this, 
though, splintered environmental groups into two camps. The protectionists, represented by the 
preservation philosophy of John Muir sought to make large pieces of land off-limits to private 
interests that profited from the destructive spread of resource extraction into the urban 
hinterlands (Walker, 2007, Chapter 1). The conservationist perspective represented by the 
philosophy of Gifford Pinchot sought greater integration of nature and society. The 
conservationists believed in regulating and managing resource extraction processes, rather than 
stopping them altogether (see Meyer, 1997 for more on the political divide between Pinchot and 
Muir). 
By World War I, modest gains in both environmental protection and conservation were 
made, but the environmental regulatory structure had already splintered. At the federal level, the 
National Forest Service adopted Pinchot’s “right use” ideology that sought to develop scientific 
methods for managing forests (Miller, 2001, Part 4). The perspective of this group was 
exemplified by its placement within the Department of Agriculture, which sought to maintain 
rural lands as productive sources of agricultural products. Meanwhile the National Parks Service 
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was formed within the Department of Interior to protect certain large areas of wild lands, mostly 
in the west. The Department of Interior employed both conservation and preservation strategies, 
depending on which natural resource was being regulated, but with regard to land often favored 
protectionism.  
The environmental regulatory system grew rapidly in the early 1900s following passage 
of the Antiquities Act under Theodore Roosevelt. The Act gave the federal government broad 
powers to claim ownership over land for historic or scientific purposes. This enabled the creation 
of a number of National Parks and preservation areas. Aditionally, John Muir’s Sierra Club grew 
into a large and powerful advocacy organization representing the protectionist philosophy for 
environmental regulation that pushed hard for the federal government to leverage its new-found 
powers and set aside increasing amounts of land. The internal contradictions between 
protectionists and conservationists, though, remained. Overall, the division between 
conservation- and preservation-minded activists and policymakers exposed a lack of consensus 
within the movement and “the absence of a clear vision concerning how to contend with the 
forces of urbanization and industrialization” (Gottlieb 1993, 24).  
Between World War I and World War II, the tenure of Harold Ickes as Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s head of the Department of Interior exemplified the entrenchment of both 
protectionist and conservationist interests in the federal government. The trend at the time 
amongst mainstream environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club and The Wilderness 
Society became one of immersion in the policymaking processes. Protectionist groups began to 
lobby the federal agencies as did private utilities and corporations with an interest in accessing 
resources on federal land (Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 35-36). As well, conservationist strategies that 
allowed for managed access to natural resources were especially well suited for creating jobs. As 
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such, they were integral to Roosevelt’s New Deal programs for lifting the nation’s economy out 
of depression (Ickes, 1935). Ickes directed his agency toward land use programs drawn from the 
protectionist agenda such as aiding in the creation of several new national parks. He also 
supported conservationist strategies for managing resources such as large-scale irrigation and 
water filtration projects that violated the protectionist principles (see Koppes, 1983). 
By the post-World War II years and especially by the 1960s, the accommodation between 
preservation and conservation within federal policy that Ickes supported began to erode. Though 
both sides were embedded in the federal institutional structure for land use regulation by this 
time, a divided ideology came to characterize the environmental movement. As a result, when 
postwar suburban development patterns became an issue of concern for environmentalists, 
protectionist and conservationist approaches represented two poles of the mainstream 
environmental movement’s response. There was no consensus over how to best approach the 
question of urban land use and suburban sprawl amongst the mainstream environmental groups. 
Many groups deferred to the “unbiased” opinions of a new class of technical experts and 
professionalized advocates working on their staffs to decide agendas (Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 55-59).  
One of the first efforts to theorize how the technical expertise being developed by 
environmental policymakers could be applied to postwar urban sprawl was put forth by the 
influential landscape architect Ian McHarg in his best-known work, Design with Nature (1969). 
McHarg argued for a new data-driven approach to urban planning and design that incorporated 
theories from landscape architecture. He drew upon the ideas of Scottish urban planner and 
educator Patrick Geddes to design his approach to planning which relied upon an environmental 
inventory of the area being developed. McHarg’s approach focused on protecting the most 
aesthetically pleasing and ecologically sensitive lands, such as floodplains and aquifers. McHarg 
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updated Geddes’ ideas by calling for new mapping technologies and data processing tools to be 
incorporated into the practice of planning. He prescribed a type of urban development that 
started from a data-driven understanding of the natural elements in the area and then built around 
them. One of McHarg’s students, Anne Whiston Spirn (1984), summarized his view: “Cities 
must resist the habit of fragmenting nature…an understanding of the urban natural environment 
should underlie all aspects of the physical design of the city” (p. 262).  
McHarg’s approach emphasized the importance of the technocratic skills developed by 
the environmental movement in the context of postwar urban growth. While he sought to 
establish an informed base of action for the practice of environmental planning, McHarg’s ideas 
have been criticized for not attending to issues of power. McHarg did not address how the 
designs and technologies that he advocated get implemented (see Wheeler and Beatley 2004, p. 
38 for a summary). This approach has also been criticized for the possibility that it can 
exacerbate social inequality (see Marcuse, 1998).  
McHarg’s efforts notwithstanding, urban development was a peripheral concern for 
environmental professionals during the postwar period. Many environmentalists had begun to 
focus on the advancing skills of ecological science and natural resource management. Existing 
federal environmental regulatory agencies including the Department of Interior and the National 
Forest Service were known entities for environmental activists and perceived as the best location 
for environmental policy. These agencies had no expertise or experience with urban policy. This 
would be an important factor in the 1970s debates over the proper administrative home for a 
national land use policy. These debates pitted environmentalists against community development 




 The 1970s are often cited as the time when contemporary environmentalism was born. 
The first Earth Day on 22 April 1970 marked an elevated public consciousness around 
environmental issues (Odum and Barrett, 1971, p.4). That year, the claim by scientists that a 
“global warming” phenomenon which had been documented since the turn of the century was 
accelerating received extensive media coverage. The environmental consciousness that arose as a 
result of this and other realizations about the impacts of human activities on the environment 
highlighted individual responsibility for ecological stewardship through such programs as 
recycling and tree planting (see Fisher et al., 2012). Reflecting this heightened consciousness, 
President Richard Nixon announced environmental regulation as a major issue for his 
administration in his State of the Union address in 1970. That year, he established the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) within his cabinet. The new agency was tasked with 
consolidating the functions of all agencies that dealt with pollution issues. This marked a 
considerable advance for the environmental regulatory community (Flippen, 2000).  
The heightened attention to environmental issues in the 1970s also highlighted and 
intensified the institutional structure that divided social and environmental activism. At the first 
Earth Day in New York City, U.S. Senator Jacob Javitz supported efforts to address 
environmental concerns but reminded the crowd that had gathered in lower Manhattan that they 
should not replace social concerns. He stated, “I am concerned that this fight against 
environmental and physical pollution is so popular that it will [overwhelm] the longstanding and 
equally vital effort to deal with poverty, alienation, racial tensions, the gross inadequacy of 
health services, education, housing, and intelligent population control…” As the reporter 
covering Javitz’s speech commented, he was afraid that “today’s newfound attention to the 
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environment would distract attention from the misery of the poor.”
 10
 Javitz’s comments are 
representative of the competitive politics that characterized arguments over federal policy at the 
time. These competitive politics continued throughout most of the 1970s.  
As well, the 1970s marked a period of professionalization and growth for mainstream 
environmental groups. Many groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council and the 
Environmental Defense Fund, had formed with the intent of having professionalized staff and 
technical expertise that could be easily absorbed within the environmental policy system, now 
led by the EPA. Most organizations, though, still incorporated both “adversarial and system 
management perspectives on how to achieve environmental change” (Gottlieb, 1993, p. 316). 
However, the incorporation of both opposition and management into the workings of 
environmental groups, much like in the community development field, was undone by the 
introduction of more complex policy instruments. By the 1980s, mainstream environmental 
organizations were largely focused on expanding and maintaining complex ecological 
conservation programs. 
In response to the technocratic drift amongst mainstream groups, a new set of 
organizations such as Greenpeace and EarthFirst! formed (Gottlieb, 1993). These groups led an 
ideological “pushback” against the approach taken by mainstream organizations. They did not 
seek to join ranks with the established environmental policy system. Rather, these groups 
became outspoken critics of that system and its muted stance on urban industrial development. 
Today, many of the 1980s counter-establishment environmental organizations such as 
Greenpeace have moved closer to the mainstream. As Pulido (1996) argues, it is hard for even 
these groups, founded on the idea of independence from the established environmental 
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regulatory system, to resist the pressure of adopting the discourse of mainstream 
environmentalism in order to gain access to its institutions and resources.  
Despite the shift toward the mainstream, the division between the older and newer 
environmental groups that expanded in the 1980s as the modern movement began to mature 
demonstrates that the debate between conservationists and preservationists had not gone away. 
Today, environmental sociologists focus on the relative roles of technological and institutional 
change. Specifically, the “ecological modernization” thesis argues that ecological crises created 
by industrialization will be resolved by the producers themselves through new technologies (Mol 
and Spaaragen, 1993). The “treadmill of production” thesis sees this approach as limited, 
contending that technological improvements only ameliorate the worst offenses of industrial 
production (Gould, Pellow & Schnaiberg, 2004). This perspective is taken further by the “death 
of environmentalism” argument that the bureaucratization of the environmental movement has 
diminished capacity to enact fundamental change (see Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005). The 
ecological modernization versus treadmill of production perspectives are an extension of the 
preservation versus conservation debate in the environmental movement. They demonstrate that 
the internal division present at the movement’s founding remains in place. 
 
1.2d: Environmental Justice and Urban Environmental Activism 
Mainstream community development and environmentalism comprise parallel and 
distinct historical tracks of the urban environmental movement in the United States with their 
own organizational infrastructures. With the growth of mainstream environmentalism and the 
modern community development field, the connection between social and environmental issues 
was largely lost due to professionalization and specialization within the fields. As the Settlement 
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Movement gave way to the professions of social work and urban planning and as 
environmentalism became more closely associated with the environmental policy system, the 
potential for action which combined these interests diminished. The organizing-versus-
development debate in community development and the ecological modernization debate in 
environmentalism highlight the push toward ever more narrow specializations, as well as the 
internal counter-push toward wider calls for institutional change.  
Despite the divided historical trajectory of community development and environmental 
institutions, the recent growth of environmental justice advocacy has sought to combine the two. 
Environmental justice groups focus on the racial and social injustices represented by the uneven 
distribution of environmental contamination in cities (Bullard and Johnson, 2000). They tend to 
be represented by small neighborhood-based grassroots groups in marginalized communities that 
seek political power to control their own space. For them, this means more than bricks-and-
mortar programs.  
Environmental justice activists begin from a recognition that the immediate human 
consequences of pollution and environmental destruction in the U.S. are felt most directly by 
poor people of color who live in neighborhoods where environmental hazards and contaminants 
are disproportionately concentrated (see U.S. GAO 1983; Commission for Racial Justice 1987). 
For example, attempts to site a landfill for PCB-contaminated soil in largely African-American 
Warren County, North Carolina in 1982 sparked large, highly publicized protests and gave a 
name to the concept of environmental racism—the targeting of communities of color for waste 
disposal and polluting industrial activity (Bullard 1990). Shortly thereafter, dispersed 
environmental justice struggles coalesced through the groundbreaking 1991 National People of 
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Color Environmental Leadership Summit and revived earlier emphases on self-determination and 
grassroots organizing to realize redistributive urban development outcomes.
11
 
As a result, environmental justice advocates understand the environment to encompass 
the totality of life conditions, including air, water, and access to open spaces and recreation, as 
well as working conditions and wages and the quality of housing, education, health care and 
transportation. They highlight the connection between environmental and community issues. In 
order to engender greater equality and health in cities and simultaneously maintain local control, 
environmental justice organizations such as the cluster of groups that have formed in the South 
Bronx section of New York City have developed a structure of community-based groups that 
mobilize active memberships at the local level and form networked coalitions which sometimes 
then work in dialogue with city and state agencies (see Steil and Connolly, 2009).  
The environmental justice movement’s founding principles resist commodification, either 
through the payment of community benefits before development or monetary damages after the 
fact, seeking instead the transformation of our relations to one another and to the earth. This 
transformation begins at the grassroots, from the particular context of specific everyday lives. 
The movement represents a response to the fact that the internal conflicts between organizing 
and development and between conservation and preservation have limited the political capacity 
of both sides. Environmental justice organizations seek to connect community and environmental 
activism by refusing to reduce their goals to specific brick-and-mortar or conservation actions. 
Rather, they push back against the historical tendency to reduce urban environmentalism to a 
technological rather than an institutional challenge. They disavow those forces within 
community development and environmentalism that would ignore questions of power and 
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politics. In doing so, they are pushing for the institutional divide between mainstream 
community development and environmentalism to be undone. This is a productive push, but it 
remains on the margins of the urban and environmental regulatory world. 
 
1.3| Conclusion 
Through the professionalization and formalization periods in the 1970s and 1980s, 
community development interests were largely unconcerned with environmental issues and 
environmentalists were largely unconcerned with urban community issues. From the earliest 
conservation-versus-preservation debates in the environmental movement and 
professionalization-versus-reform debates in the community development field to the 
contemporary ecological modernization and organizing-versus-development debates, the basic 
conflicts of both movements remain unchanged. In each field, the mainstream has largely 
adopted the position of rationalizing processes of production, while the counter position has 
challenged institutions. Within the counter positions of community development and 
environmentalism, the possibility for connections has been most developed. However, there have 
been occasional shifts in this direction within the mainstream as well. The challenge for urban 
environmentalism is to build a counter-institution that can both rationalize processes of 
development in order to maintain and extend the positive aspects of urban growth and create 
institutional change that reorders land use patterns toward more socially and ecologically 
sustainable outcomes. 
The internal conflicts and contradictions of community development and 
environmentalism created by the close association of both fields with a professionalized policy 
system ensure that neither can expand its purview beyond narrow regulatory approaches. As a 
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consequence, urban policies that seek to transcend the fragmented structure of local zoning 
regimes which favor economic development have been forced to either focus on social or natural 
issues. Within this system, discrete federal and state environmental land use policies and discrete 
federal and state social urban policies work across localities. However, effective urban 
environmental activities, by definition, must bring these together. The institutional structure of 
U.S. land regulation militates against such an outcome. 
Only now, as the science of climate change has increased the urgency of addressing the 
roots of environmental degradation has the practice of reserving social issues for the urban 
professions while leaving matters of nature as non-urban issues begun to be questioned within 
mainstream practice. While urban environmental practice has developed new technologies and 
strategies for building cities, it has not developed a concomitant understanding of how to alter 
the specific institutional norms that direct urban development so as to bring about the adoption of 
these technologies and strategies on a wide scale. As the quote at the beginning of the chapter 
states, “The barrier to building a better city is not lack of knowledge, but refusal to apply that 
knowledge” (Whiston Spirn, 1984, p.263). What type of knowledge is considered pertinent to the 
method for constructing cities is decided by the institutions that govern land use, which are 
comprised of rules, norms and laws for human behavior. In order to overcome the barrier that 
Whiston Spirn points out, urban environmentalists must alter what Davis (2000, p.5) calls the 
“building culture,” or “system of knowledge, rules, procedures, and habits that surrounds the 
building process” in American cities. That is, they must change the institutional context of 





Chapter 2: Research Design 
Methods and Framework for Analysis 
 
 
2.1| Statement of Strategy 
In order to understand better how to meet the institutional challenges of urban 
environmental planning and policy, this dissertation addresses three questions: (1) What is the 
extent of the institutional divide between community development and environmentalism? (2) 
Why do alliances form across community development and environmental interests in land use 
policymaking and what are the barriers to such alliances? (3) How do these alliances alter land 
use institutions? The first question is viewed through an historical lens; while the second and 
third explore contemporary policy issues. 
In order to address these questions I employ two primary methods. First, I examine the 
extent of the institutional divide between community development and environmentalism 
through analysis of archival materials relevant to the debate over national land use legislation 
that took place between 1970 and 1975. This policy debate occurred at a pivotal moment in the 
professionalization process of the two fields. Both sides had recently achieved increased formal 
recognition within the federal policy apparatus through the creation of new federal agencies and 
were re-formulating their roles within the public sphere. In this context the debate over who 
should administer the National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA) moved from a simple issue of 
bureaucratic turf to a struggle over whether land use policy should focus on community 
development or environmental issues. The Act did not pass but the 5-year-long political battle 
that it sparked defined the federal role for community development and environmental interests 
relative to land use policy. In the end, it solidified the institutional divide between these two 
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sides and this divide is now a key institutional challenge for contemporary urban environmental 
policymakers. 
In order to examine how policymakers are dealing with this institutional challenge I 
analyzed two contemporary case studies that involved the formation of alliances across 
community development and environmental interests. I focus on the formulation and early 
implementation of two recently enacted state-level policies: (1) the New York State Superfund 
and Brownfield Law (2003) and (2) California’s Sustainable Communities and Climate 
Protection Act (2008). For these case studies, I utilize data from semi-structured interviews, 
network surveys, public workshop observations, and public documents. 
The New York case involved a formal consensus-building process that attempted to align 
the interests of community development; environmental; private business; local and state 
government; and regional planning advocates. In this case, the alliance between community 
development and environmental groups broke down. The California case did not involve a 
formal consensus building process. Rather, it is representative of a typical political negotiation 
between community development; environmental; private business; and local, regional, and state 
government interests. An alliance between community development and environmental groups 
did form in this case and has been maintained. I examine why the outcomes were different in 
terms of political alliances between community development and environmental interests in each 
case. I also analyze what these alliances have meant for the early implementation of the two 
policies. 
The archival analysis describes the institutional challenges faced by urban environmental 
planners and the contemporary case studies describe strategies for resolving these challenges 
within the policymaking process. The historical data show the extent to which urban 
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environmental policy is being created within a divided institutional context. As well, the case 
studies demonstrate that certain organizations and strategies are especially well suited for 
constructing bridges across community development and environmental interests. This study 
presents an analysis of how these organizations and strategies operate within the context of urban 
environmental policymaking.  
 
2.2| Archival Analysis  
Historical analysis enables a better understanding of contemporary society. As Brundage 
(2002) argues, “history…deals with the past, but it conceptualizes a past in constant dialog (sic.) 
with an ever-advancing present, one that responds to new questions and reveals fresh insights 
into the human condition” (p.2). Often, historians seek to expand the manner in which people 
conceive of a given circumstance by highlighting overlooked details or giving voice to 
underrepresented individuals. In doing so, historians select the stories that they think are 
important for contemporary readers to hear, and those stories are always shifting. As well, 
because the stories that historians tell enable a better understanding of the present, they provide 
crucial lessons for policymakers. Especially in a rapidly developing area such as urban 
environmental policy, it is essential to understand the historical context that shaped the 
contemporary limits for action in order to expand the possibilities for the field.  
An essential historical moment that defined the limits of environmental land use planning 
in the United States occurred in the early 1970s when Congress, the President, and federal 
agency staff debated the possibility of creating a national land use policy. Though these debates 
did not result in passage of legislation, they did generate a national conversation about the proper 
role for social and ecological regulation with regard to land use in postwar America. The 
35 
 
institutional challenges faced by urban environmental planners that were solidified in the wake 
of the national land use policy debates are the focus of the history presented here.  
In order to understand better the institutional structure that formed around community 
development and environmentalism in the 1970s, I performed a detailed analysis of federal 
archived documents dated between 1970 and 1975 related to the National Land Use Policy Act. I 
used largely untapped archival materials from the two federal urban policy entities active at the 
time, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Urban 
Affairs Council (UAC). I also draw from Richard Nixon’s staff files contained in his presidential 
library collection and a limited number of documents from this period that have been made 
available in the archives from other federal departments, including the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), which oversaw development policy for towns with fewer than 5,500 
people, and the Department of the Interior (DOI), which managed federal lands. Documents from 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were not reviewed because the agency was too new 
at the time of the national land use policy debates to be an active participant.
12
 Even the 
legislators that sponsored the creation of the EPA did not propose it as the lead agency.  
 
2.2a: Archival Data Collection 
The archival data reveal how the day-to-day discussion around the proposal for a national 
land use policy shaped the subsequent institutional structure for land use regulation. The relevant 
memos, policy analysis reports, and other materials housed in the National Archives II facility 
expose the dynamics of the ongoing conversation amongst agency staff members and 
policymakers engaged with shaping national land use policy. The documents demonstrate the 
                                                 
12
  See memorandum for Bud Krogh: Decision Paper and Draft Bill on National Land Use,” Nixon WHCF Subject 
Files, Egil Krogh 1969-73, Folder: Land Use Policy, Box 15. 
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“backstage” aspects of the federal policymaking process. That is, they provide a sense of the 
internal conversations that lay behind the “front stage” public presentations from the federal 
agencies and policymakers (see Goffman, 1959). The frustrations, assumptions, and 
opportunities that shaped the actions of those involved are evident. As well, the archived 
materials make clear the biases built into the conversation that heavily impacted the roles 
ascribed to community development and environmental agencies. 
The bulk of materials reviewed consisted of correspondence and subject files from 
Samuel C. Jackson, HUD Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Planning and Development. 
Jackson was in charge of coordinating HUD’s response to the many national land use policy 
proposals being developed in Congress and he was integral to the development of HUD’s own 
proposal for a national urban growth policy. These materials cover the period between 1970 and 
1973. UAC materials consisted of documents contained within the Richard Nixon White House 
Central Files (WHCF). The documents are primarily correspondence memos from Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who served as Assistant to the President on Urban Affairs when Nixon 
first entered office and authored an influential report entitled “Toward a National Urban Policy.” 
These memos are dated primarily between 1969 and 1970. The dynamics of the period between 
late 1973 and 1975, when the final two votes on a national land use policy occurred, are mainly 
understood through external policy analyses created by advocacy groups and secondary 
literature.  
All materials were analyzed with close concern for the role of environmental issues in 
HUD’s formulation of policy at the time. Correspondence files from Assistant HUD Secretary 
Samuel C. Jackson and President Richard Nixon’s White House Central Files provided extensive 
material demonstrating the shifting political positions of urban and environmental interests at the 
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time. The Nixon documents consist of numerous correspondence memos with the President and 
his staff on the topic of urban growth and land use policies.  
All archived documents including relevant memos and policy reports are contained 
within the National Archives II facility in College Park, Maryland and were accessed over the 
course of 45 days of active search between 4 January 2010 and 30 March 2010. The documents 
come from 55 boxes (out of 90 reviewed). After completing training for access to the document 
room, I reviewed the topic headings listed in catalogs for HUD, DOI, USDA, and Presidential 
staff archives. I requested all boxes with headings potentially related to national land use policy. 
Headings were often vague and many boxes that were requested did not contain relevant 
documents (in all 35 boxes contained no relevant materials).  
As Hannam (2002) argues, a system for determining the relevance of materials within an 
archive is essential to successful data collection. Once I made the box requests, I employed three 
criteria for determining relevance. First, I selected all documents that pertained to the proposed 
National Land Use Policy Act or the National Growth Policy. Second, I selected all documents 
that pertained to the role of community development or environmental interests relative to land 
use policy. Third, I selected all documents that pertained to arguments about the proper role of 
the federal government in land use planning processes. By employing these criteria across all 55 
relevant boxes, I selected approximately 600 pages of documents to be electronically scanned on 
site from their original hard copies. After electronically scanning each selected document, I 
labeled them with citation information following Hill’s method (1993, p. 72) that included 
name(s) of correspondents, date, box, folder, collection and archive location. As well, I carefully 
noted the location of all documents that stood out as especially important and took 27 typed 
38 
 
pages of notes with citations on the important themes that emerged as I read through the 
documents. 
 
2.2b: Archival Data Analysis 
 The greatest benefit of doing archival analysis in social research is that the documents are 
“non-reactive.” Archive materials are an unobtrusive measure of social phenomena because the 
observer is removed from the events being studied. As such, there is no awareness on the part of 
the author of the archived materials that the documents being produced are part of social 
research. Thus, the potential for results to be skewed as a result of such awareness is removed. 
This is an advantage over other types of social data, such as interviews, where respondents are 
aware of the study and their reactions may skew their responses, altering the results (see Bryman, 
2001, p. 370). 
Despite the non-reactive aspect of archival materials, all archival data contains biases. 
While the documents analyzed in this study are almost certain to be authentic (i.e. not forgeries 
or alterations) given that they are sourced directly from the federal archives, they are reflective of 
the biases of the people and agencies that created them. They are an expression of the social, 
political, and intellectual perspectives of those involved with creating federal urban policy in the 
early 1970s. As Bryman (2001) observes, state documents of this sort “can be interesting 
precisely because of the biases they reveal” (p. 375). In order to leverage this aspect of state 
documents, it is necessary to interrogate each document’s purpose. As Hannam (2002) writes, 
“Few textual sources offer instant answers and certainly many are not reliable sources of ‘truth’, 
though all provide evidence. Any researcher needs a degree of skepticism when faced with any 
text” (p. 190). Some questions that must be asked of archived texts are: “Who wrote it, and why? 
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Who is the audience for this source?...Is the document propaganda? Is it polemical?” (Berkin and 
Anderson, 2003, p.40). As well, in the context of policy studies, it is important to ask if the 
document had a strategic political purpose in the policymaking process.  
In order to account for these biases, I combined a qualitative content analysis of the 
selected materials with limited hermeneutics. Qualitative content analysis, also referred to as 
textual analysis, is closely aligned with “coding” strategies that might be used in grounded 
theory research (see Bryman, 2001, p. 381; Hannam, 2002, p. 192). Grounded theory allows the 
important theoretical points of a case to emerge in the process of analysis rather than entering the 
case with a pre-determined theoretical model (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Qualitative content 
analysis is one technique for developing grounded theory. It calls for breaking the materials up 
into pre-defined categories, but allowing for other important themes to arise in the analysis. The 
role of qualitative content analysis is to simplify the materials according to discrete themes but 
also to draw attention to the overall narrative that the data reveals.  
The pre-defined coding categories I employed reflect the three criteria for selection of 
materials from the archive. These initial coding categories were purely functional, dividing the 
documents by topic. Within the first criteria focused on the various policy proposals, I created 
two “sub codes” for documents concerned with the National Land Use Policy Act and for 
documents concerned with the National Growth Policy. Within the second criteria focused on 
community development and environmental relations, I coded the documents according to 
whether they were related to the role of environmentalists, community development activists, or 
both. I also marked documents according to whether the relations they referenced were 
cooperative, combative, or neutral. Within the third more general criteria, I created a number of 
sub codes for each of the federal initiatives related to land use policy at the time. These included 
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categories for several HUD and UAC programs, such as model cities, urban renewal, land 
banking, and regional planning. 
In addition to the coding of documents according to topic, I recorded 27 pages of type-
written notes meant to reflect the narrative story that the documents expressed. The notes 
focused as well on ordering events referenced in the materials chronologically. In all, they 
highlighted the main themes that re-occurred throughout the archived materials and the 
connections between themes. The role of the notes was to look beyond the functional topics of 
each document in order to outline the connections between the ideas expressed in the document 
and other documents that had been reviewed. In other words, my notes served to describe how 
the archived documents were related. The focus within the narrative that these connections 
expressed was on the manner in which community development and environmental issues were 
characterized by the various policymakers.  
In order to expose the biases embedded in the materials, I employed a hermeneutic 
strategy. Hermeneutics have been used for textual analysis by literary and biblical scholars for 
many years. The method involves an attempt on the part of the analyst to derive the meaning of a 
text from the perspective of its author (see Bryman, 2001, p. 382). It “emphasizes the 
sociocultural and historic influences on qualitative interpretation. It also exposes hidden 
meanings” (Byrne, 2001, p.1). I identified the authors’ perspectives by contextualizing their 
words within the known events of the time. For example, HUD was developing its response to 
the national land use policy proposals in the context of a pervasive anti-urban sentiment among 
the American populace that followed a series of riots in cities throughout the country during the 
1960s. As well, the national land use policy debate took place within a long historical context of 
a model of federalism that allocated land use regulation to the states.  
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I also considered more specific contexts. For example, George Romney, the director of 
HUD at the time, was growing increasingly disillusioned with the Nixon administration during 
his early tenure in the position—a fact not made public at the time, but that serves as important 
context for some of Romney’s statements. Additionally, Samuel C. Jackson spent most of his 
career before the 1970s working to implement fair housing programs. This background 
inevitably worked its way into the strategies for national land use policy that he favored, though 
it was not explicitly acknowledged by Jackson. These and other pieces of context highlighted in 
chapter Four are employed as filters for the archival information.  
Overall, the qualitative content analysis allowed me to classify and understand the major 
topics covered in the texts relative to one another while the hermeneutic analysis allowed me to 
account for at least some of the potential biases within the texts. The HUD, DOI, and presidential 
communications analyzed in Chapter Four provide insight into the strategies used by community 
development and environmental advocates to interact with the other interests involved. They also 
demonstrate the extent to which the institutional divide between these two sides was solidified. 
The contemporary case studies discussed below operate within the institutional environment that 
the national land use policy debates in the 1970s helped to create. As such, the archival study is 
an essential background to the institutional issues addressed in the case studies. 
 
2.3| Case Studies  
This study employs a small-N comparison of efforts to create urban environmental 
policy. As Abbot states, small-N comparison “aims to keep the interpretive and narrative subtlety 
of ethnography and narration but to add to these an analytic strength that echoes standard causal 
analysis” (2004, p. 58). In other words, the first aim of these case studies was to provide context-
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specific knowledge of the process by which the policies were formulated. The second aim was to 
use their similarities and differences to strengthen claims the findings.  
The small-N case study approach is common, especially among authors focused on urban 
politics. Castells (1983) used a small-N comparison of organizing efforts in four cities to develop 
his view on urban social movements. DeFillipis (2004) used a comparison of three models of 
collective ownership to develop his theory of how communities can gain control of forces 
dominated by global capital. Ferman (1996) examined two case studies in Chicago and 
Pittsburgh in order to develop her theory of how communities can effectively challenge the 
economic development agenda of local organized elites. Additionally, Berry, Portney, and 
Thomson (1993) examined five core cities in order to develop a theory of local participatory 
governance in the United States. Small-N case studies have also served as the foundation for 
several dominant urban political theories. For example, Dahl (1961) examined the distribution of 
political resources among several citizen groups in 1950s New Haven, Connecticut in order to 
develop his theory of pluralism in urban governance. Stone (1989) later countered Dahl’s 
assertion that the pluralist model had replaced elite domination of urban development in his 
study of several interest groups in Atlanta for the development of his regime theory of urban 
politics.  
In all, small-N case study analysis is a well-established means of combining empirical 
understanding of unfolding events in cities with the accumulated theoretical knowledge of how 
cities work. As Castells writes, the case studies are “used as steps in the process of theory 
building and are chosen with this purpose in mind” (1983, p. 339). Castells’ characterization of 
theory-building as an ongoing process rather than a destination for scholarly research is adopted 
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here as well. The point of these case studies is to refine existing theoretical knowledge rather 
than provide a singular explanatory model.   
Ideally, small-N analysis allows Mill’s (1843) method of difference to be employed. Mill 
argued that analytical leverage could be added to case studies “by comparing instances in which 
the phenomenon does occur with instances in other respects similar in which the phenomenon 
does not” (Mill 1843, book 3, Chapter 8, as quoted in Odell, 2001, p.167). In comparing 
differences across cases and using case studies as a “step in the process of theory building,” the 
benefits gained by the small-N approach are maximized. Mill’s method of difference highlights 
the “analytic strength that echoes standard causal analysis,” which Abbot (2004, p. 58) 
described. 
However, the small-N case study method has well-known limitations. Both the internal 
and external validity of small-N case studies have been questioned. The concerns over internal 
validity question the ability of researchers to draw causal connections between the various 
factors described within the cases. Whenever a claim that one event led to another is made by a 
researcher there is a question of whether that causal claim is correct and of how the connection 
can be proved. A number of other variables outside of the view of the researcher may have 
caused the event. That is, every dependent variable that a study seeks to explain may be caused 
by a number of independent variables. Consequently, authors of explanatory case studies must 
take care to examine as many independent variables as possible before making any causal 
claims, and some of those independent variables may be interacting to create the observed effect. 
While all independent variables cannot be realistically examined, identifying several proximate 
variables increases the explanatory power of the case. 
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Yin (2003) described the iterative process of explanation-building that accounts for 
numerous independent variables in order to make causal links within a case study. He writes, 
“case study evidence is examined, theoretical propositions are revised, and the evidence is 
examined once again from a new perspective” (p. 122). In this iterative manner wherein theory 
and empirical observations are juxtaposed, the list of possible explanatory (i.e. independent) 
variables can be expanded and the relation between the independent variables and the event 
being explained can be better understood. Yin writes as well that in this process it is important to 
consider rival explanations as a means for testing if your causal link is in fact the strongest: “The 
gradual building of an explanation is similar to the process of refining a set of ideas, in which an 
important aspect is…to entertain other plausible or rival explanations…the objective is to show 
how these [rival] explanations cannot be built, given the actual set of case study events” (p.123).    
Another common critique of social science research, including case study analysis, is the 
threat to external validity, or extent of “generalizability” of the findings. Both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in the social sciences have been questioned for the limited ability to 
determine if the findings from the analysis are representative of what one might find in other 
examples across time and space (Bryman, 2001, pp. 282-283). Flyvberg (2001) argues that 
generalizability can be considerably increased by “strategic selection of critical cases” (p. 77). 
However, he also argues that “formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific 
development, whereas ‘the power of the good example’ is underestimated” (p.77). Most 
researchers who rely on case studies recognize that even carefully selected cases with clear 
differences for comparison may not be fully representative. This is why case studies must be 
considered as steps in the process of theory building, as Castells specified. The purpose of this 
type of analysis is not to treat the case as a “sample of one drawn from a known population,” as 
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might be the goal for quantitative analysis. Instead, case studies “generalize to theory rather than 
to populations” (Bryman, 2001, p. 283). 
 
2.3a: Delimiting the Case: The Organizational Field 
The outcome of interest in this study is not the creation of new state laws per se, but the 
effect of efforts to change the laws and the institutional reorganization that the laws signify. That 
is, I am primarily interested in the extent to which the processes that led up to and followed from 
the creation of the legislation in each case have altered the relevant actors in land use decision-
making. As such, durable re-alignments in the organizational fields are the key variables to be 
measured.  
The organizational field is the “set of organizations linked together as competitors and 
collaborators within a social space” (Marwell, 2007, p. 3). As Dimaggio and Powell (1983, p. 
148) argue, “The structure of an organizational field cannot be determined a prioiri, but must 
defined on the basis of empirical investigation.” This is because organizational fields are 
comprised not only of networks of like actors, but of all organized interests concerned with a 
given field of action. As such, organizational field analysis is concerned with both the extent of 
connectedness amongst organizations (i.e. the organzational networks) and the structural 
equivalence of groups. Structural equivalence refers to the extent to which two organizations 
have the same connections within the network (see White et al., 1976 for an early description of 
the term). Therefore, two organizations with identical networks would have complete structural 
equivalence, and a more connected network would have a stronger structural position than a less 
connected network. An example of an organizational field in the context of urban policy is 
provided by Lowndes (1998) in his study of British urban regeneration projects. The 
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organizational fields Lowndes studied were comprised of business, community and not-for-profit 
agencies, and governmental bodies. Each had different incentives for competition or 
collaboration based upon their position within the field of organizations involved in the urban 
regeneration programs. 
As Lowndes’ study emphasized, the organizational field is a meso-level social space 
which operates between individual social actions and the larger structural rules of society such as 
those generated by a system of capitalist democracy (see Hall and Tolbert, 2005, p. 81). As such, 
organizational fields allow researchers to view a social space that operates in-between the effects 
of structure and agency. The organizations considered to be within a field share a common set of 
rules and interests, but are competing for position. As McQuarrie describes it: “field analysis 
directs us to be attentive to the presence of an organized competitive struggle over a monopoly 
on the rules that will define what positions will have the most access to field-specific forms of 
capital and capital exchange with other fields” (2009, p.127). 
The goal of field-level analyses in these cases is to understand how shifts in relations 
between community development and environmental organizations affect the positions of those 
organizations vis-à-vis all others within the field. Such analysis is especially useful in this study 
because it includes all organizations, regardless of sector, associated with the creation or 
implementation of the policy. All organizations that are a part of the organizational field in each 
case share an interest in shaping the policy proposal in some way. Of course, specific goals for 
the policy diverge and this drives competition for position within the field. Organizational fields 
associated with policymaking are contentious in this regard as positions of a given organization 
shift from policy to policy.  
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In this study, the organizational field includes all groups involved with the formulation 
and early implementation of each policy. I did not identify the entire organizational field, as this 
would have involved several hundred groups in each case. Rather, the included organizations 
were identified through interviews with key informants and review of the legislative documents. 
Interviewees were asked to identify other organizations with whom they worked as well as any 
that were specifically excluded from the core set of negotiations. Both those who were directly 
involved in the negotiations and those who became involved during the implementation phase 
are included in the analysis. Through this method, the “core” negotiators were identified and 
interviewed as well as a sample of all other interests involved. 
This research examines how collaboration and hierarchy work to systematically order 
organizational fields of urban governance and shape planning outcomes. It looks at outcomes 
that produce planning innovations through collaboration between interest groups seeking to 
improve their position. The emergent and entrenched interests within the fields exist in a 
conflicted state of mutual dependence, where the separate demands for innovation through new 
collaborations on the one hand and maintenance of the hierarchical power structure on the other 
form a constant push and pull within processes of policy creation.  
 
2.3b: Case Selection 
Case selection for this study follows Flyvberg’s criteria for selection of comparable 
“critical cases.” Flyvberg writes that the selected cases must have “importance in relation to the 
general problem” (Flyvberg, 2001, p. 78). The general problem I sought to analyze was how 
policymakers might meet the institutional challenges of urban environmentalism in the context of 
land use regulation. Through archival analysis I identified a primary institutional challenge 
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within the field to be the divide between community development and environmental interests. 
As such, I selected cases focused on land use wherein attempts to form bridges across 
community development and mainstream environmentalism were evident.  
The cases I selected were, in several respects, extreme examples that are subject to Mill’s 
method of difference. The cases are extreme examples because the conclusion could be made 
that if an effect is not observed in these examples then it will not be observed anywhere. As well, 
the cases are subject to Mill’s method of difference because they represent a successful and 
failed instance of building institutional bridges across community development and 
environmental interests. The California case provides an example where strong connections were 
formed across community development and environmental actors. The New York case provides 
an example where these connections largely failed to form. The outcomes of each case can be 
compared in order to test how the creation of such alliances impacts the types of changes that are 
possible within local land use planning processes.  
The cases were initially selected on several variables. First, I sought to analyze state-level 
urban environmental policies, as the state is the widest political arena where such policies are 
possible given the history of federal legislation. A state-level urban environmental policy was 
defined as a policy (legislation or regulation) that directs urban development throughout the state 
for the purpose of achieving environmental goals. Second, in order to select critical cases, I 
sought policies where community development and environmental interests had clearly been 
engaged in the formulation process. At this point, it was difficult to ascertain whether alliances 
across these interests had formed or not. As such, this was not a variable in my initial selection 
phase. Rather, I waited to do more in-depth examination of this dynamic until after I selected my 
cases. Third, I sought cases where the policy had been enacted recently enough that respondents 
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could easily recall events but not so recently that the political dynamic would still be so charged 
as to make it difficult for respondents to speak freely. This temporal variable was defined as a 
policy that had been passed at least one year but no more than ten years prior to my analysis. 
Five potential case studies that met these criteria were identified through a search of media, 




Table 2.1. Initial Candidates for Case Study Analysis. These five cases were identified as policy actions that met the 
first three selection criteria: 1) statewide urban environmental policy, 2) community development and environmental 
interests were engaged with the formulation phase, and 3) the policy had been enacted in the past 1 to 10 years. 
 
 
State Policy Topic Year Passed 













New Jersey Pinelands 
Wastewater Service 
Regulations 




Texas Updates to 
Renewable Portfolio 
Standards 
Alternative energy 2005 







In the second phase of case selection, I narrowed the five potential case studies according 
to two criteria. First, I sought cases in states with comparable environmental voting records in 
order to establish that the cases had similar political dynamics. In order to identify these trends, I 
examined the “Environmental Scorecards” from each state over the past ten years. The 
Environmental Scorecard is a national report on the voting records of congressional 
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representatives from all states. The scorecard is released each year by the League of 
Conservation Voters (see League of Conservation Voters (LCV), 2000 through 2010). Four of 
the states with policies being considered for inclusion in this study were pro-environmental. 
They consistently scored in the top quintile in terms of states whose representatives voted for 
national environmental policies. They included California, New York, New Jersey, and 
Wisconsin. Texas consistently scored in the bottom quintile. Figure 2.1 shows the results by state 
for 2010, which is representative of the trend throughout the decade. Because of its uniquely 
anti-environmental policy position, I removed Texas from consideration. The political context in 
Texas was too different from that of other states being considered, possibly complicating the 
ability to compare across cases.  
 
Figure 2.1: Results from the 2010 League of Conservation Voters Environmental Scorecard. The percentages refer 
to the number of times that Senators representing each state voted in favor of proposed environmental legislation in 
the prior legislative session. The trend observed here generally holds throughout the prior decade. Source: League of 






The next criteria used for case selection combined demographics and geography. Of the 
four remaining states, the 2010 Census population estimates show that New York and California 
were the most similar. Since 1950, the two states have been among the top five most populous 
and, since 1980, have contained the two largest urban regions in the country around New York 
City and Los Angeles (United States Census Bureau, 2010, p. 6). As well, despite the fact that 
both states have vast agricultural areas, they remain among the densest in the country. While the 
two states are relatively politically liberal compared to others in the country, the divided urban 
and rural geography within them has created a similar political split. In New York, the upstate-
downstate dynamic generally divides politically conservative and liberal populations, as does the 
interior-coastal distinction in California. At times, both states have been so divided across these 
geographies that there have been calls for secession.
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New York and California, as well, have highly centralized legislative processes. In New 
York, the “three men in a room” represented by the Governor, speaker of the House and speaker 
of the Senate, largely control which bills move forward and which do not (Lachman and Polner, 
2006). In California, the “big five” consisting of the Governor, Assembly Speaker, Assembly 
Minority Leader, Senate President Pro Tempore, and Senate Minority Leader can nearly always 
assure their caucuses’ votes on an issue because they control campaign financing and committee 
appointments (California Department of Finance, 2006). Additionally, New York and California 
both have large economies—since the 1950s, they have represented two of the top three largest 
budgets in the country (Dorish, 2011). As well, both states have had budget gaps in the wake of 
the most recent economic downturn that are among the top ten largest in the country (McNichol, 
Oliff, and Johnson, 2011).  
                                                 
13
 For example, there was a 2011 proposal from the “inland empire” counties and San Diego county in California to 
form a new state, known as Southern California. 
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The second phase of case selection established a choice between comparing policies in 
New York and California or in Wisconsin and New Jersey. New Jersey and Wisconsin, with 
much smaller populations and no large cities are also comparable to one another but have very 
different demographics and political contexts than New York and California. Another round of 
selection criteria helped to decide which comparison would likely yield the best data for 
understanding the institutional challenges of urban environmental planning. 
The third phase of case selection focused on identifying which two-state comparison 
would provide the best critical case example as well as which would provide the most 
differences for comparison of outcomes. New York and California were selected as the best 
comparison of critical cases. If state-level urban environmental policy cannot be successful in 
areas such as these with highly urbanized and pro-environmental populations as well as strong 
economies, then it is unlikely to be successful anywhere. For this reason, New York and 
California represent critical cases. As well, initial analyses implied that these cases would 
provide an opportunity to employ the method of difference. The California case seemed to 
provide an example where strong connections were formed across community development and 
environmental actors. In the New York case, these connections largely failed to form. 
 
2.3c: Brief Description of Cases  
The legislative actions that are the focus of this study were selected as recent laws that, 
according to media and scholarly literature, involved a successful and a failed instance of 
building institutional bridges across community development and environmental interests. They 
are not the only urban environmental laws passed in New York and California in recent years, 
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but they are among the most prominent. Each law was developed in response to a specific 
legislative context.  
California’s Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act (known as “SB 375” 
for its senate bill designation) is the land use component of a series of greenhouse gas reduction 
laws passed in the state in recent years. Most notably, SB 375 follows from California’s 2006 
Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, which empowered the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions statewide. The bill was first 
proposed by two environmental advocacy groups: the California League of Conservation Voters 
and the Environmental Defense Fund. The law mandates that metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs) align regional plans for transportation and housing in order to create 
incentives for people to drive less (Barringer, 2008). The law seeks to create more compact 
growth that reduces sprawl and leads to less demand for personal car trips by requiring all large 
regions in the state to develop a regional plan approved by CARB that computer models show 
will result in reduced air emissions.  
In order to reduce emissions through more efficient land use the bill required a number of 
established political interests in the land use regulatory community to align their agendas. The 
bill incorporated amendments to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) which 
requires large developments to show that they will not cause significant environmental harm, the 
Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) procedures which set affordable housing mandates 
for localities, and the Regional Transportation Planning (RTP) process which determines the 
allocation of state and federal transportation dollars. Additionally, the planning strategy required 
in SB 375 is influenced by the regional planning model from the Sacramento Metropolitan 
Planning Organization known as the “Blueprint”.  
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As SB 375 addressed transportation, housing, local zoning, and environmental review 
laws, the bill had to reflect numerous interests. Four distinct networks of organized interests 
operated in the negotiation process. During the development of SB 375, these smaller networks 
of interest mostly worked in isolation, but connected periodically through intermediaries. These 
networks are the environmental groups (referred to by those involved as “enviros”), the local 
counties and municipalities (“locals”), the private developers (“builders”), and the affordable 
housing groups (“housing”). The networks of enviro and housing organizations both shifted their 
traditional positions in order to align their interests. The coalition between community 
development and environmental interests that formed greatly impacted how all other actors in the 
negotiation related to one another. As well, this coalition was maintained in the early 
implementation of the bill.  
A similar set of interests was involved in the New York case. The Brownfield 
Opportunity Area (BOA) program that was part of New York State’s Superfund and Brownfield 
Law (2003) was first proposed by community development activists. It creates a mechanism for 
including community-based organizations within formal land use decision-making processes 
related to brownfield redevelopment. The program, administered by the New York Department 
of State, designates community representatives for areas with high concentrations of actual or 
possible industrial contamination to take the lead in formulating an area-wide strategy for 
redeveloping brownfields in their community. Conformance with this strategy is then a 
prerequisite for receipt of some of the public financial incentives that help private developers 
remediate and redevelop brownfield sites.  
While community development and environmental organizations were able to form 
alliances around the area-wide planning strategy called for in the BOA program, the coalition 
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dissolved around the issue of what level of cleanup should be required at individual sites. These 
organizations did not shift their traditional policy positions in this instance. As such, the 
hybridized norms of practice that formed in California did not form to the same extent in New 
York. The New York case offers an example wherein durable bridges across the “siloed” 
institutional structure that divides community development and environmental interests did not 
take shape.  
The cases represent a successful and failed instance of building institutional bridges 
across community development and environmental interests. The California case provides an 
example where strong connections were formed across community development and 
environmental actors. The New York case provides an example where these connections largely 
failed to form. The outcomes of each case can be compared in order to test how the creation of 
such alliances impacts the types of changes that are possible within local land use planning 
processes.  
In addition to the types of coalitions that formed, there are a number of other differences 
between the cases. First, the status of the regulatory agencies was different in each case. In 
California the entrance of CARB into the land use arena represented a major change with 
unknown repercussions. CARB was a new agency with no track record which indicated the types 
of actions it would take with regard to land use. This meant that the entrance of CARB into the 
land use regulatory field created a great deal of uncertainty amongst the various stakeholders. In 
New York, the existing state agencies were likely to remain in charge of the brownfield program. 
Thus, there was far less uncertainty involved in the New York case. In California the question 
was how the new program for regulating land would be developed and in New York the question 
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was whether the existing regulatory structure would be formalized. These were different 
questions with regard to the degree of uncertainty. 
There are three additional differences between the policy formulation processes that took 
place in each state. These include who initiated the policy, the target geography of each policy, 
and the role of consensus building efforts. The California policy was formally initiated by 
mainstream environmental interests. The bill was drafted by representatives from the California 
League of Conservation Voters and the California chapter of the Environmental Defense Fund. 
The mainstream environmental interests, and especially the League of Conservation Voters, took 
the lead on negotiating the terms of the policy. In New York, the legislative actions were 
initiated by community development interests.  
In addition to the different interests that initiated the policies, the two laws examined here 
necessarily focused on different target geographies. SB 375 in California focused on the regional 
level. From the start, it was meant to encourage regions to plan for smaller urban footprints. It 
was primarily about pushing sprawl in from the edges. The BOA program in New York 
expanded the existing site-based focus of brownfield legislation to an area-wide approach, but 
remained focused on the neighborhood scale. The rest of the New York brownfield law remained 
focused on individual sites. The local focus reflected the community development goals of 
creating redevelopment strategies that would allow for urban growth to occur at the city center 
and would benefit existing residents. 
The different target geographies coincide with different administrative structures for each 
case. Both policies required a new environmental plan to be created by sub-state organizations, 
but the California case relied upon existing Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to 
create the plan at the regional level, while the New York case relied on newly created 
57 
 
Brownfield Opportunity Area (BOA) organizations to create the plan at the local community 
level. Thus, when the state and sub-state levels are both considered, each case relied on a mix of 
new and existing administrative agencies. The different scales at which each case created new 
agencies (community versus state) allows for comparison of the institutional impacts of scale.  
In order to work out the roles of the new agencies that regulate land use in each case, the 
different interests that initiated the policies approached consensus building amongst the various 
stakeholders in very different ways. The mainstream environmentalists that shepherded SB 375 
through the formulation phase had extensive state-level lobbying experience. They had no 
expectation or imposition of consensus from the start. Rather, the California process was a 
traditional policy negotiation. In contrast, the New York case was designed from the start as a 
process that would require full consensus from all participants. The stakeholders were selected 
from a variety of competing interests and the intention on the part of the organizers was to find 
common ground within a consensus building effort. Thus the New York case was the inverse of 
the California case—it began with a consensus process and then turned to a more traditional 
policy negotiation whereas the California case began with policy negotiation followed by a 
consensus process.    
The case studies examined in this analysis are examples of programs that reflect the new 
intellectual context of urban environmental planning. Climate change policy was the impetus in 
the California case and smart growth policy was the stated framework for the New York case 
(see Kass et al., 2011). These cases represent both sides of the land use equation for reducing 
sprawl development. On one side, the California law utilized regional planning to create more 
compact growth patterns that would reduce the urban footprint of regions and thus limit the 
ecological impact of growth. On the other side of the equation for reducing sprawl, the New 
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York case involved the use of area-wide planning for brownfield redevelopment as a means for 
enabling urban growth in existing downtowns. This approach sought to maximize the potential of 
urbanized land and remediate prior ecological damage.   
Both the differences and similarities across the cases enable lessons to be learned for 
urban environmental policymaking. In comparing the different outcomes within these critical 
cases where the basic demographics and political dynamics are similar, it is possible to draw 
lessons about the minimum conditions needed to create effective urban environmental policy. 
The ability to form coalitions across community development and environmental interests in 
each case serves as a central difference for comparison. Table 2.2 below demonstrates the 
differences and similarities in each case. 
 
2.4.| Case Analysis 
Given the focus on the extent to which urban and environmental interests formed 
coalitions, it was essential to treat the case studies as a means for “discovering empirical 
relationships” amongst organizations concerned with urban environmental policy (Lipjhart, 
1971, p. 683). The methods described below were intended to serve this purpose. The data that 
each method generated was cross-referenced in order to determine the findings presented in 








Table 2.2. Comparison of Cases. The table below lists the major similarities and differences between the New York 
and California case studies. 
 
Attributes Cases 
 California: Sustainable 
Communities and Climate 
Protection Act 
New York: Superfund and 
Brownfield Act 





among the top five most populous 
states since 1950 
among the top five most populous 
states since 1950 
 
Large Urban Centers 
 
 
Los Angeles is one of the two largest 
urban regions in the country 
New York City is one of the two 
largest urban regions in the country 
 
Environmental Voting Record 
 
 
consistently scored in the top 
quintile in terms of states whose 
representatives voted for national 
environmental policies 
consistently scored in the top 
quintile in terms of states whose 






interior-coastal distinction generally 
divides politically conservative and 
liberal populations 
upstate-downstate dynamic 
generally divides politically 






development activists; private 
developers and businesses; and local 
and state government representatives  
environmentalists; community 
development activists; private 
developers and businesses; and local 





Highly centralized legislative 
processes, prior legislation made it 
clear that a new law was needed 
Highly centralized legislative 
processes, prior legislation made it 
clear that a new law was needed 





Coalitions between community 
development and environmental 
interests formed 
Coalitions between community 
development and environmental 





CARB was a new regulatory interest 
in land use 
DEC and DOH were existing 
regulatory interests in brownfield 
redevelopment 
 
Role of Consensus Building 
 
 
Consensus building efforts occurred 
at the end of the process after the 
open political negotiations had 
achieved basic alignment of interests 
Carried out as a formal consensus 
building process from the 
beginning—sought to achieve an 
alignment of interests in the process 
 
Who Initiated the Policy 
 
 
Initiated by mainstream 
environmental groups 










2.4a: Semi-structured Interviews 
To develop my cases, I interviewed 59 (27 in New York and 32 in California) 
representatives from community development groups, mainstream environmental organizations, 
environmental justice organizations, state and local agencies, and private developer groups 
involved in formulating the policies. The interview protocol and analysis was approved by the 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board (Protocol Number: #IRB-AAAF1648) on 26 
May 2010. All interview data was gathered with the understanding from respondents that 
findings would be reported anonymously. In each case, the goal was to interview all key 
negotiators in the policy formulation as well as a representative sample of groups that were 
engaged in the early implementation of the policy. In California, I interviewed heads of 
organizations identified in the publicly available legislative analysis as both “in favor” and 
“opposed.” In New York, I interviewed the heads of organizations that were members of the 
“Pocantico Roundtable,” which served as the impetus for the strategy that was later turned into 
law. In both cases, I also used a snowball sampling method to identify other organizational 
leaders that were mentioned by respondents as being especially engaged in the formulation 
process of the legislation. In order to analyze the implementation of the policies I also 
interviewed elite representatives of all of the New York City “lead” BOA organizations at the 
time of my study, and members of the Regional Advisory Task Force (RTAC) in California. 
These respondents represent the earliest efforts to translate the new policies into action. All of 
the interviews were scheduled in advance and lasted approximately one hour.  
I utilized a semi-structured interview method. This method allowed respondents to 
identify the issues of importance to them within an established research frame (Cohen and 
Crabtree, 2006). The research frame was reflected in the interview protocol developed in 
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advance to guide but not dictate discussion (see Appendix 1, Interview Protocol). This semi-
structured interview method has been employed in numerous studies of social phenomena and 
has been used widely within urban research. For example it was the primary method in studies of 
attitudes toward urban green space (Balrama and Dragicevic, 2005), the use of climate 
knowledge in urban planning (Eliasson, 2000), and the social construction of home ownership 
(Gurney, 1999), among others.  
Semi-structured interviewing is a widely deployed method because it is flexible and 
provides enough structure to allow detailed issues to be explored and compared across 
respondents. The flexibility arises from the emphasis on exploring the “markers” provided by 
respondents (see Weiss, 1994, Ch. 3). Markers are issues that respondents mentioned as being 
important to them, but that they did not elaborate on in their initial response because they were 
uncertain if the topic was related closely enough to merit further consideration. The researcher 
can decide if a marker is within the bounds of the substantive research frame. As long as it is, the 
respondent can be asked to elaborate. This leads to a structure where the issues that each 
respondent stresses as having the most impact upon their actions become the focus of the 
interview, in addition to the questions that appear in the protocol.  
The possibility of the flexible structure of semi-structured interviews to create data that 
lacks specificity and cannot be compared across respondents is counter-acted by the use of an 
interview protocol. The protocol guides the discussion and sets the bounds of the substantive 
frame (see Bryman, 2001, p.315). For my interview protocol, questions were related to the 
development of the legislation and how groups interacted in the formulation and implementation 
processes. It covered how the organizations came to be involved in the legislation, who the 
organizations worked with, how they worked with them, and what strategies were used to pass 
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the bills. In the interviews, I also asked respondents how the specific strategies for each policy 
were developed, what the biggest conflicts were, and what their biggest hopes going forward 
were. As well, respondents were asked if the strategies and political coalitions they were a part of 
or observed were novel in terms of their experience. These questions allowed me to understand 
how observed alliances between community and environmental interests altered the governance 
networks that directed local land use decision making by offering evidence of the effect these 
coalitions had upon the normal relationships amongst organizations associated with the policy. I 
was able to understand from various perspectives if a different inter-organizational dynamic 
characterized this process and, if so, why.   
In terms of analysis, all interviews with the main negotiators of each policy were 
transcribed. Transcribed interview data was then coded into several categories including: (1) 
environmental issues, (2) internal organizational issues, (3) inter-governmental issues, (4) inter-
organizational issues, (5) planning and development issues, (6) process and history of the bill, 
and (7) social equity issues. Each of these seven main categories was then further sub-coded into 
smaller categories that focus on the organizational relationships and strategies specific to each 
case. For example, the environmental issues category was classified according to whether they 
were for, against, or neutral on the legislation. It was also sub-coded according to issues that 
represented a shift in the environmental position, and issues that were urban in nature. 
 In general, the coded data identified common themes that serve as the foundation for the 
theoretical assertions developed in Chapter Seven. A common criticism of the coding approach 
to analysis of interview data is that it fragments the data, possibly disconnecting it from the 
context and narrative flow of the respondents’ words (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Coding, 
however, allows trends across interviews to be more easily identified and substantiated. It allows 
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the researcher to go beyond simply offering a venue for the respondents’ voice to be heard. 
Rather, in coding the data for its main themes, the researcher is able to theorize and contextualize 
interview (and other qualitative) data (see Bryman, 2001, p. 400).  
A certain narrative coherence for each case is maintained by portraying events in 
chronological sequence according to their description across multiple interviews and multiple 
data sources. In this manner, the presentation of the case results from a “triangulation” of data 
(Yin, 2003, pp. 97-99). In addition to gathering interview data from multiple respondents across 
all pertinent sectors in the organizational fields, the case studies relied upon three other types of 
data to corroborate and contextualize the interview data. These included review of public and 
internal documents; and observation of public meetings.  
 
2.4b: Document Review 
Information gained in interviews was corroborated through the investigation of public 
documents including review of memos, legislation, policy analyses, agency reports and media 
coverage. All interview respondents were asked to provide any possible documentation for the 
processes they described. Seven memos sent to others involved in the policy negotiations (four in 
California and three in New York) and numerous policy reports (14 in California and eight in 
New York) were identified. As well, the draft and final legislation in both cases were retrieved 
from public databases. Finally, especially in the California case, extensive news and advocacy 
media sources were reviewed in order to provide a broad context of the various perspectives on 
the legislation.  
 As with the archival materials, documents in case study analyses must be reviewed with 
their biases in mind. Given that the case studies I analyzed are both centered on legislative 
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processes, the biases of authors are usually quite clear. Most documents argue from a particular 
perspective, which they state upfront. For example, social equity organizations wrote an 
influential memo to the task force charged with the early implementation of SB 375. This memo 
stated the position that the authors represented in the beginning. In other words, for most 
communications, because bias was assumed by the sender and receiver, it was generally made 
explicit what position was being supported. This was typical of all documents used in both case 
study analyses. 
 Other considerations of the use of documents in case studies are that they may be 
incomplete or inauthentic (see Creswell, 2003, pp. 187-188). It is possible that I missed 
documents that were not identified by respondents as important but would have been useful for 
this analysis. However, I did have a substantial amount of information from numerous 
perspectives. All reports and memos were complete. Draft and final versions of the legislation 
were available in both cases. All documents that were identified in the interviews as essential to 
understanding the cases were obtained and complete. 
 
2.4c: Public Meeting Observation 
Observation of public meetings was a part of both case study analyses, but played an 
especially important role in the California case study. The California state government has an 
unusually large amount of openly accessible information about government processes available 
on the internet. The California Air Resources Board, for example, has a video recording of all 
public hearings related to SB 375 available for download (CARB, 2011). All of the meetings 
were downloaded (approximately 43 hours of video). Each of the hearings was viewed in its 
entirety. The same coding categories used to code the interview data were used to code the 
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public hearings as well. Specifically, all mentions of how the various interests were relating in 
the process were notated and described in detail. Since several respondents from the interviews 
appear in the hearings as well, their comments were checked for consistency. While some minor 
factual statements appear to have been recounted incorrectly in the interviews, there were no 
major inconsistencies.   
In addition to the recorded public meetings in California, I attended seven information 
and planning meetings for the New York case (see Appendix 3 for complete list). These 
meetings were held by early sponsors of the brownfield legislation in order to inform potential 
BOA sponsors and brownfield redevelopers of what the legislation is meant to do and to update 
interested parties on the next steps in brownfield advocacy in New York state. Detailed notes of 
the proceedings and comments were taken at meetings. Overall, the meetings were informational 
and positive about the legislation, but there were occasional disputes. These disputes were 
especially of interest because they seemed to reflect longstanding differences of opinion. The 
meetings are also interesting because of who they did not include. While developers and state 
representatives were often present, there was no visible presence on the part of mainstream 
environmental activists at any of the meetings. 
  
2.5| Conclusion 
The rigor applied to a case study analysis determines its validity. Validity of case study 
findings must be constantly evaluated on several levels. The construct validity, or adequacy of 
the operational measures being used, was addressed through the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (i.e. interviews, documents, public meetings) from which a chain of evidence was 
established. I corroborated accounts from interviews with statements from other interviews as 
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well as review of public legislative and journalistic accounts. The internal validity, or legitimacy 
of the causal relationships, was established primarily through analysis and quotations of the 
content of interviews and archived documents. As such, readers can judge the extent to which 
interpretations of the data are correct. As well, rival explanations to my conclusions were 
addressed. The external validity, or the extent to which the study’s analytic generalizations apply 
on a larger scale, was established through the extensive historical frame for my study as well as 
the small-N case study model. While the findings from two case studies cannot be generalized on 
a wide scale, when they are considered as a step in the theory building process, common trends 
and threads of action are important indicators of how the urban environmental field is meeting its 
institutional challenges.  
The data gathered for this study positions the findings to be able to speak to the literature 
on urban environmental planning, consensus building in planning processes, institutions, and 
institutional change. A review of each of these literatures is presented in the next chapter. The 












Chapter 3: Literature Review and Theoretical Frame 
Urban Environmentalism, Institutions, and Institutional Change 
 
3.1| Overview 
 In order to contextualize the findings presented in Chapters 4 through 6, this chapter 
reviews three areas of literature. The first section reviews the contemporary literature on urban 
environmentalism and presents a case for why environmental land use planning is a state-level 
issue. This section describes the current knowledge in the field and the failed history of federal 
efforts to create land use policy. The second section outlines the planning and urban social 
science literature on organizations, institutions, and institutional change. This section provides 
necessary background for the theoretical literature on heterarchic governance presented in the 
third section. Heterarchic governance is one way of understanding processes of institutional 
change and serves as the theoretical frame used to formulate the findings of this study. 
 
3.2| Urban Environmentalism and State-level Land Use Planning 
 Urban environmentalism covers issues presented in a broad set of literature on history, 
planning, sustainability, and local activism. This literature demonstrates that urban 
environmental land use planning in the United States is best conceptualized as a state-level 
political issue given the parochial focus of localities and the limited capacity of the federal 
government to enact land use regulations. This section supports this point with a detailed history 
of efforts to create a national land use policy. The most recent effort in the 1970s is examined in 





3.2a: Literature on Contemporary Urban Environmentalism 
 The intellectual context of urban environmental planning has been changing in recent 
years. Authors have identified dozens of American cities that since the 1990s have “invested 
significant amounts of time, resources, and social capital in the development of initiatives to 
pursue some form of sustainability” (Portney, 2003, ix; see also Wheeler, 2008; Fitzgerald, 
2010). These include efforts toward sustainable development, smart growth, transit-oriented 
development, urban environmental stewardship, new urbanism, environmental justice, and local 
climate change planning. The new intellectual frame for city-building has led to specific 
programs for “green” jobs, climate change plans, and urban sustainability reports (see Maclaren, 
1996; Kousky and Schneider, 2003: Renner et al., 2008). While the effects of these efforts have 
largely been confined to the municipal level, their collective impact has been to expand the 
intellectual justification for urban environmental planning (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010).  
The growing literature on urban environmentalism can be classified into four categories: 
urban environmental history; urban environmental planning; sustainability; and local 
environmental action such as stewardship and environmental justice organizing. Each sub-
literature describes the institutional challenges faced by the urban environmental movement, but 
none focus on the overall characteristics of the urban environmental policy system that must be 
addressed in order to meet those challenges. Where strides have been made in this direction, the 
literature has mostly highlighted the role of discourse in shaping institutions. While useful, it is 
necessary to augment this approach with organization-level political perspectives in order to 
outline strategies that urban environmental planners, policymakers, and activists can use to 
manage processes of institutional change. 
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First, urban environmental history has become its own specialization. It seeks to 
“combine the study of the natural history of the city with the history of city building and their 
possible intersections” (Melosi 1993, 2). Cronon largely founded the specialization of urban 
environmental history with his book, Nature’s Metropolis (1991), on the development of 
Chicago and its hinterlands. On a global scale, this type of history might cover the period as far 
back as the initial development of cities, but it generally begins in the United States with the 
growth of the early 19
th
 century industrial city. Writers such as Cronon (1991), Walker (2007), 
Gandy (2002) and Colten (2005) have analyzed various urban regions with a focus on the means 
by which the process of turning natural resources into commodities has fueled the growth of the 
city. These authors and others within urban environmental history literature view cities as 
markets for flows of commodities. They focus on how the development of the hinterlands and 
trade routes around a city determined the built form and ecological impact of individual cities.  
For example, Cronon (1991, Chapters 2 and 3) observes that early conservation strategies 
developed in response to the devastation of forests and grasslands in regions such as the greater 
Chicago area. The environmental impacts were rapidly increased when new urban infrastructure 
such as grain elevators and railroads enabled mass production methods pioneered in the 
manufacturing sector to be applied to basic commodities like wheat and lumber. Walker (2007) 
details the process of rural devastation that led to regulation in the San Francisco Bay Area. He 
writes of the connection between the growth of cities and the growth of early conservation 
organizations that would ultimately force the private corporations driving urban growth to 
respect ecological processes. Similarly, Colten (2005, Chapter 1) demonstrates the means by 
which natural hazards guided the way that New Orleans residents thought about regulation of 
growth in their city. 
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Urban environmental history provides an important institutional context for urban 
environmental planning. The literature demonstrates that classic environmentalist concerns, from 
land preservation to species protection and pollution regulation, are ultimately about how cities, 
and the markets for goods and resources that cities support, impact natural processes. Historians 
in this area have shown as well how the continued understanding of natural processes shaped 
institutions that guide development. They have pointed out that the underlying system of regional 
economic development relies on maintaining the political separation between “the city” and “the 
countryside.” Urban markets are based upon production processes that developed in the 
industrial era with extensive external costs, such as air and water pollution. These costs, 
however, remained outside the purview of local regulators as long as urban markets and wider 
systems of resource extraction were dealt with as separate political issues. The institutional 
divide between social and natural regulatory regimes that urban environmentalists must contend 
with is based upon the historic political division between urban growth and resource extraction.  
As such, this literature demonstrates why the city and the country, the natural and the 
social, the urban and the environmental exist in separate political-economic and psychological 
spheres and why distinct institutions have formed around them (see especially Williams, 1973; 
Benton-Short and Short, 2008; Light, 2009). The separation served the needs of urban boosters 
that sought growth at all costs (Cronon, 1991). Literature in this area reminds us that the 
separation is artificial; it is more for enabling the expansion of markets than reflective of the 
reality of production processes. Urban environmental history demonstrates the institutional base 
of urban environmental practice and implicitly raises the question: what would cities be like 
without this artificial separation?  
71 
 
Second, the literature on contemporary urban environmental planning focuses on 
professional practice in specific areas of concern such as solid waste and water management, 
green building, ecological footprints, and air pollution. It views urban environmentalism as a 
localized response to the negative environmental effects of urban development (see Marcotulio 
and McGranahan, 2007, Ch.1; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). The focus on the city-
level response to such far-ranging impacts as greenhouse gas emissions, habitat fragmentation, 
and concentrations of industrial contaminants in soil and groundwater draws attention to 
technological improvements that might reduce the negative environmental impacts of urban 
growth.  
This literature generally seeks to enable planners to find “solutions to the problems of 
negative environmental spillovers from urban activities…and to foster positive environmental 
spillovers produced by land uses such as wetlands and parks” (Miller and De Roo, 2005, 1). In 
other words, it seeks to develop discrete strategies for internalizing the long history of ecological 
impact from cities. This literature gives urban planning practitioners interested in protecting the 
natural environment a “policy toolbox” to work with (Kousky, 2005). However, it does not 
address the institutional issues which must be resolved in order to implement technological 
solutions on a wide scale.  
A portion of the urban environmental planning literature has applied the physical science 
perspective of conservation biology and ecology to urban areas. This literature has focused on 
modeling urban ecosystems in order to develop strategies for limiting the effects of cities upon 
ecosystem services and biodiversity. For example, Grove and Burch (1997) argue that the 
patterns of settlement in the 1920s and 1930s provide an understanding for how to regulate 
human-ecosystem interactions in urban regions. As well, Wadell (2002) describes the emerging 
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field of computer modeling being employed by planners to understand how and where growth 
will occur in order to direct it away from ecologically sensitive areas. Additionally, a number of 
researchers have focused on how habitats for various species can be constructed within the city 
(see Beier and Noss, 1998; Bryant, 2006). 
In addition to the urban ecology and biodiversity literature, urban environmental planning 
research has focused on the development of specific interventions that make cities “greener.” 
These include “brownfield” remediation, green roof technologies, and energy efficient “green 
building” practices. For example, Lynch and Moffat (2005) describe “bioremediation methods 
for removing heavy metals from contaminated “brownfields” through the use of certain plant 
species that naturally extract metals. Del Barrio (1998) presents a model of the cooling capacity 
of green roofs as a mitigation measure for rising temperatures in urban areas due to trapped 
atmospheric gases, a phenomenon known as urban heat island effect. As well, the United States 
Green Building Council (USGBC) has sponsored numerous research projects that refine the 
techniques employed by developers to reduce the ecological impact of individual buildings (see 
USGBC, 2000).  
There have been efforts as well to develop regional strategies for environmental planning 
under the rubrics of “Smart Growth” and transit-oriented development. While smart growth 
planning can include a wide range of activities, it generally involves efforts to create compact 
development that utilizes urban land efficiently and limits the number of vehicle miles traveled 
(Greenberg et al., 2001). The notion of smart growth planning as a regional strategy for creating 
more compact development has been embraced by numerous public agencies at all scales of 
government (see United States EPA, 2003). The focus of the smart growth agenda is to create 
transit-accessible nodes of walkable development (Handy, 2005; Downs, 2005; Frank and 
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Kavage, 2006). As a result, smart growth is closely linked with the notion of transit-oriented 
development (TOD) (see Cervero, Ferrell & Murphy, 2002, p. 2). TOD has been defined as, 
“Development within a specified geographical area around a transit station with a variety of land 
uses and a multiplicity of landowners” (Salvensen, 1996, p. 37). 
While the technical and scientific knowledge developed in such areas as ecology, 
modeling, green development, and regional planning have aided in the understanding of how 
cities can be made more environmentally sound, it has not focused on how the institutions that 
guide urban development are changed in order to adopt this knowledge on a wide scale. Implicit 
to this literature is an understanding of institutional change resulting primarily from 
technological change. For example, while Randolph (2004, p.3) acknowledges that managing the 
relationship between society and the environment “depends on technology, human ingenuity, and 
the values and norms of society,” his textbook for environmental planners focuses heavily upon 
technology and human ingenuity. While the role of institutions is an important background for 
Randolph, the bulk of his text focuses only on technological and policy interventions. Bromley 
(1989) points out that the reliance on technological change as the primary driver of institutional 
change is tautological because institutions themselves determine the costs and values of the 
adoption of new technologies. Thus, urban environmentalists should not expect that discrete 
strategies for implementing technical advancements alone will lead to better cities. The field 
must address as well the underlying power dynamics that guide the adoption of new 
technologies. 
Third, the growth of urban environmental planning has occurred alongside the rise of 
“sustainable” urbanization as a global ideal for many urban planning, design, and policy 
professionals (Brand and Thomas, 2005). Sustainability literature has been generated in 
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numerous disciplines including ecology, planning, economics, and political science over roughly 
the past twenty years. Urban sustainability is a term with broad application, but most uses refer 
to the Brundtland Commission’s definition posed in 1987, which states, “Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” This literature views cities as integrated 
elements of their wider bioregions. It often has a normative goal of making sustainability 
mainstream (i.e. Newman and Jennings, 2008, p.7).  
The sustainability literature has broadened quite a bit in recent years and the points of 
entry for institutional analyses are numerous. Cedric Pugh (1996) argues that the diversity in this 
area has led to a division between analysts that look at economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. This divided analytic structure is reinforced by a focus within sustainability 
studies on the “green agenda” of ecological issues rather than the “brown agenda” of urban 
issues. As well, while sustainability studies have paid attention to institutional structure, they 
have tended to focus on an economistic view of institutions as essentially market mechanisms, 
rather than a social view of institutions (see Solow, 1991). The literature on sustainability that 
does look at the social construction of institutions consists of either vague calls for collective 
movements (i.e. Lerner, 1993) or a specific focus on narrow policy tools that only indirectly 
affect the institutional norms of urban growth, such as the “ecological footprint” technique of 
Wackernagle and Rees (1996; see also Maclaren, 1996). As a result, the utility of these studies to 
those interested in resolving the institutional challenges of American urban environmentalism is 
limited. 
While authors have recognized the need to address the institutional context of urban 
environmentalism, few have discussed the specific processes by which the challenges in the field 
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can be met. Graham Haughton (2007) has described the discursive language which supports and 
reinforces an institutional divide in efforts to make cities sustainable. He argues that simplistic 
dualisms plague “the ways in which policy domains are discursively constructed” (Haughton 
2007, 279). He describes the tendency within the literature to present society and nature; town 
and country; mega-city and small settlement as distinct entities. He also criticizes as overly-
simplistic the tendency to describe cities only as environmentally destructive. Haughton argues 
that these claims ignore the fact that the dualisms he describes are all inter-related outcomes of 
complex social systems. While Haughton correctly highlights false dualisms and over-
simplifications, his approach is representative of much literature on discourse and citizen 
participation in this area. It offers ways of framing the problem, but does not offer specific tools 
for bringing about institutional change that accounts for existing power dynamics in urban 
development (see also Petts and Brooks, 2006).  
Authors writing about best practices have also focused on the institutional challenges that 
arise from diffuse political agendas. Harriet Bulkeley (2006) argues that local policymakers 
necessarily re-conceptualize best practices to suit their own political needs. As such, Bulkeley 
finds that the logic of urban sustainability lacks a central organizing principle and is always 
subject to the “competing governmentalities” that shape urban development. Bulkeley correctly 
highlights the limits of the expansive literature on sustainability best practices geared toward 
practitioners (see also Newman and Jennings, 2008; Portney, 2005). While these local practices 
might have been successful at steering a particular condition toward a more environmentally 
sustainable direction, they did so under certain local political circumstances that, because of the 
lack of an established institutional frame, must be reconfigured at new sites.  
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Connor and Dovers (2004) offer an explicit argument for the need to develop an 
institutional frame for urban sustainability. They directly address the “purposive institutional 
change” needed for sustainability to be adopted as an international goal. In order to do so, they 
develop a list of common institutional challenges to the widespread adoption of principles of 
sustainability. Like much of the literature on the institutional issues of sustainability, Connor and 
Dovers tend toward a narrow analysis of discourse and a wide focus on international issues (see 
also Frank, 1967; Meadows et al., 1972). In the end, they do not go much beyond literature 
which reduces all institutional issues to questions of discourse.  
Finally, the literature on local urban environmental action, including stewardship and 
environmental justice, has drawn attention to the challenges of the field at the local level. The 
contemporary urban environmental stewardship literature examines organizations and 
individuals that work to conserve, manage, monitor, advocate for, and educate the public about a 
wide range of issues related to sustaining the local environment (for more details on this 
definition of stewardship, see Fisher et al., 2007). Stewards serve as direct managers of small 
parks and gardens, street trees, wetlands, and other sites that provide ecosystem services 
including air and water filtration, micro-climate regulation, drainage, and recreational/cultural 
benefits, among others (Barthel, 2006; Bolund and Hunhammar, 1999; Boyer and Polasky, 
2004). They also form a crucial component of the urban environmental governance structure by 
networking with other local groups and citywide advocates and agencies.  
The stewardship literature, in combination with literature on social-ecological systems, 
has begun to examine the institutional challenges of integrating environmental management into 
urban governance systems (see Connolly et al., forthcoming). It has also focused on combining 
community development and environmental action (see Svendsen and Campbell, 2008). This 
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literature is developing a framework for contextualizing individual actions of stewardship within 
larger systems of governance. Stewardship literature is also focused on the inter-organizational 
challenges inherent to urban environmental governance (see Fisher et al., 2007). However, 
authors in this area have only looked at the local municipal context and have not focused 
specifically on processes of institutional change. 
Finally, the environmental justice literature has focused on the fact that “environmental 
issues have emerged in the context of urban and industrial change” (Gottlieb 1993, 240) and that 
this should lead the environmental movement toward questions of social justice. Environmental 
justice research has focused on confirming the over-representation of minority groups in 
environmentally hazardous areas (i.e. Bowen et al., 1995; Jerret et al., 2001) and the history and 
structure of the movement (i.e. Bullard, 1990; Bullard and Johnson, 2000; Towers, 2000; 
Schlosberg, 2007). While the environmental justice movement has drawn increasing attention to 
the connection between community development and environmental issues, it has not dealt with 
how the social and environmental perspectives are integrated.  
The ideas that inform the intellectual context for urban environmental planning are not 
new, but the extent to which they guide urban policy is a recent development. Strategies for land 
use planning that focus on ecological preservation and social equity have been around since 
Howard’s (1902) Garden Cities of To-Morrow and include the Progressive Era parks and public 
health initiatives of the early 1900s (Fine, 1972; Corburn, 2005) as well as McHarg’s (1969) 
Design with Nature. These earlier efforts continue to inform the work of urban environmental 
planners. They inspired experiments with the built form of cities and suburbs but did not provide 
a counterforce for the unrestrained sprawl of postwar urban regions. Several cities were planned 
in accordance with Howard’s vision (Mumford, 1961, pp. 516-524), and the Garden Cities 
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concept inspired master planning efforts of the 1960s (Jacobs, 1961, pp. 23-29). As well, 
Progressive Era activists successfully advocated for numerous parks and housing improvements, 
but soon splintered their activities into various professionalized fields (Fine 1972; Plunz, 1990). 
A clear frame for urban environmental planning never arose in any of these efforts. McHarg’s 
ideas have directed the design of specific developments, most notably in Woodlands, Texas (see 
Forsyth, 2002). These projects, though, are unique—more outliers than the norm for urban 
development. 
The literature on urban environmentalism focuses on the historic, technological, 
discursive, and localized aspects of the institutional issues involved. The literature does not 
specify a view of institutional change which accounts for the wider social and political context 
within which technological and discursive innovations occur. In order to develop this 
perspective, it is necessary to understand how organizations work as agents of institutions and 
how they can be leveraged in processes of institutional change. First, though, a brief analysis of 
the proper arena for efforts toward creating institutional change through the political process is 
needed. 
 
3.2b: Why the state level? The history of national land use policy 
Land use policy in the United States is largely controlled by municipal zoning laws but 
environmental activists have won some federal- and state-level legislative victories in this area. 
National laws that regulate urban growth include the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA) which mandates environmental reviews on large federally funded urban developments, 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972 (FWPCA) which limit 
development on wetlands, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
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Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) which mandates cleanup of contaminated formerly industrial 
sites. Taken together, these laws form what Popper (1988, 296) describes as a system of 
“specialized centralization” of land use controls at the national level. These federal 
environmental laws set broad limits on specific types of development and on development in a 
narrow range of ecologically sensitive or contaminated areas, but do not generally impact the 
capacity of private builders to develop low-density housing in undeveloped areas that are subject 
only to local land use controls.  
The parochial interests that local planning institutions support have historically left little 
room for comprehensive protection of ecosystems. With few exceptions, the municipal zoning 
system has a long history of disregarding regional and environmental impacts. Many researchers 
have found that complete reliance on local zoning is socially and ecologically unsustainable (see 
Gould, Schnaiberg & Weinberg, 1996; Danielson, 1976; Sager, 1969). For example, researchers 
examining the “ecological footprint” of the current pattern of development and consumption in 
the United States conclude that if the entire world had similar land use patterns then humans 
would require several planet Earths to maintain the level of needed resources (Wackernagel et. 
al, 2006). Despite this, other societies seek to replicate America’s land use patterns in search of a 
similar living standard, further exacerbating environmental impacts of land use worldwide.
14
 As 
such, the lack of a strong system of regional and federal land use policies that mandates a more 
sustainable growth model in the United States creates social and environmental problems on a 
global scale. 
 Four major efforts tried to bring order to the fragmented system of federal land use policy 
in the United States.  First, in the early nineteenth century, Congress proposed federal 
infrastructure improvements to aid the growth of the developing nation. Second, in the early 
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twentieth century President Theodore Roosevelt proposed a national plan for preservation of land 
and natural resources. Third, in response to the need for coordinated federal action following the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s National Resources 
Planning Board sought to develop a federal role for land use planning of major infrastructure. 
Finally, in the 1970s, there was a concerted effort on the part of President Richard Nixon and 
several Congressional representatives to pass a national land use policy. Each employed some 
variation on the model of cooperative federalism, wherein states have final implementation 
power for a set of federally designated programs. All of these efforts, however, failed to pass or 
were quickly dismantled. 
 
3.2b.i: The Gallatin Plan 
In 1808, treasury secretary Albert Gallatin first confronted the political difficulties 
attached to federal land use planning when he proposed a national plan for “internal 
improvements.” Gallatin’s plan was focused on physical infrastructure and laid out a proposal for 
federally sponsored construction of major projects, such as canals and roadways. The plan 
sought to connect all of the major cities at the time and open up new opportunities for industrial 
trade and inland travel (see Goodrich 1958). Gallatin viewed cities as a set of trade partners 
rather than competitors and sought to cement these relationships through the provision of large-
scale federally coordinated infrastructure. In order to implement his goals, Gallatin relied on an 
institutional model of “cooperative federalism.” He proposed that the federal government should 
develop an infrastructure plan but implement it through flexible negotiations with the states. He 
argued that the federal government should seek approval from each state that would be impacted 
by the plan on a project-by-project basis (Lacey 2000, 101).  
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In the end, no action was taken by Congress on the Gallatin proposal. Concerns on the 
part of some members of Congress over the proper role of the federal government could not be 
overcome (Lacey, 2000). There was a strong defense of states’ rights by several representatives 
who comprised the intellectual precursor to Andrew Jackson’s base of support that took shape 
two decades later. Jackson’s political platform curtailed the role of the federal government in all 
domestic affairs. Though the debate over national plans for internal improvements continued in 
muted terms, Jackson’s presidency brought an end to all considerations of the issue as it marked 
a strong turn toward states’ rights and an increased role for private enterprise in development. In 
Jackson’s mind at least, this left no room for federal land use planning (Ellis, 1987). Just as with 
the “cooperative federalism” model, the conflict over the proper role of federal government 
would play a major part in every subsequent debate over national land use planning. 
 
3.2b.ii: Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism 
 It took one hundred years from the time of the introduction of Gallatin’s plan for the idea 
of a national land use policy to be taken up again. Theodore Roosevelt’s platform of “New 
Nationalism,” which he developed during the first decade of the 1900s, was his response to the 
uncoordinated and often failed endeavors of private industry to provide adequately for the basic 
necessities of the country. He had initially gained prominence as a police  commissioner in New 
York City who had been one of the only public figures during a great heat-wave in 1896 to 
champion a coordinated government-based program to aid the residents of the tenement houses, 
roughly 1500 of whom died because of the crowded conditions and prolonged exposure to high 
temperatures (Kohn, 2010). The 1896 heat wave cemented Roosevelt’s reputation as a reformist 
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politician. His rise in popularity was a decided swing away from the hands-off Jacksonian 
approach to government.  
Roosevelt’s presidential platform of New Nationalism was premised on the notion that 
the devolution of powers to localities crippled the ability of the public sector to regulate private 
interests. Most importantly for him, devolution of powers and the outsized influence of private 
interests enabled industrial development to irrevocably deplete natural resources, which he 
argued was an issue of clear national significance.
15
 In a famous speech presenting his doctrine 
of New Nationalism in which he directly addressed accusations from his political rivals that he 
was a communist, Roosevelt said, “Conservation is a great moral issue for it involves the 
patriotic duty of insuring the safety and continuance of the nation. Let me add that the health and 
vitality of our people are at least as well worth conserving as their forests, waters, lands, and 
minerals, and in this great work the national government must bear a most important part.”
16
 
This approach to conservation which linked protection of natural resources with public health 
presaged the arguments that Progressive Era urban reformers would soon develop and that came 
to underlie much of the work of contemporary urban environmental activism.  
Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism employed earlier strategies of cooperative 
federalism seen in the Gallatin plan through its call for a permanent federal conservation 
commission which would gather data and coordinate land use and development planning via 
state commissions (Lacey 2000, 121). Even this relatively tempered effort to create federal 
institutional support for states to guide land use was decried as too revolutionary and socialist by 
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Roosevelt’s critics. Because of these allegations, Congress did not act on the conservation 
commission land use proposal. Entrenched disagreements over the utility of local control and the 
proper role of national government made such legislation impossible in 1910. Roosevelt was 
forced to address his conservation platform in a more piecemeal fashion. 
 
3.2b.iii: Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning Board 
Two decades after Theodore Roosevelt’s conservation planning proposals failed to be 
taken up by Congress, the Great Depression served as an impetus for his distant cousin and then 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) to make a third attempt in the history of the nation to 
create a national land use planning policy (see Gelfand, 1975 for an overview of federal urban 
policy at the time). In July 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed the initial members of 
what eventually became known as the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB). The Board 
was developed in response to calls for a better coordinated use of public utilities construction as 
a counter-cyclical economic development strategy (Reagan 1999, p. 181). It was comprised of 
reform-minded elites associated with a network of social research institutions. One central task 
of the Board was to ensure that public works programs protected environmental resources (Hays, 
1999, Chapter 11). As well, members of the Board had connections with leaders of urban social 
movements, such as the settlement house and occupational health movements. These movements 
had already sought at the municipal level to systematically address degraded urban environments 
as a way of improving the health and well-being of city residents (see Gottlieb 1993, Ch. 2).  
The connection between environmental quality and public health that Theodore 
Roosevelt emphasized in his conservation platform was made more explicit during the 
presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This time, though, it was more connected with urban 
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reform efforts than conservation of natural resources outside of cities. The NRPB was one of 
FDR’s “New Deal” agencies and was tasked with coordinating the actions of private business, 
civil society and government decision-makers through application of newly developed social 
scientific thought on institutional design. The plans that came out of the board tended to be 
“research oriented and open ended in recommendations” (Reagan, 1999, p. 191). Its planning 
agenda was broad and extended into economic development as well as land use strategies. While 
the NRPB worked closely with members of the business community to develop its 
recommendations and thus had supporters amongst private business, it was perceived as a threat 
to the power of many Congressional leaders (Clawson 1973).  
In the end, the short-term local interests of Congressional politicians conflicted with the 
long-term national benefits that members of the NRPB argued their plans would provide. By 
1940, as a result of congressional pressure the National Resource Planning Board had been 
moved out of executive control and its agenda had become divorced from FDR’s direct interests. 
As well, there was heated criticism of the President’s programs as involving too much 
government interference (Brinkley, 2000, p. 179). The NRPB faced substantial hostility from 
several members of Congress in the spring of 1943. As a conciliatory move toward his critics, 
FDR did not contest the action when “in some of the most sweeping language Congress has ever 
used, it abolished the Board and forbade the expenditure required to make it function” (Clawson 
1973, p. 43). 
 
3.2b.iv: The Postwar Context of National Growth Policy 
As Reagan (1999, p. 238) points out, shortly after Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s planning 
board was abolished, United States metropolitan areas experienced a period of economic and 
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population growth. Wartime production for the Second World War and postwar prosperity 
created a boom in jobs and suburban housing production. The economic growth also fueled the 
dual effects of urban decline and environmental degradation (see Beauregard, 2006, Chapter 2; 
Rome, 2001). The primary apparatus employed by private developers for meeting the postwar 
rise in demand for new housing focused on building single family homes in previously 
undeveloped suburban areas. Federal policy and private industry created mechanisms for 
enabling massive and rapid construction of new suburban communities beginning in the 1950s 
(Jackson, 1985, Chapter 13). However, this new frontier of housing was unavailable to many 
non-white buyers. Racist housing covenants of the 1930s that forbade sale to minorities were 
later outlawed even as their segregationist intent was institutionalized by the 1950s in the uneven 
lending practices of banks. On the whole, the suburbs developed as “a self-fulfilling prophecy” 
which equated property values with race (see Jackson 1985, 178-218). Racism combined with 
uneven levels of spatial mobility across class to create what Teaford (1986) calls the “age of the 
urban crisis” (p. 128). The economic gaps that grew wider at this time between rich and poor 
were expressed not only in higher levels of inequality in terms of wealth and income, but also in 
the uneven distribution of tax resources between wealthy suburbs and declining inner cities. 
By 1970, the move away from the central city on the part of whites was propelled 
forward by ubiquitous images and descriptions of riots, crime, and filth in cities. In 1968, 
Richard Nixon remarked in his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, “As we look at 
America, we see cities enveloped in smoke and flame. We see sirens in the night. We see 
Americans hating each other at home.”
17
 He was echoing the popular and news media portrayal 
which repeatedly painted cities in a negative light and increasingly equated declining urban 
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environments with black residents. As Beauregard (2006, 76) summarized the situation, 
“Postwar antiurbanism was racial animosity transferred to the cities.”  
The rapid move toward the suburbs motivated by social conflict had visible effects upon 
the environment. One of the leading voices that pointed out the intertwined social ills of the city 
and environmental ills of the suburbs was landscape architect Ian McHarg. McHarg despised the 
growth of subdivision housing developments built with little concern for the natural environment 
around them. He called these residential areas the “most complete conjunction of land rapacity 
and human disillusion” (1967, p. 39). McHarg also had a deep disdain for the central cities of his 
time, using language reminiscent of the dramatic portrayals of the slums in the early years of the 
industrial revolution. He called them “imprisoning gray areas…Race and hate, disease, poverty, 
rancor and despair, urine and spit live here in the shadows…united in poverty and ugliness” (p. 
39). McHarg was among several that called for improved land use planning as a means of 
managing the problems.  
In the wake of the increasing visibility of the negative environmental effects of ever-
expanding suburban growth fueled by social conflict in cities, states began to comprehensively 
regulate urban growth. In response to the weak federal controls over the rapid spread of postwar 
suburbs, Hawaii, Wisconsin, and California created the first state regulations to protect large 
environmentally sensitive areas in the late 1960s (see Rome, 2001, Chapter 4). As well, urban 
regions including metropolitan areas around San Francisco, Minneapolis, and New England 
developed region-wide water resource protection legislation (Bosselman and Callies, 1971). By 
the early 1970s, the first statewide land use policies were created in Vermont, Maine and Florida 
(Rome, 2001, pp. 225-230) and hybrid governmental agencies were created to protect 
environmentally sensitive areas in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware (Bosselman and 
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Callies, 1971). This movement on the part of many states was significant for national efforts at 
land use planning. As the history demonstrates, a cooperative federalist model which relies upon 
state-federal coordination would be required and state support would be essential for countering 
the inevitable argument that national land use policy represents an over-extension of federal 
governmental powers. 
Important institutional innovations at the federal level changed the context of the national 
land use planning debate by 1970. New federal urban and environmental agencies were created 
in the late 1960s. These included the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
which was primarily meant to address issues of homeownership and urban decline, as well as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), meant to address issues of environmental degradation. 
By giving formal cabinet-level representation to urban and environmental interests, Presidents 
Lyndon Johnson (in the case of HUD) and Richard Nixon (in the case of the EPA), established a 
federal basis for these policy agendas. These agencies were essential in professionalizing the 
community development and environmental movements respectively and in creating a natural 
constituency for federal-level action on land use issues that impacted both fields.  
The new federal agencies sparked the growth and professionalization of non-profit 
organizations in these areas with technical expertise and advocacy capacity in order to shape and 
work with the growing federal regulatory apparatus. A national land use policy would only 
increase the tools available to both fields. Land use planning fit well within their 
professionalized model as it offered the possibility of applying data-driven approaches to social 
and environmental challenges. This was the approach advocated by McHarg and developed in 
the numerous state policies. As such, the new federal agencies helped to build a professional 
urban and environmental constituency rooted in the technocratic approach that federal land use 
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planning would require. The agencies also comprised an existing apparatus for administering 
such a policy, which would avoid the challenge that prior legislative efforts faced in their calls 
for a new federal entity.   
Together, the elevated public consciousness of urban and environmental issues, the 
growth of professionalized community development and environmental policy fields led by 
cabinet-level federal agencies, and the move on the part of a number of states to address the issue 
represented a new frontier of opportunity to address land use at the national level. In 1970, it 
seemed to several members of Congress and President Richard Nixon’s staff that after 162 years 
and three failed large-scale efforts, the time for a national response to the negative impacts of 
uncoordinated growth had come. However, as explored in the next chapter, the 1970s proposals 
for a federal land use policy that were developed were greatly weakened by claims from existing 
agency heads seeking to protect their bureaucratic turf. Several new and old federal agencies 
wanted land use programs under their control. Rather than resolving the social and ecological 
goals for land use, the federal agencies that would be implementing a national land use policy 
sought to protect their narrow interests (see Flippen, 2000, p.101). As such, the competition for 
regulatory control at the federal level made it impossible in the 1970s to create a single national 
land use policy. 
The repeated failure to create a model of cooperative federalism in land use policy and 
the role of states in granting local zoning powers to municipalities dictate that the states are 
currently the most viable political level at which to develop urban environmental land use policy. 
Neither national nor municipal governments can effectively perform this function. As President 
Richard Nixon argued in defense of his administration’s proposal for a national land use policy 
that required statewide land use planning, “The states are uniquely qualified to effect the 
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institutional reform that is so badly needed, for they are closer to the local problems than is the 
federal government and yet removed enough from local tax and other pressures to represent the 
broader regional interests of the public” (Corrigan, 1971, p.598).  
As the history of efforts to create national land use policies demonstrates, the U.S. model 
has never allowed the federal government to take the lead in this area. Rather, the institutional 
structure for land use policy has made municipal governments “the primary institutions in 
America that exercise power over land use” (Frug and Barron, 2008, p. 2). This institutional 
structure pushes hyper-local competition for resources amongst municipalities. As a result, the 
issues of local politics are defined by “development, taxes, services and exclusion” (Burns, 1994, 
p. 113). While some localities have ventured into sustainability policy, land use decisions tend to 
be filtered through a narrow set of economic and social concerns. Within this system, “The most 
significant restrictions of local power in the United States come from state governments not the 
national government” (Frug and Barron, 2008, p. 44). As a result, the states must be the 
laboratories for extra-local land use policymaking.   
 
3.3| Organizations, Institutions, and Institutional Change 
In order to provide context with which to understand the institutional challenges of 
creating a state-level system of urban environmental land use planning, this section outlines the 
role of organizations, institutions, and institutional change in the planning and urban social 
science literature. As well, literature on urban governance and organizational networks is 
reviewed with a focus on institutional change. These topics establish a foundation on which to 
build a more robust model of institutional analysis in urban environmental land use planning. 
They also serve as context for the next section on heterarchic governance.  
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3.3a: Organizations and Urban Social Science 
Within the planning and urban social science literatures, it is far from obvious that efforts 
to create more socially and environmentally sound cities should start at the organizational level. 
Current paradigms focus instead upon the importance of enabling pluralism and consensus 
amongst individuals with differing levels of prior knowledge and resources. Advocacy planners 
working in the tradition of Davidoff (1965) argue that planners should openly serve as 
representatives of individual interests in land use disputes. This pluralist democratic model 
structures planning processes similarly to the courts. It relies on the tensions amongst interests 
being worked out between individuals through open debate. More recently, the communicative 
(Healey, 1992) and collaborative planning (Innes 2003) literatures have viewed the field from the 
perspective of the individual planner working to facilitate conversations amongst interested 
parties about how the city should be managed. The “communicative turn” in planning focuses on 
the role of planners as mediators in discussions about the proper outcomes for planning (see 
Healey, 1995).  
While mediation and advocacy are undeniably important aspects of every urban planner’s 
job, there are limits to what can be accomplished at the individual level. Every mediation and 
attempt to advocate for a given side occurs within an institutional context. Often, this context is 
the biggest barrier to accomplishing planning goals (see Fainstein, 2009; Mollenkopf, 1983; 
Harvey, 1989; Krumholz and Clavel, 1994). The “internal dissonance” between the stated 
progressive goals and structures of institutions that guide urban development has long been 
frustrating for planners working to resolve differences amongst interests in the public arena (see 
Goudie, 2005). This situation does not occur only because planners are unable to engage with the 
community in a meaningful way. It also occurs because the institutional structure blocks even the 
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best advocates and mediators from achieving their goals.
18
 The planning field requires some 
capacity to alter the institutional context of the advocacy, participation and mediation that it 
carries out. This capacity is limited within scholarship focused on the work of individual 
planners rather than the organizational context that planners work within. 
The focus within the planning literature upon individual actors rather than organizations 
mirrors a trend, at least since the 1960s, within the social sciences. The relative lack of interest in 
organizations as a unit of analysis amongst social scientists has only recently been questioned, 
and this trend is more the case with regard to inter-organizational activity. The main focus for 
urban research since the 1950s has been upon individual-level analyses, but this was not always 
so. Beginning with the Chicago School in the early years of the twentieth century, urban-oriented 
social scientists took formal organizations and institutions of all sorts into account with their 
ecological approach to studies of urban community (Park et al., 1928; Burgess, 1925). This 
tradition held until the 1950s when many social science disciplines, urban researchers included, 
turned toward what has been labeled “methodological individualism” (Arrow, 1994). Aligned 
with a rise in the sophistication of quantitative statistical techniques and econometric analyses, 
individual-level analysts concerned themselves mostly with correlating specific characteristics of 
people with their life chances, such as race and occupational mobility (Blau and Duncan, 1967). 
As Marwell (2007) puts it, “organizations disappear in this kind of analysis.”  
The social sciences generally continued down the path of methodological individualism 
into the later decades of the twentieth century when questions of urban poverty and race effects 
came to dominate the urban literature. In the 1980s, William Julius Wilson (1987, p. 56) 
presented his now-famous argument on the underclass that painted a picture of poor 
                                                 
18
 Often by the time that developers engage community-based plans, there is no arena available for effective 
advocacy—the project is too far along (see Fainstein, 2010, chapter 3). 
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neighborhoods as institutionally barren. This reinforced the turn away from the organization as a 
unit of analysis for most urban researchers. If there were no organizations in these poor 
neighborhoods that had become increasingly the focus of urban social science, then studies that 
began with the organization as a unit of analysis did not make sense. 
Of course, the urban-oriented social sciences were not completely divorced from 
organizations. Organizational functions make up a long-standing topic of study for scholars of 
public policy. Charles Lindblom (1959, p. 88) focuses his classic account of planning and policy-
making in the United States on explaining why agencies adjust their policies “to the concerns of 
other agencies in the process of fragmented decision-making” (86). Such a formulation aligns 
with studies of inter-organizational relations within urban policy fields that followed soon after 
Lindblom’s article. In the 1960s and 1970s, a small cohort of sociologists developed a strong 
base of studies concerned with inter-organizational linkages that initially focused on urban 
processes (see Laumann, Galaskiewicz, & Marsden, 1978 for a good review). For the most part, 
though, these studies appeared only in the administrative science journals and by the 1980s could 
hardly be found. The inter-organizational studies that remained from this line of research turned 
almost entirely toward the private industry firm as the organization of interest, leaving behind 
promising advances in the study of urban governance. This turn away from public organizations 
coincided with Reagan-era national policies that elevated the role of private actors in public 
service and was paralleled by a number of similar moves in other social science endeavors. For 
instance the rise of regime theory in political science focused on the governing role of private 
actors vis-à-vis public institutions (Stone, 1989), economics rose even higher in status as the 
science of policy (Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001), and a ubiquitous spread of globalization, 
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neoliberalism and privatization as topics of study became prevalent at this time (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002).  
The end result of the turn toward methodological individualism and private organizations 
as foci in the social sciences has been that the growing complexity in systems of governance 
formed by fields of varied organizations is relatively understudied. Recently, though, there has 
been a surge of interest in urban organizations in part as a result of the discussion around social 
capital (Burt, 2000; Putnam, 1995). This connection comes about because social capital is 
formed by the “accumulation of negotiations based on mutual confidence that simplify, or 
obviate the need for further negotiations” (Degenne and Forse, 1999, p. 115). Much of this 
accumulation of negotiations is embedded within an individual’s organizational ties. Thus, the 
connection between individuals and organizations is a focus for social capital researchers. 
The recent interest in organizations has been fueled further by the rise of the “new 
institutionalism” which views “actors and their interests as institutionally constructed”  
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 28). This line of thought has generated powerful explanatory 
mechanisms for understanding the connection between social dynamics and formal 
organizations. One example is institutional isomorphism, which posits that forces operate within 
organizational fields that encourage organizations to become more and more alike over time 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Additionally, some authors studying globalization and neoliberal social processes turned 
their attention to the organizational structures of governance processes (i.e. Brenner, 2004). 
Cities have grown much more organizationally complex since the days of the Chicago School 
and even since the 1960s when policy analysts began examining inter-organizational relations. A 
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lot of organizational ground remains uncovered with respect to urban research, and especially 
with respect to organizations and planning.  
The increased organizational complexity within cities is driven in part by more 
organizational linkages that have formed as privatization of social services and devolution of 
government to the local level has created new demand for more local organizations (see 
Marwell, 2004). Researchers that have studied these increasingly complex urban organizational 
systems generally examine them from the perspective of egocentric networks (for example 
Small, 2006; Arum, 2000). In other words, these linkages have mostly been studied by starting 
from the position of a single organization and working out to develop that organization’s 
network. Rarely has the total sociocentric network of urban governance processes been 
examined. Sociocentric analysis allows for the positioning of egocentric networks relative to all 
other organizations and linkages. It enables many recent advances in network theory to be 
operationalized (Degenne and Forse, 2006, pp. 2-17). For example, the importance of an absence 
of direct links between two types of organizations that form “structural holes” where certain 
types of actors are not connected to others in the network can be fully developed (see Burt, 
2000). This allows for the structural position of organizations, referring to the amount of links 
and centrality of the organization, to be derived. When coupled with an analysis of the types of 
connections made, sociocentric analysis enables the character of networked systems to be 
explained (ibid.: 118-123). 
Organizational fields can serve as a representative sample of the sociocentric networks in 
a metropolitan region. The narrowed field of a specific policy process is likely exemplary of the 
political dynamic of the region. As such, examination of the field enables a sociocentric 
approximation of overall governance networks. Organizational fields, though, contain multiple 
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scales of activity at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. At the macro-level researchers have 
focused on structural conditions that dictate the actions of organizations (see for example Weber, 
1968; Alexander, 1988, p. 3). One example of macro-level research is work done under the 
banner of regulation theory which posits that certain political-economic structures have shaped 
cities according to “fordist” and “post-fordist” spatial patterns determined by demands for labor 
(see Painter, 1995).  
At the micro-level of intra-organizational processes, analyses of social networks and 
organizational structure have yielded established knowledge about how individual connections 
shape outcomes for urban residents (see for example Davies, 1966; Israel et al., 1998). Work on 
“small worlds theory” (see Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and the “strength of weak ties” 
(Granovetter, 1973) have done much to build a stable understanding of micro-level urban social 
dynamics. The meso-level, which Mollenkopf (1981) labels “political mediation” and Alexander 
(2005) associates with inter-organizational networks is less identifiable within a specific genre. 
Clearly, though, there is a macro-meso-micro relation between the organizational levels of 
urbanization processes which must be accounted for and which calls for a research method that 
can relate them. 
Bourdieu has written extensively on the need to explore the meso-level of social 
processes. In the explanation of his concept of “habitus,” Bourdieu argued that “social practice 
cannot be understood “solely in terms of individual decision-making, on the one hand, or as 
determined by supra-individual ‘structures’…on the other hand” (cited in Jenkins, 1992, p. 74). 
Bourdieu sought to focus social analysis on the “acquired system of generative schemes 
objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 
95). For Bourdieu, these schemes were often played out in fields of social action populated 
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mostly by organizations that shifted position constantly according to changing conditions in 
order to maximize their economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. In essence, Bourdieu 
argued that most of the action of social life happens at this meso-level where the micro- and 
macro-levels interact.  
Within the planning literature, the task of directing practitioners toward the meso-level of 
organizations and organizational ties as a means of affecting the institutional context that the 
field operates within has been an active project for some time. Forester (1989) has sought to 
provide a framework for a “practical and politically critical understanding of organization that 
can inform progressive planning practice”(p. 67). He argues that “popular thinking” and 
academic theory generally view organizations in one of two ways: instrumental or social. The 
instrumental view sees organizations as a tool of society. The publicly stated goal of the 
organization is what defines and directs the actions and purpose of the organization. Forester 
argues that the instrumental is only partially correct, as it does not describe activities wherein 
organizations are also deeply social in nature and maintain themselves only through the creation 
of ongoing relationships, both inside and outside of the organization. A strictly social view of 
organizations is also incomplete from Forester’s perspective. He argues that this view tends to be 
apolitical. 
Forester argues that a third, more synthetic view of organizations is needed in planning 
scholarship. The “critical view of organizational action” focuses, via their social and 
instrumental roles, on the extent to which organizations shape “selective claims and arguments” 
by reproducing “social relations of trust or distrust, cooperation or competition, amiability or 
hostility…” (pp. 68-69). Forester writes, “Citizens may…be exploited not only through the lack 
of democratic control over what private and public organizations produce in this society but also 
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through the lack of democratic control of the social relations those organizations reproduce” (p. 
78). The social reproductive role of organizations in the planning process is, for Forester, the 
necessary analytic component that introduces political aspects to the social and instrumental 
actions of organizations. This lens requires a synthetic view of organizations as interrelated 
entities which direct planning processes through their functional roles (i.e. administering the 
construction of infrastructure), their social roles (i.e. facilitating such construction through the 
centralization of stable social relationships between interested actors), and their political roles of 
legitimating selected actions within contested political arenas. Planning agencies are often 
historically positioned as functional organizations, but recent developments toward a 
decentralized, less hierarchical structure for planning have coincided with a move toward 
governance models that have made the social and political roles of planning organizations more 
visible. As such, in different ways, Mollenkopf, Alexander, Bourdieu, and Forester all argue that 
planning analysis must account for social actions at the meso-level where organizations balance 
the micro and macro forces that shape cities. 
 
3.3b: Urban Governance and Organizational Coalitions  
Urban governance refers to a mode of public decision-making that involves state and 
non-state actors working in unison (Stoker, 1998). Governance theory is an organizing 
framework which conceptualizes the shift away from the top-down state-centered approach to 
directing urban processes through formal hierarchic government toward interactive policymaking 
processes. Governance incorporates public, private, and voluntary sectors into all levels of urban 
management. It includes government, but is more complex. Governance processes supposedly 
have more capacity to deal with the rapidly changing conditions, such as those brought on by 
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globalization (Brenner, 1999) and urban decline (McQuarrie, 2010). As such, the governance 
literature focuses on the meso-level of socio-political practice. 
The literature offers a number of possible organizational types that might be considered 
pertinent to the practice of urban environmental governance. These include neighborhood, 
community, service, subcultural, interest group, bureaucratic, corporate, representative, 
participatory, appointed,  and inter-organizational group. As Forester (1989) reminds us, all of 
these organizations are political actors (even if some have a primarily cultural purpose), meaning 
they work to shape public policy toward their interests. At various times and places they are 
connected to networks of urban governance which include public, private, and civil society 
organizations linked through formal contract, interpersonal relations, or personnel/resource flows 
to jointly create public policy. 
While the shift toward governance signals a wider base of participation in both decision-
making and service provision at the municipal level, it does not necessarily change institutional 
norms (see Coaffee and Healey, 2003). Networks that form within governance regimes are 
generally shaped by pre-existing power structures (LeGales, 2001). This limits the capacity for 
fundamental shifts in the distribution of the benefits of urban growth and, while it does have 
potential to improve performance of urban management practices, it is unlikely to alter the 
existing outcomes for an elite-dominated city.  
Some authors have pointed to the fact that the participatory democratic benefits of 
governance partnerships are sometimes limited by the evolving relationship with established 
hierarchic power structures (Whitehead, 1997; Jessop, 1999). Whitehead (1997) argues that pre-
existing hierarchies of power continued to express themselves in the Single Regeneration Budget 
(SRB) partnerships that were developed as participatory governance programs in Britain’s cities 
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under the “Third Way” ideology of the New Labour party government in the 1990s. Whitehead 
follows Jessop (1999) in describing a situation wherein, along with the rise of the new 
governance regimes across state, private, and civil society sectors, came a “meta-governance” 
structure which sought to maintain control over these regimes. Meta-governance processes 
counter the openness and multi-lateral nature of governance relations because pre-existing 
political authorities set the ground rules for the relationships, provide the information that guides 
expectations, and become the final arbiter of disagreements (Jessop, 1999). Whitehead is critical 
of the ability of governance language to “deflect attention away from the hidden hierarchies built 
into the architecture of partnership forms” (p. 20). He argues that it can be a cover for true power 
structures. 
Within the urban literature, work on civic capacity has focused on the means for building 
a lasting and flexible base for decision-making. Judd (2006) argues that operational civic 
capacity involves a coalition of organizations that persists over time and has sufficient means of 
mobilizing resources. His view of civic capacity (a somewhat more complex definition than 
others such as Stone et al., 2001) focuses on the extent to which the ability of a community to 
bring various sectors together determines its political power. Judd describes the case of St. Louis 
where “a restructuring of the local state made it possible to build civic capacity without a 
governing coalition and even without strong civic leadership” (p. 45). Auspos and colleagues 
(2007) also focus on the convening power of community organizations. They find evidence 
across nine cities of “local community development systems that are resilient enough to adapt to 
changes in the macro environment and take on a [broad] scope of work” (p. iii). For these 
authors, the important point is that civic capacity does not take one form and is not necessarily 
dictated by the local state. They draw attention toward the meso-level of organizational inter-
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relations by further contextualizing the work begun by Stone (1989) on urban regimes through 
their specification of “regime” as only one of the possibilities for the assemblage of “power to” 
shape cities. 
Critics of the civic capacity literature have argued that there is scant evidence that 
community coalitions are successful and that the ones that are either focus on a narrow agenda or 
involve relatively tight-knit and homogeneous communities (Kadushin et al., 2005). They argue, 
as well, that the coalitions imagined are generally too broad to be realistic, assume the existence 
of a community that often does not exist, are plagued by conflicts over power differences often 
drawn along race, class, and ethnicity lines, must navigate a history of “organizational debris” 
within cities which often make it more difficult to develop trust amongst organizations, try to put 
organizations with different norms, values and styles together, and result in a random often 
irrational solution based upon the idiosyncrasies of the organizations involved. This view 
fundamentally asserts that “the hope that social capital generated by coalitions will substitute for 
the lack of financial capital” is a false hope (Kadushin et al., 2005, p. 271). The notion that 
networked organizational structures provide a permanent power base for communities, though, 
should not be dismissed. Rather, it is only in their ability to mobilize these networks that 
community coalitions become powerful actors. 
The social-ecological systems literature offers one perspective on analyzing governance 
networks specifically concerned with managing the interplay between natural and human 
resources. Social-ecological systems are “intricately linked to and affected by one or more social 
systems” (Anderies et al. 2004, section 2).  In a social-ecological system, some relationships 
between people are “mediated through interactions with biophysical and non-human biological 
units” (Anderies et al., 2004, section 2). The social-ecological systems literature, then, bears a 
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relationship with Actor-Network Theory (ANT) developed initially by Bruno Latour (see 2005 
for a full description). In Actor-Network Theory, the non-human entities are given agency in 
social networks. The example that Anderies et al. (2004) give of a social-ecological system, is 
when a fisher’s activities are affected by another fisher’s activities via interactions with the fish 
stock. In a social-ecological system, the fish stock has agency in social networks because 
outcomes for one person in the network (a fisher) are altered by the actions of the fish, which 
themselves are altered by interactions with another fisher. A social-ecological system then is a 
particular type of actor network which focuses on management of natural resources. Further, 
most authors concerned with social-ecological systems are generally concerned with the social 
and physical infrastructures that support cooperative action relative to natural resources (see 
Ostrom and Schlager, 1996; Anderies et al., 2004; Bodin, 2006). 
In a sense, all cities are social-ecological systems. Cities are comprised of a series of 
public infrastructures built around natural resources. Resources, resource users, and public 
infrastructure all interact in order to maintain quality of life. Because of this, cities and nature 
cannot be considered in isolation since each is constituted by and constitutes the other. As 
Benton-Short and Short (2008, p. 18) argue, cities are “a transformation of the physical 
environment to a built environment.” The economic processes that support the built environment 
are, as Cronon (1991) argues, premised upon processes of extraction and commodification of 
natural materials altered for human use. The understanding of nature in such a system is shaped 
by our built environment. From the early periods of urbanization, walls for security were built 
around cities. These walls were meant to protect the city from attack, but they also created a 
differentiation between the “urban” and the “wild”. This sense of separateness was built into the 
urban way of life and, like all aspects of the built environment, intensified during the industrial 
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revolution. The “social construction of nature” as not only apart from, but subject to, the needs of 
the built environment has largely been supported by the institutions that have organized land use 
and resource extraction for at least the past 300 years (Castree and Braun, 2001). 
 Therefore urban environmental governance must be concerned not only with the impact 
of pre-existing power structures relative to communities, but also with the impact of changing 
ecological circumstances, from climate change to decreased oil and natural gas reserves. 
Governance for urban environmentalists must manage the social-ecological systems that 
determine the relationship between the natural environment and the built environment. This is a 
more and more pressing concern as the impacts of human activity upon the natural world become 
apparent and is increasingly viewed as an question of shaping institutional structures. 
 
3.3c: Institutions 
Institutions are generally defined as the rules and conventions that direct individual and 
organizational behavior. Sjöstrand (1993, p. 9) writes, they are “a human mental construct for a 
coherent system of shared (enforced) norms that regulate individual interactions in recurrent 
situations.” They are the “infrastructures of human interactions” that include laws, regulations, 
rules, routines, conventions, traditions, customs, myths, and habits (ibid., p. 61). Institutions 
employ external, formal sanctions to “govern the behavior of a well-defined group of persons” 
(Elster, 1989, p. 147). The goal of the sanctions, which may take many forms, is generally to 
make an undesirable practice more costly for those who might be tempted to engage in it” (ibid., 
P. 148). 
A distinction is often made between institutions and organizations (North, 1990). 
Organizations work within institutions and, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out, might be 
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an arena for several competing institutional interests, but generally are not themselves 
institutions. As Bromley (1989, p. 32) argues though, “Even to settle on the definition of 
institutions as rules and conventions that define individual choice sets leaves open the issue of 
how best to conceptualize their role, and to understand the pressures that come for institutional 
change.” Campbell (1993) partially responds to this observation by incorporating the role of the 
governance regimes that enforce institutionalized conventions (see also Williamson, 1991).  
In giving “meaning, scope, and responsibilities to organizations” (Bromley 1989, p. 23), 
institutions make organizations their stewards. The connections across several organizations that 
such stewardship often requires in order to create sufficient external sanctions are the raw 
material of institutional structure. For instance, the legal institution in the United States is 
comprised of written laws and unwritten conventions as well as an established set of associations 
between judicial, legislative, and executive organizations and individuals that are required to 
enforce and legitimate those laws and conventions. While no one organization can be said to 
comprise the legal institution, the established relationship between organizations, as much as the 
laws and conventions themselves, are part of the legal institution. Associations between those 
responsible for enforcing institutional rules and conventions are especially important for the 
consideration of institutional change because they create points of access to the governance 
regime associated with the institution.  
These associations, and the institutions they are a part of, are the meta-infrastructure that 
maintain the underlying building culture of cities. For example, the Board of Trade in Chicago 
was established as a set of organizational alignments formalized to represent the institutional 
norms of commodities markets which directed the rapid expansion of grain elevators and 
compartmentalized shipping, forever altering the function and growth of major port cities (see 
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Cronon, 1991, chapter 3). In doing so, it formed a political structure capable of making cities 
build physical infrastructure that supported the norms of mass-produced commodities markets. 
This amounted to a formal expression comprised of both organizational alignments and rules and 
norms that represent a certain set of ethical decisions about the use and exchange of 
commodities. It also became one of the central institutional forces guiding the construction of 
industrial cities. Market-based organizations like the Board of Trade create formal sanctions that 
enforce a certain building culture which views urban growth as a tool for market expansion. Thus 
they support market institutions. Similar organizations also direct the construction of housing 
and infrastructure (Davis, 1999). 
Market institutions are not the only ones competing for control over urban space. As 
Michael Teitz (2007, p. 26) writes, “urban planning… can scarcely be said to exist without 
institutional structures” and, as such, is constantly faced with the effects of the ethical decisions 
embedded within institutions that direct urban form. Especially with concern for land use 
planning in the United States, local governance arrangements (i.e. organizational alignments both 
inside and outside of formal government) express the institutionalized norms which will be 
favored in cities. Numerous empirical and theoretical analyses have examined these governance 
arrangements, including the operations of urban regimes (Stone, 1989), political machines 
(Eerie, 1988; Merton, 1957), elite-centered growth coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1988; Hunter, 
1953), pluralist governance processes (Dahl, 1961), participatory democratic programs (Young 
2000; Berry, Portney & Thomson, 1993), urban social movements (Castells, 1983; Fainstein and 
Fainstein, 1974) and various paradigms of cross-institutional communication including 
consensus building and communicative planning processes (Fischer, 2009; Healey, 1998). These 
approaches have often led to the development of typologies of urban institutional environments 
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based upon differing historic power structures within cities, such as “elite-centered” or “machine 
style” cities (see Weir, 1999). The motivations of individual and organizational actors have also 
been analyzed (for example Jacobs, 1961). However, this literature has rarely focused on how 
the urban institutions within these political structures change. 
 
3.3d: Institutional Change 
Healey (2005, p. 305) states that planners must be able to “‘read’ the dynamics of the 
context in which they are situated” in order to form what Beauregard (2005, p. 206) calls the 
“bridge…from the technical knowledge that planners embrace to the institutional change that 
seems necessary for planning to be effective.” Within such efforts, organizational connections 
that form governance regimes are primary variables in determining the shape of institutions. 
Thus, organizational strategies meant to alter existing power relations by reconfiguring those 
connections are essential elements in processes of institutional change. In order to convert 
technical knowledge into widely adopted strategies for urban development, environmental 
planners must understand processes of institutional change and how they can interact with them. 
The institutional change literature within planning has centered on two areas: a 
transactions cost perspective and a social constructivist agenda. The transactions cost perspective 
is influenced largely by North’s (1990) work on institutions as “friction” within markets. This 
approach is most strongly represented by the writings of Alexander (2005; 2007) who focuses on 
how planned institutional environments affect individual decisions in the market. This 
economistic understanding of institutions assumes that change arises from an aggregation of 
individual decisions. While this is a clear means of institutional change within markets, it ignores 
the effect that organization-level alterations to existing institutional environments have upon 
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shaping the context within which individual decisions are made. Alexander does not account for 
the interventions of organization-level and inter-organizational activities and thus does not move 
to the level of analysis necessary to address the more direct mechanisms for institutional change 
that planners as organizational actors can connect with. In all, the market approach to 
institutional change does not focus on why organizational commitments to changing institutions 
arise. 
Another explanation of institutional change is outlined within the social constructivist 
approach. Authors in this area are influenced by the “new institutionalism” in sociology. They 
emphasize the role of both individual and organizational connections in determining the shape of 
institutions. Healey (2007) points to individual actions, systemic biases, and cultural norms as 
the foundations of an ever-changing multi-level institutional environment. She argues that the 
norms of urban development which determine the shape of cities and are formalized within 
institutions are constantly reshaped by the actions of individuals and organizations. This 
assertion can be aligned with Lefebvre’s (1974) notion of the social production of space as a 
process of interacting social forces that are embodied within institutions formulating the limits of 
action for a given space. In this line of thought, institutions are part of “embedded governance 
cultures” (González and Healey, 2005, p. 2063) contained within larger institutional fields (see 
Jessop, 1997; Hillier 2007). These interacting cultural forces highlight the situated nature of 
institutions but do not explain what causes institutional change in these conditions.  
Increasingly, social constructivist planning theory employs the notion of complexity to 
explain institutional change. Complexity is an apt concept given the numerous non-linear 
relations between intersecting institutions that urban environments possess. Healey (2005, p. 
304) describes the complex environment with which planners must engage. She writes, 
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“Planning activity…is inherently a governance activity, situated in a complex landscape of 
formal government organizations, and all kinds of other public, semi-public, voluntary and 
private agencies providing some kind of collective goods.” For Gualini (2001: 25), this 
environment requires non-hierarchical problem solving which generates “emergent and 
concurrent” policy directives enacted by “multiple decentralized actors in the framework of 
evolutive processes.” Thus, Gualini argues that a decentralized governance environment creates 
opportunities for innovation which works across institutional boundaries.  
The current tendency among most social constructivist institutional theory is to rely upon 
consensus building to empower emergent forces for institutional change. Authors writing from 
the collaborative planning perspective theorize that a normative concept of collaborative 
dialogue based on the concept of communicative rationality proposed by Habermas (1981) can 
create flexible, adaptive, learning institutions that direct land use decisions (Innes and Booher, 
2003). Habermas (1970) postulated that if conditions could be created where all speakers 
legitimately represent interests for which they speak, speak sincerely, speak comprehensibly, and 
speak accurately, then the “ideal speech situation” could be approximated. Under such 
conditions, “more broadly discursive and more personally and publicly satisfying” decisions for 
public action can be achieved (Innes and Booher, 2003; see also Gualini, 2001). Collaborative 
planning theorists argue that a diversity of actors with interdependent interests is required as well 
to create the benefits of new creative answers for land use and resource questions built upon new 
lasting relationships. 
There are many examples of successful efforts to engage in formal consensus building for 
the purpose of collaborative policymaking (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999; Innes, 1992; Innes and 
Booher, 1999; Ostrom 1990). However, these cases are quite specific. They all require resources 
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and time to engage in a structured consensus building effort. They are all selective in who is 
involved. As well, it is unclear what conditions brought the diverse and interdependent actors to 
agree to engage with the consensus process under specified rules. In fact, within such 
explanations, the emergence of new organized interests remains under-theorized. Collaborative 
planning moves theories of institutional change mostly to the individual level, downplaying the 
role of organizations. It does not address the conditions under which emergent interest groups 
shape the parameters of the consensus process or how they deal with pre-existing power 
relations. This is especially the case for groups working for change outside of existing 
institutional norms. Thus, consensus processes describe how competing interdependent groups 
that already have motivations for consensus arrive at new answers. Required is a view of 
institutional change which accounts for how competing interests are first brought to roughly 
equivalent negotiating positions.  
Proponents of collaborative planning recognize the limitations of the approach. Innes and 
Booher (2003), two leading authors on collaborative planning, state that the collaborative policy 
dialogue approach does not fit well with hierarchically organized governance models (p. 50). 
Thus, most planning issues that are subject to the traditional political process and the typical 
alignment of interests around land use cannot be resolved through collaborative planning. As 
Innes and Booher (2003) explain, this approach is quite different than the “social movement 
model” of planning which challenges existing power structures (p. 53). The social movement 
model relies on advocacy for specific goals; collaborative planning is not based on a pre-defined 
set of goals. Rather, goals emerge through dialogue. The goal of collaborative planning is, 
instead, to create flexible and adaptive institutions capable of learning and changing according to 
changing conditions. While this is a necessary condition for effective urban environmental 
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institutions, there also needs to be a way of specifying desired outcomes. Thus, urban 
environmentalists require an institutional strategy that combines collaborative and social 
movement models. 
The social-ecological systems literature supports the call for adaptive and flexible 
institutional structures. It relies on a model of institutional change that is closely related to the 
social constructivist perspective in planning, but adds a focus on the need for flexible 
institutional structures that can constantly adapt to changing environmental conditions. 
Generally, the need to manage complexity in networks has led the social-ecological systems 
literature to focus on the need for institutional arrangements that work across multiple scales and 
flexibly respond to changing environmental conditions (see Crona & Hubacek, 2010; Ernstson et 
al., 2010; Prell et al., 2009). Olsson and colleagues (2004) argue that because ecosystems are 
complex and adaptive they require flexible governance structures that can change along with 
new knowledge and new ecosystem conditions (see also Dale, 2000; Walker, 2002). The authors 
are specifically concerned with the “social features” that enable resilient systems of adaptive co-
management. They highlight the fact that adaptive social-ecological systems can “emerge 
through organizational change within existing institutional arrangements” (2004, p. 83).  
This model of institutional change involves an emergent and self-organizing process of 
interactions within organizational networks that result in rapid adaptation to changing 
environmental conditions (see Buck, 2001; Ruitenbeek & Cartier, 2001).The argument is that 
effective institutional structures for managing social-ecological systems are characterized by the 
emergence of localized responses to problems that are then adopted by the larger institutional 
context. Such systems must work within existing institutional contexts, but also require flexible 
institutional structures that enable the conditions for emergence to be effective. As such, both 
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individual acts of stewardship and the governance system that supports them are crucial to a 
strong and resilient social-ecological system of adaptive co-management of ecological resources.  
In order to achieve the flexible and adaptive structure that is required, this literature 
focuses on bridging organizations that connect different areas of an organizational network as 
necessary components of a strong and effective institution. Bridge organizations are brokers that 
create flexible and adaptive qualities needed for a resilient social-ecological system (Ernstson et 
al., 2010). Ernstson and colleagues explain the role of bridge organizations in their description of 
“midscale managers” that incorporate new information into the network of organizations in a city 
to help local stewards flexibly respond to changing knowledge and ecological conditions. They 
also examine the role of “scale-crossing brokers” that unite the work of small scale ecosystem 
service managers with citywide and landscape-wide actors in order to create multi-scaled 
management practices. Ernstson and associates find balances “between centralization (for 
effective collective action) and decentralized modularity (for distributed diversity of autonomous 
and localized knowledge generation in preparation for change)” (2010, p. 5). In other words, the 
meso-level brokers that they analyze both centralize the functions of a sub-set of local stewards 
and allow for decentralized innovative practices by connecting local autonomous groups with 
higher-scale resources and knowledge. 
All of these approaches add important elements to the understanding of processes of 
institutional change in the urban environmental context. However, each of these perspectives is 
limited as well. The transactions-cost perspective relies upon the aggregation of individual 
preferences as an explanation for institutional change. Social constructivists concerned with 
institutional change in planning such as Healey, Hillier, and Gualini rely heavily upon notions of 
consensus building within complex, but underspecified emergent processes of social change. The 
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social-ecological systems perspective also relies upon emergent and self-organizing actors as 
drivers of institutional change, but does not explain how such systems are built within actual 
systems of urban governance.  
These approaches embrace only one type of institutional change: bottom-up. While 
atomistic, grassroots, and emergent forces can be sources of institutional change, the opportunity 
to alter the actions of entrenched interests that enforce existing institutional norms is limited for 
each of them. Because they do not explain change outside of the existing institutional 
boundaries, these perspectives embrace the circularity that Bromley (1989, p. 30) ascribes to 
many neo-institutionalist explanations in economics.
19
 Thus, these explanations cannot fully 
satisfy the needs of urban environmentalists seeking to move cities toward a new institutional 
frame that reflects a new set of norms for the built environment. 
There are a number of additional approaches to institutional change outside of the 
planning and urban ecosystems literature. One of the most established explanations is that it is a 
byproduct of technological change. Marx (1904) observed that “mankind always sets itself only 
such tasks as it can solve,” asserting that the material conditions for a solution must be present 
before a problem can be posed.
20
 This is an important notion for efforts to create environmentally 
conscious urban development, wherein the material conditions for a solution are present (or at 
least perceived to be in the form of alternative energy technology, green building strategies and 
sustainable planning programs), but the destructive model of classic sprawled urban growth 
                                                 
19
 This is the case for the sociological institutionalists in planning because they presume a set of actors that 
consensus can be sought from is already present—these actors are defined by existing institutional arrangements and 
thus limit the types of change that consensus processes make possible. For transactions cost analysts in planning this 
is the case because institutions themselves determine costs and values, a critique also leveled at the work of 
institutional economists such as O. Williamson, D. North, K. Arrow. See Bromley 1989 for more on this critique. 
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 Importantly, as Bromley (1989) points out, institutional economists have observed that the functionalist 
explanations for institutional change as a byproduct of technology are tautological because institutions themselves 
determine the costs and the values of the adoption of new technologies.  
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continues to spread. Clearly, the fact that the technology exists for a more environmentally sound 
system of urban development is not enough to change the way we build cities. If the functionalist 
view of institutional change as a byproduct of technological advancement is incomplete, what 
additional social mechanisms are needed to unite problem and solution within urban 
environmental planning and how do these mechanisms work? 
The mechanisms of institutional change have also been a focus for authors that analyze 
the discursive practice of sustainability (see Harvey, 1996; Rydin, 2003; Torgerson, 1995). For 
them, sustainable development offers a language for framing issues and setting goals, but is not 
associated with a particular set of political actions. Brand (2004: 10) critiques this perspective as 
limited. He writes, that “the problem with much discourse analysis [of sustainability] is that it 
limits itself to discourse as some discrete entity and ignores the ‘conditions of its emergence.’” In 
order to understand the impact of sustainable development, Brand argues, discourse, institutions, 
and spatial form must all be considered in dialectical relation to one another. Thus, the current 
view of the actual and potential impact of the abundant and continuing efforts at creating 
environmentally conscious urbanization is decidedly mixed.  
 
3.4| Heterarchic Governance 
The “conditions of emergence” which connect discourse with processes of institutional 
change and thus affect the shape of cities make up the largest persistent grey area in the analytic 
efforts to sort out these impacts. The heterarchic governance literature in sociology is one 
perspective that has addressed this issue with a specific focus on explaining how emergent social 
forms take shape in meso-level interactions to manage institutional change. Heterarchic 
governance involves a temporary alignment amongst competing organizational interests and has 
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been described most prominently as “neither market nor hierarchy” (Powell, 1990). The 
literature on heterarchic governance describes the conditions under which competing interests 
align within organizational fields. Stark (2000) writes that, “Whereas hierarchies involve 
relations of dependence, and markets involve relations of independence, heterarchies involve 
relations of interdependence” (p.12). The concept is especially suited for understanding 
situations where established institutional arrangements are in the process of being altered and, as 
a result, there is a general context of uncertainty that all organized interests must contend with 
(Stark, 1996; Jessop, 1997). Heterarchic governance has been applied to the study of regional 
economies, industrial districts, transitioning national regimes, and urban planning processes (see 
Powell 1990, Stark 1996, Jessop 1998, Stone 2006; McQuarrie, 2010).   
Heterarchy as a formal principle for framing interactions amongst groups was first 
established in the natural sciences (see McCulloch, 1965; Findlay and Lumsden, 1988). It was 
later applied to the activities of private corporations (see Hedlund, 1986; Grabher and Stark, 
1997; Stark, 1999). Grabher (2001) pioneered research that applies it to processes of urban and 
regional governance. He described five required features of any heterarchic social assemblage. 
The most important for him was diversity of organizations and rivalry amongst them. The 
benefits of adaptability to changing and complex environments that organizations gain from 
participation in heterarchic arrangements are derived from organizational diversity. This 
principle has long been established within the study of organizational ecology, which holds that 
“a system with a greater variety of organizational forms…has a higher probability of having in 
hand some solution that is satisfactory under changed environmental conditions” (Stark 2000, 
p.10 summarizing Hannan 1986, p.85).  
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Heterarchic systems, though, are not fundamentally about altruistic cooperation amongst 
heterogeneous actors. Within heterarchic arrangements, there is a rivalry between “competing 
and coexisting value systems” (Stark 2000, p. 13). Rivalry amongst organizations holds each of 
the groups accountable according to multiple logics and values, and to reflexive questioning of 
“the assumptions of one’s own organizational behavior” (Grabher 2001, p. 354). Rivalry 
combined with organizational diversity makes groups within a heterarchic assemblage better at 
finding answers within complex and dynamic moments of institutional crisis because each 
organization has “more than one way of evaluating worth” (Stark 2000, p. 13). When “sticky 
norms” (Kahan, 2000) make a new resolution difficult, heterarchic assemblages are one way of 
loosening those norms through contestation. This is because heterarchic governance situations 
leave open the question of which conception of worth, or which value system, should prevail in 
any given circumstance. As Grabher (2001) writes, “Rather than being built on a static 
coexistence of organizational forms, [heterarchies] are driven by rivalry between them” (p. 353). 
While rivalry and heterogeneity are essential to enabling organizations to reflexively evaluate 
their position within a changing institutional structure, so too is the ability to integrate and align 
the practices of organizations as a new set of norms, rules, and laws are being structured.  
In processes of urban development, heterarchic governance has been used to characterize 
periods where private market actors give up autonomy in decision-making and state actors give 
up top-down authority. In order to bring this about at the inter-organizational level, Jessop (1998, 
p. 36) argues, “the ‘added value’ that comes from partners combining resources rather than 
working alone” must be evident to all involved. The heterarchic governance literature focuses on 
the role of institutional crisis and uncertainty in creating such a condition. Here, the literature is 
open to the same criticism that collaborative planners are in requiring “ideal speech situations” to 
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be created without specifying how power structures are re-aligned to make such a condition 
possible. Heterarchic governance literature, though, has focused on some mechanisms that help 
to bring this about. Grabher (2001) argues that “tags” such as “sustainable development” and 
discrete projects that cut across institutional boundaries are the mechanisms of integration that 
allow diverse groups within a heterarchic governance assemblage to discover the possibilities for 
added value through partnership. As such, heterarchic governance situations require both 
advocacy and communication at the organizational level in order to structure a new set 
institutional norms, rules and regulations. The literature, though, is limited to explaining how 
situations are managed when institutional norms are in the process of changing.  
In his analysis of the organizational responses to the institutional crisis of a collapsing 
“growth machine” in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, McQuarrie (2010) offers a recent example of 
urban heterarchic governance. He describes the heterarchic arrangements of groups working 
there as important because “they get beyond idealistic conceptions of ‘policy paradigms’…and 
toward seeing how institutional change actually happens in experimentation and political 
contestation” (2010, p. 240). Immediately following World War II, Cleveland was a booming 
manufacturing city with a growing economic base and an institutional structure largely focused 
on expanding and investing in manufacturing infrastructure. By the mid-1960s and throughout 
the 1970s, the decline of the manufacturing economy in the United States, the migration of firms 
from union cities such as Cleveland, and ongoing unrest over civil rights combined to cause 
severe economic decline. The growth machine institutions that focused on expanding the 
economic base no longer had much financial capital and open conflict ensued between 
neighborhoods starved for investment. The primary rivalry that would define the next several 
decades was a contest between neighborhood interests and growth-oriented elites. In the end, 
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Cleveland’s political environment did not stabilize until the late 1990s. One of the results of its 
institutional crisis was a reconfiguration of affordable housing from a publicly provided good in 
the 1960s to a multi-interest tool for economic development in the 1990s and 2000s. As new 
institutional arrangements formed to link non-profits with state-provided tax credits which they 
sold to raise private capital for the creation of affordable housing, developers became a source of 
capital and began to be incorporated into the governance regime of the city.  
McQuarrie (2010) rejects the notion that the new governance regime can be solely 
explained as a consequence of external shock such as economic decline. Institutional innovation, 
he points out, is not an automatic response to such situations. Nor does McQuarrie subscribe to 
the generalized notion that “policy paradigms” or new diffusions of ideas explain the new 
arrangements that can be seen in Cleveland following the institutional crisis that arose in the 
1970s. Rather, McQuarrie is interested in “the practical experimentation that underpins 
institutional innovation” (p.246) across different types of organizations. McQuarrie turns to 
heterarchic governance precisely because it is the condition under which specific 
experimentation across institutional logics can develop into a new and possibly permanent 
institutional form. 
The institutional innovations that McQuarrie highlights in Cleveland involve the uses of 
Community Development Corporations and mediating organizations that linked those 
corporations to state and private actors. In the end, leaders of the CDCs were given high ranking 
positions in the municipal government, which McQuarrie argues signals a permanent shift away 
from hierarchic growth machine politics. In the new governance arrangement the state played a 
more marginal role than it had in the 1970s, private sector guided by mediating organizations 
brought capital and sector-specific modes of management and problem solving to the 
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arrangement, and nonprofits acted as developers and attracted foundation capital. As well, they 
“enable[d] a degree of community-based control and input into land use and development 
processes” (p.259). Nonprofits were the primary mediating organizations that worked across the 
different institutional logics of the governance assemblage. They were “the distinctive 
organizational forms in heterarchic governance” (p. 261).  
As this example demonstrates, the “ad-hoc forms of cooperation” (McQuarrie, 2010, p. 
261) that come with heterarchic governance arise in moments of institutional crisis and change 
because they combine different institutional logics across organizations (see Stark, 1996; 
McQuarrie, 2010; Jessop, 1997). Heterarchic governance in this example enables “a higher 
problem solving capacity in complex and dynamic situations” (Zimmerman, 2009). In Cleveland, 
it incorporated more perspectives than the prior hierarchically designed, growth-oriented 
structure of governance processes would allow. Greater interdependence amongst the units of 
governance (state, private, and civil society) increased the need for coordination across sectors 
and created complex feedback loops that could not be governed by one hierarchically organized 
bureaucracy. As such, even as the interdependence of groups increased, so too did the governing 
power of the marginalized. 
Heterarchic governance should, however, be applied narrowly. It refers to moments 
where uncertainty creates an impetus for institutional change and not to general conditions of 
governance. Some authors have taken heterarchy so far as to view it as the norm for governance 
in most advanced political economies. Gilles Paquet (1996), for example, argued that the 
organizational resources of most western societies are comprised roughly equally of “society, 
economy, and polity.” Paquet then argues that in reality there is not a pecking order amongst 
them. He describes the relationship as one where the state (polity) is neither properly 
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conceptualized as fully subservient or dominant to private interests. In his view, heterarchy is the 
norm for governance.  
While Paquet’s application of heterarchic governance would apply to far more situations 
than the theory can adequately explain, he does draw a useful connection between processes of 
heterarchic governance and the organizational ecology concept of co-evolution. Institutional co-
evolution involves “feedback processes among interacting systems (social, economic, political) 
going through a reciprocal process of change” (Paquet, 1996, p. 6). Akin to the punctuated 
equilibrium theory of biological evolution
21
, institutions likely co-evolve slowly all the time—
learning from the norms, rules, and laws of one another—but during periods of crisis and 
uncertainty when learning across institutional logics in order to problem solve becomes a matter 
of survival for organized interests
22
, co-evolution proceeds rapidly. Heterarchy, then, is the 
condition that typifies the punctuation in institutional co-evolutionary processes.  
Given the functional role in the co-evolution of institutions played by heterarchic 
governance relations, they need not necessarily lead to progressive institutions. McQuarrie 
concludes that “heterarchic governance in Cleveland has little accountability and has seriously 
skewed the distribution of resources in the city” (p. 262). Jessop (1998, p. 39) emphasizes the 
dangers of uncritically celebrating heterarchic forms of governance since they do not change 
market principles. Rather, it is simply a new, if more complex arena where the antagonisms 
created by competition for capital are expressed. Whitehead (2007) describes circumstances 
under which heterarchy became a facade placed over the normal hierarchic power structure of 
urban policymaking under Britain’s New Labour policies. The dark side of heterarchy that 
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 This theory posits that species generally evolve slowly over millennia but occasionally experience rapid processes 
of evolution due to environmental stimuli. 
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 This is also a period when heterarchic governance relations become common 
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Whitehead describes, though, arises when it is a pre-designed rather than emergent outcome and 
thus the partnerships are used as a way to market certain policy choices. Similar to Whitehead, in 
his study of heterarchic governance scenarios in the workforce development networks of Boston, 
Herranz (2008) demonstrates how the various management strategies which were designed to be 
heterarchic tended to actually reflect the pre-existing bureaucratic, entrepreneurial, or community 
focus of the dominant set of organizational actors in each workforce development program.  
The heterarchic governance situations that are important for processes of institutional 
change are not those that are consciously designed in advance, but rather those that result from 
moments of institutional crisis or from concerted and risk-taking efforts to innovate governance 
processes from within. Any analysis of heterarchic governance must be wary of the use of 
heterarchic facades by those in power to serve as a veneer of a flattened power structure over 
what is actually a hierarchic control over urban space. It cannot be said, though, that this is the 
situation for all heterarchic alignments, especially not those that are emergent within evolving 
political processes.  
 
3.5| Conclusion 
In line with the sociological literature on institutions, this study maintains the distinction 
between organizations and institutions. In this study, I focus on the “institutional arrangements” 
(Connor and Dovers, 2004, p. 19) that include the organizations that represent a given institution 
and the connections between those organizations. Thus, an institution is defined here as the rules 
and conventions that guide human activity and institutional arrangements are the core 
organizational associations that emanate from those rules and conventions. However, the focus 
on institutional arrangements should not be construed as an argument that institutions are the 
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same as organizations—rather, they are the norms that organizations support. In short, 
institutions are the infrastructure of human relations and organizations are components that 
comprise the infrastructure. The organizational relations that hold the components together 
determine how effectively the norms are enforced and thus are essential to consider in social 
processes.  
If institutions are “rules of the game” then institutional change is about changing those 
rules. Following the social constructivist approach in planning literature and the social-ecological 
systems approach, this study views institutional change as the result of an emergent process of 
interactions within organizational networks. These interactions impact the core organizational 
associations that enforce existing rules and conventions of urban development. However, from 
this perspective it is necessary to explain how emergent interests alter the actions of entrenched 
powerful organizations in the network. That is, existing organizational networks have uneven 
distributions of power and the entrenched interests will not simply change their actions because a 
new set of groups request it. Emergence of new institutional paths must be further specified in 
order for this model of institutional change to be useful for urban environmental planners.  
The literature on heterarchic governance has focused on how opportunities arise for 
emergent interests to direct other organized actors in the network. A more robust model of 
institutional change combines the social constructivist view with theories of heterarchic 
governance. This robust model can guide urban environmental planners who face a divided 
institutional context amongst the community development and environmental interests toward 
effective actions that will create institutional change. Urban environmentalists also face a deeply 
entrenched power imbalance within the institutions that direct urban development. As such, 
specification of a model of institutional change as an emergent process of inter-organizational 
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activities that builds upon moments of heterarchic governance is especially useful for urban 
environmental planners. 
An analysis of institutional processes that employs a heterarchic governance approach 
focuses on how the moment is created where traditionally hierarchically aligned powers become 
flattened. In this moment, new outcomes for land use become possible because the traditional 
approach of those at the top of the hierarchy is no longer the only one considered. Contestation 
does not go away. Rather, it is empowered. The outcomes of contestation within an established 
hierarchy are basically predetermined. The outcomes of contestation in a heterarchy are open. 
Thus, heterarchic governance analysis focuses not only on how the contestation is managed once 
the heterarchy is achieved (as is the case with collaborative policymaking), but also on how the 

















Chapter 4: History 
The National Land Use Policy Debates, 1970-1975 
 
 
“Those who believe that we are talking about the Grand Canyon and the Catskills, 
but not Harlem and Watts, are wrong.” 




4.1| Introduction: “Battlelines” in the National Land Use Policy Debates 
In order to demonstrate the extent and effect of the institutional divide between 
community development and environmentalism, this chapter presents the results of an archival 
analysis of the failed effort between 1970 and 1975 to create a national land use policy in the 
United States. During this time, Congress, the President, and federal agency representatives 
debated the proper role for federal and state governments with regard to regulation of land use in 
urban regions. The failure to pass a national land use policy, despite strong support from across 
the political spectrum, expressed the tensions between the newly developing federal urban and 
environmental regulatory structures and cemented the institutional divide between them. All 
efforts since this time to create more sustainable and socially just land use patterns have had to 
contend with the national institutional structure that resulted from this period.  
In reference to the developing dynamic within the debate over national land use policy, 
Robert M. Paul, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Acting Director 
of the Office of Program Evaluation and Development stated that he was “very uncomfortable 
with the battlelines that are being drawn up.”
24
 Paul was concerned that a fundamental divide 
between the urban and environmental regulatory spheres was forming. He referred to the 
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 Quoted in Gottlieb (1993), p. 112. Originally reproduced in: Environmental Action (1970) Earth Day—The 
Beginning, A Guide for Survival. Bantam Books: New York. 
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 Memo from Robert Paul to Frederick McGlaughlin, Subject: Jackson Bill. January 12, 1971. (s. 3354). Record 
Group 207, E135, Bin 14. Folder: Jackson-Javitz Bills. 
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divisions between HUD’s national growth policy, the Council on Environmental Quality’s 
(CEQ) proposal for a national land use policy, and a bill authored by Senator Henry M. Jackson 
then under consideration in Congress which prioritized environmental issues and was to be 
directed by the Department of Interior (DOI). The “battlelines” that made Paul uncomfortable 
were being drawn between HUD’s urban constituency and the rising environmental lobby. Paul 
saw the potential for the environmental approach to national land use policy focused on 
alleviating pollution and congestion to appeal to a middle class suburban constituency that had 
already left cities, and to supplant urban policy focused on addressing poverty and social equity.  
In 1970, environmental and community development interests were relatively new 
additions to the federal regulatory apparatus. As a result, urban and environmental agencies were 
in the process of setting their long-term agendas and carving out their policy domains. HUD 
established a programmatic focus on community development and residential desegregation, as 
well as widespread homeownership in urban and suburban areas. The agency enforced the Fair 
Housing Act which banned discrimination in home buying and lending, and administered 
federally-backed home loans which made credit available to a much wider market than had 
previously been possible. These efforts were linked with pre-existing “Urban Renewal” and 
Model Cities initiatives focused on redeveloping urban centers, as well as the New Communities 
program which provided federal support for development of new urban centers. All of these 
programs were part of ongoing efforts to halt processes of urban decline and enable expansion of 
new development outside of existing city centers (Weaver, 1985).  
For its part, the newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as well as the 
Department of Interior (DOI) and the Water Resources Council (WRC), were focused on 
environmental resource management. The DOI, which houses the National Parks Service (NPS), 
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administered a number of conservation-oriented land use programs. The EPA and the WRC were 
recent inventions at the time, reflecting a new wave of environmental policy including the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969 and the Clean Air Act of 1970. These 
agencies focused mainly on controlling pollution.  
One of the most contentious early issues within the national land use debates centered on 
which federal entity would be the “lead agency” for the proposed policy. The primary question 
was whether the policy should be directed by HUD— the federal agency responsible for 
community development programs — or another department more connected with environmental 
issues such as the DOI or the WRC. The battle over which “institutional home” (see Bonastia, 
2000, p.1) was right for national land use policy was not a simple battle for bureaucratic turf. It 
was a statement on which goals—community development or environmental—would have 
greater political importance in the new federal regulatory structure of the 1970s. 
Despite overwhelming support from the President, Congressional leaders, and the public, 
five years of negotiations over national land use policy resulted in a proposal that no longer 
appealed to either urban or environmental interests (Weir, 2000). The battle between the 
agencies and the committees that represented them led to a vague legislative proposal (see 
Corrigan, 1971; Flippen, 2000). Eventually, the community development and environmental 
advocates involved could not be sure exactly whose interests the legislation would serve and the 
effort was abandoned in 1975. As a result of the failure to pass legislation, the divided 
institutional structure of urban and environmental policy that developed during the debate 




Weir (2000) established the centrality of the national land use planning policy debate for 
the field of urban environmental planning.
25
 Though her analysis was based upon secondary 
literature and media reports, she argued that urban interests at the time viewed environmental 
interests as potential competitors for federal resources and largely saw the National Land Use 
Planning Act as an environmental bill which might usurp what regional planning capacity HUD 
possessed (pp. 203-204). She focused on the deep mistrust amongst urban advocates over the 
possibility that the rising environmental agenda would displace the progress made in addressing 
urban social issues. For their part, Weir argues, the environmentalists at the time were oriented 
toward specific local battles against development and had little interest in or capacity for state-
level land use planning (pp. 206-208). Weir argued that the act would have created “an 
alternative institutional setting where advocates from both groups (urban and environmental) 
could interact” (p. 212). She concludes that the missed opportunity to create such an institutional 
space is one of the largest missteps that both groups made at the time.  
This chapter builds on Weir’s argument. It employs primary documents from the time to 
focus on the institutional effects of the missed opportunity that Weir describes. It reports the 
findings from analysis of roughly 600 pages of archived memos, policy reports, and other 
materials relevant to the debates over the proposed National Land Use Policy Act dated between 
1970 and 1975. The documents came from the National Archives II facility in College Park, 
Maryland. They are drawn from collections deposited by HUD, the Urban Affairs Council 
(UAC), Richard Nixon’s staff files, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and 
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 Weir’s argument is mostly conceptual. It does not extend to the institutional structure that current policies must 
contend with and does not utilize the primary documents presented here. Rather her argument is based on secondary 
literature and media reports. Several other authors have addressed this topic within the academic literature, but none 
have focused on the institutional issues in the debate. See Corrigan (1971), Graham (1976), Lyday (1976), Hanson 
(1982), Popper (1988), Daly (1996), Flippen (2000), Kayden (2000), Lacey (2000), Rome (2001).  
126 
 
the Department of the Interior (DOI). As well, secondary literature is employed to further 
contextualize the events referenced within the archived documents.  
In the sections that follow, I present a detailed analysis of the political battles over 
national land use policy in the 1970s with a focus on the role played by urban policy agencies. I 
ask how the urban interests represented by HUD constructed their position within the debate 
relative to environmental interests. I conclude with a description of the institutional structure that 
developed in the wake of these unresolved tensions over the direction of land use regulation. 
This structure, I argue, became the essential context to which the state-level urban environmental 
policies examined in subsequent chapters had to respond. 
 
4.2| Nixon’s Urban and Environmental Policy  
The 1970s debates over national land use planning were paradoxical; they took place at a 
time when sweeping federal action was becoming increasingly improbable in the United States 
(Hudson, 1980). The Administration of President Richard Nixon covered most of the period 
between 1970 and 1975, when the policy was proposed. In 1969, Nixon presented his doctrine of 
“New Federalism” which called for a dramatic reduction in the role played by the federal 
government. He favored state and local government as the proper level for deciding appropriate 
action in most cases and sought through “revenue sharing” to give states and localities greater 
power in deciding how to best spend federal grants for infrastructure and social programs 
(Conlan, 1988; Hanson, 1982, p. 64).  
However, one year after Nixon presented his doctrine of New Federalism, his own 
appointees to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) cited the need for a national land use 
planning policy as the highest priority environmental issue (Council on Environmental Quality 
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(CEQ), 1970). The CEQ report stated, “The time has come when we must accept the idea that 
none of us has the right to abuse the land and that, on the contrary, society as a whole has a 
legitimate interest in proper land use…we must work toward development of an effective 
National Land Use Policy…” (pp. xii-xiii). The report concluded, “Urban land misuse is one of 
today’s most severe environmental problems” (p.10). The authors pointed to suburban growth as 
the primary culprit which destroyed open space, covered floodplains, led to the expansion of 
space for cars at the expense of natural areas, and drove demand for infrastructure that hindered 
natural processes (p. 170). The CEQ report observed that this process led to an annual 
conversion of two million acres of rural land to developed purposes. It concluded that “there is a 
need to begin shaping a national land use policy” (p. 191). 
Given that land use had always been a sacrosanct power of localities in the United States, 
it was paradoxical for Nixon to embrace CEQ’s recommendation. Clearly, a federal land use 
policy would contradict the doctrine of New Federalism. However, as Nixon entered office, the 
issues of water and air pollution rose to the top of the public’s consciousness. In 1969, an oil 
slick on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio caught fire and burned two railroad trestles. Time magazine 
ran a piece on the incident using it as an example of the extreme level of pollutants in formerly 
industrial urban waterways. The Cuyahoga River fire then became a powerful national symbol 
that mobilized a wide set of interests around the cause of addressing the “ecological crisis” in 
postindustrial urban regions (Straddling and Straddling, 2008, p. 518).  
The extent of public interest in taking action to protect the environment was made clear 
soon afterward on 22 April 1970 at the first Earth Day. The event was initially organized as a 
“teach-in” on environmental issues at Harvard University, but quickly became a nationwide 
series of rallies and protests attended by 20 million people (Flippen, 2000, Chapter 1). As a result 
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of the large crowds and media attention, Earth Day is credited with marking the beginning of the 
modern environmental movement in the United States. At least early on, conservative and liberal 
politicians alike sought to capitalize on the mass appeal of the movement (Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 7-
8).  
Nixon told his staff even before he had taken office to “get out in front of the 
environmental issue” (Lazarus, 2004, p. 75). By 1970, he was desperate to court the increasingly 
powerful environmental lobby in order to offset public outrage at his support for continued 
military action in Viet Nam (Flippen, 2000, Chapter 1; Train 1996). In addition, the politically 
conservative director of CEQ, Russell Train, was appointed by Nixon himself; the policy 
prescriptions that Train produced could not be easily ignored. As a result, Nixon embraced the 
contradictory position of supporting New Federalism on the one hand and a national land use 
policy on the other. Such contradictions were a part of Nixon’s political strategy, wherein he 
commonly spoke to conflicting interests as if they were both a part of his agenda (see Graham, 
1976, pp. 190-198). He made his position clear during the 1970 State of the Union address. After 
describing both urban and environmental challenges that the country faced, he stated, “I propose 
that before these problems become insoluble, the nation develop a national growth policy” 
(Nixon, 1970, Paragraph 101). 
In using the language of “growth policy” rather than the more specific land use policy, 
Nixon was acknowledging the fact that in 1970 the environment was only one of two domestic 
issues that commanded the American public’s attention; racial unrest in cities associated with 
urban decline was also a domestic concern on the minds of many. For each of the six years prior 
there had been at least one large and widely televised riot in a major US city. The riots, which 
came to be associated with an “urban crisis” in postindustrial America, were sparked by specific 
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racist incidents such as police brutality or overt acts of discrimination, but expressed deep and 
widespread frustrations on the part of minorities who had been largely excluded from the 
benefits of American postwar prosperity (see Sugrue, 1996). Recognizing the high level of 
public interest in addressing both the urban and environmental crises, Nixon stated in his 1969 
inaugural address that, “in pursuing our goals of…excellence…in rebuilding our cities…and in 
protecting our environment…we will and must press urgently forward” (Nixon, 1969, Paragraph 
35). Indeed, in Nixon’s early years as president, he addressed both of these issues within his 
domestic policy agenda (Hanson, 1982, pp. 9-11).   
In light of the importance of developing both an urban and environmental agenda, 
Nixon’s embrace of national land use planning was politically pragmatic (Graham, 1996). It was 
as an opportunity to appeal to his most important domestic policy constituents. Initially, Nixon 
responded to pressure to develop a national urban policy by supporting HUD as the lead agency 
in this effort. In putting national land use planning which environmentalists wanted under the 
direction of HUD, the primary urban agency, Nixon could take care of both urban and 
environmental issues. As will be seen though, HUD was weary of the proposals coming out of 
the environmentalist camp. Fred McLaughlin, Director of the HUD Office of Plans, Programs 
and Evaluation offered this critique of one of the first versions of a bill proposal for national land 
use policy created by environmental interests: 
The bill, as we read it, approaches land use planning primarily from the standpoint of 
physical planning, with the emphasis on environmental protection, recreation, and 
industrial land-use. It does not appear to give attention to the broader issues of national 
urbanization patterns nor the impact of emerging land-use patterns in urban areas on 
housing choices and job opportunities, indeed, on the social fabric of urban America (see 
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Twelve years after McGlaughlin’s comments on the environmental land use legislation that was 
proposed, Hanson (1982) summarized the concerns of the urban policy agency. He wrote: 
The environmental emphasis allowed “urban problems” to be translated to mean high 
densities, congestion, crime, and pollution. A suburban constituency for preventing these 
conditions was gathering force. The same constituency was not much interested in the 
“old” urban problems of poverty and racial conflict. (p. 13) 
 
McGlaughlin’s statements reflected, as well, that the agency’s concern with “old” urban issues 
left little capacity or desire to substantively incorporate the issues of the new environmental 
movement. Reflective of the agency’s inherent reticence to address environmental issues for fear 
that they would overwhelm social issues, one HUD staff report states:   
Growth…may…strain the capacity of the urban ecology to provide air, water—and the 
solitude, perhaps—of the quality necessary to sustain a “proper” balance between man 
and the natural environment…However…we [HUD] are concerned not so much with 
growth itself, but with the way we are growing—and the impact on community 




The lack of institutional space for urban and environmental policy to be co-created at the 
federal level complicated Nixon’s push for a national land use planning policy that served both 
interests. The environmental policymakers had shown little interest in the “old” urban problems 
and the urban policymakers had little capacity to address the “proper” balance between man and 
the natural environment. This hurdle was never addressed, let alone removed. In the end, Nixon 
gave up his hope for a united policy. He accepted and even fueled the institutional divide 
between the two sides as he pulled away from both urban and environmental approaches to 
national land use planning. 
Nixon, however was not the only one directing the push for national land use policy. For 
a number of strong proponents of environmental regulation, a national land use policy was the 
logical next step from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). As a result, the 
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CEQ proposal was one among several calls for a land use policy from the environmental 
community. Congressional sponsors, including Senators Henry M. Jackson, Edmund Muskie, 
and Representative Wayne N. Aspinall, pushed back forcefully when Nixon and the CEQ 
signaled support early in the discussion for HUD as the lead agency. The Congressmen’s own 
competing proposals for legislation supported the DOI or the WRC to direct national land use 
planning. Under pressure from the growing list of environmental interests, Nixon himself soon 
switched his support from HUD to the DOI, at least offering hope that national land use planning 
could move forward as an environmental initiative. However, even this hope was soon undone. 
The lack of resolution among legislators over where land use policy belonged and the 
failure to pass any policy at all despite initial support from a broad spectrum of political interests 
reinforced the institutional divisions between community development and environmentalism 
with regard to land use regulation. As such, the separation between urban and environmental 
policy became entrenched at the federal level. The result was a divided institutional structure for 
urban environmental policy. However, given the overwhelming push for national land use policy 
as an environmental initiative, urban interests likely would not have even been a part of the 
discussion if Nixon had not already been pressured to create a coherent national urban policy. 
 
4.3| Toward a National Urban Policy 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan used his position as head of President Richard Nixon’s 
Urban Affairs Council (UAC) to substantially shape the initial terms of the debate over national 
land use policy. On 3 February 1969, only two weeks after Nixon’s inauguration and before the 
newly appointed Secretary of HUD, George C. Romney, had fully commenced his duties, 
Senator Moynihan presented a paper he wrote, Toward a National Urban Policy, to members of 
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the recently created Urban Affairs Council (see Appendix 5 for the full report).
28
 Romney was a 
member of the UAC and Moynihan was Executive Secretary. Moynihan used his prerogative to 
set the agenda by presenting his paper very early in the Council’s existence. Toward a National 
Urban Policy was a 10-point statement of priorities which stressed the need for more and greater 
federal incentive programs for cities, but also aligned his approach with the Nixon 
administration. In it, Moynihan wrote (p. 3): 
As yet the federal government, no more than state or local government, has not found an 
effective incentive system—comparable to profit in private enterprise, prestige in 
intellectual activity, rank in military organizations—whereby to shape the forces that 
work in urban areas in such a way that urban goals—whatever they may be—are in fact 
attained. This search for incentives and the realization that present procedures such as 
categorical grant-in-aid programs do not seem to provide sufficiently powerful ones must 
accompany and suffuse the efforts to establish goals as such. 
 
While this language seems carefully formulated to appeal to the incoming administration 
that had publicly criticized the grant-in-aid programs of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” 
initiatives, Moynihan in fact had been an architect of several of these programs and sought to 
extend them even if in a new guise under Nixon. In the remainder of the paper, Moynihan 
established the goals that he believed federal incentive programs should have. First and foremost, 
Moynihan thought that urban policy goals should focus on social programs. For his first point, he 
asserted the primacy of efforts to address conditions of “poverty and isolation of minority groups 
in central cities” (p. 4).
29
 Second, Moynihan attacked the simple calculus used in most federal 
urban policymaking. He sought for all policymakers to recognize that interventions in the urban 
environment create multiple feedbacks for which policymakers must account. Moynihan’s 
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recognition of urban policy as part of a complex system implicitly acknowledged the 
shortcomings of Great Society programs that met resistance because they empowered activists to 
circumvent local governments. Nixon’s own critique of Great Society programs was primarily 
that they were too costly and overly-bureaucratic (Glazer, 1973). Moynihan left room for this 
critique without actually restating it.  
Moynihan called for a number of other initiatives including re-organization of local 
governments and increased state-level involvement in urban affairs. However, in order to avoid a 
specific political challenge, he framed his national urban policy broadly without naming any 
detailed programs. His intent was clear, though: Toward a National Urban Policy called for 
maintaining the Johnson-era focus on federal grants that address issues of inequality between 
races, classes, and across jurisdictions. That this agenda conflicted with Nixon’s preferred 
approach was, for Moynihan, a matter of semantics. He sought to reframe those goals within 
language that Nixon could embrace and his national urban policy proposal was a primary vehicle 
for doing so.  
At the time that he was developing his paper, Moynihan was working closely with 
Nixon’s staff to invent a new structure for welfare policy (see Moynihan, 1973). Moynihan 
designed Nixon’s amendments to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children welfare program, 
which was a high-profile initiative that received a lot of media attention. This gave Moynihan 
especially close access to the President just as Nixon was coming into office (Weisman, 2010, p. 
173). Moynihan sought to capitalize on his access. Communications between Moynihan and the 
White House indicate that John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs who 
Nixon had largely put in charge of urban and environmental policy, was aware of Moynihan’s 
Toward a National Urban Policy report but was largely unconcerned about its contents. He was 
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focused instead on the welfare policy discussions. This was the case even when Moynihan 
pushed his urban policy priorities into the public realm before the Nixon administration had fully 
developed its own set of priorities. It was widely known that Nixon held Moynihan in high 
esteem, but in this case the Senator was working both with and against the new administration. 
On 21 April 1969, Moynihan moved to forward his urban agenda within the Nixon 
administration. He wrote in a memo to the president that: 
There are now quite a few copies of this document [his paper, Toward a National Urban 
Policy], originally presented to the Urban Affairs Council on February 3, circulating. I 
fear one is likely to end up in the press. Worse things could happen. I think the time has 
come when a reasoned, and fairly detailed statement of administration thinking in this 




Moynihan’s suggestion was clearly that his paper should serve as the administration’s statement 
of urban policy. He offered to present the report at his next public speaking event, an address to 
the Honors Convocation at Syracuse University two weeks later.  
Moynihan knew full well, as staff Secretary of the UAC, that Nixon had not developed a 
“reasoned, and fairly detailed statement of administration thinking” on urban policy. Still, he 
casually implanted his own thinking on the issue in the public realm and implied that it 
represented the administration. He cornered Nixon’s staff into accepting its public presentation. 
As he was the producer of the report, the “threat” of his paper going to the press clearly 
originated from Moynihan or others to whom he had shown it. In seeking the administration’s 
approval to speak of it publicly as the UAC Secretary, he was committing Nixon’s 
administration to either adopt the agenda that the report laid out or respond to it in specific terms. 
This meant that the issues Moynihan thought were most important would shape the debate about 
urban policy regardless of whether his report was adopted or not. 
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In a memorandum for the record filed by Moynihan, he notes that Ehrlichman called on 
the morning of 24 April 1969 to approve his request to present the urban policy paper at 
Syracuse University.
31
 However, in written response to Moynihan’s memo, Ken Cole, an 
Assistant to the President, is more circumspect. Cole writes, “the president feels that it is still too 
soon to put out the Administration’s statement which you recommend or that if such a statement 
were issued it should omit welfare.”
32
 Moynihan took the latter option and publicly presented his 
report without mentioning welfare. Rather, he proposed to double federal aid to state and local 
authorities in order to accomplish the goals of his desired national urban policy, most of which 
he discussed at the Syracuse convocation. 
Moynihan’s push for a national urban policy established the initial context for discussions 
about national land use policy. He had entered the federal government as Assistant Labor 
Secretary for Policy and Planning Research. From this position and later as Senator, he helped to 
define urban social policy for several presidential administrations and was one of the architects 
of former President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty” initiatives. He sought to continue in 
this direction in the face of a new administration that was openly hostile to direct federal grant-
in-aid programs. His manipulation of the urban policy discussion was typical of Moynihan’s 
efforts to push Nixon toward framing his administration as conservative in its base but 
supportive of liberal democratic principles; a direction that was also reflective of Moynihan’s 
own “neoconservative” tendencies. In this regard, Nixon was fond of citing Moynihan’s 
comparison between him and British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli who was known for 
supporting “Tory men and Whig measures” (Weisman, 2010, p. 201).  
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This characterization of his administration as one that balanced conservative ideals with 
liberal actions and Moynihan’s call for a federal vision on urban issues informed Nixon’s 
original decision to position land use policy as an urban program under the control of HUD. 
Despite this, George Romney, the Republican director of HUD and Chair of the Urban Affairs 
Council was less enamored of Moynihan and became frustrated with the Senator’s efforts to 
control the urban policy discussion without HUD’s input. Romney complained to Ehrlichman 
that Moynihan did not consult him or others in developing his policy statement. When Moynihan 
presented the paper to the UAC on 3 February 1969 Romney had only been in his position for 
two weeks and apparently was not present as he was unaware of the report and Moynihan’s 
intentions until one year later. On 19 February 1970 Romney wrote in a memo that Toward a 
National Urban Policy had not been reviewed by him and was not developed in collaboration 
with his agency or other members of the Urban Affairs Council:  
Policy matters of this character certainly deserve to be brought before a Council created 
to consider urban problems. And our Department, more responsible for urban problems 





Ehrlichman responded that early drafts had been circulated but did not deny Moynihan had taken 
it upon himself to write and publicize the document. Generally, Ehrlichman expressed little 
concern about the situation which clearly bothered Romney. In part, the low-level of concern 
from Ehrlichman reflected the high esteem that Nixon held for Moynihan, especially early in his 
administration (see Weisman, 2010, p. 198), but it also reflected the low priority that Nixon gave 
to HUD and urban issues.  
Moynihan, though, continued leveraging his position as Staff Secretary of the Urban 
Affairs Council and publicly discussed Toward a National Urban Policy. Reference to the paper 
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in connection with the UAC’s activities began to appear in news reports by May 1969 
(Spartanburg Herald, 1969). As a result, HUD was in an uncomfortable position. It was the 
agency ostensibly responsible for urban policy, but had no direct connection to the major urban 
policy statement being attached to Nixon’s Administration. As a result of the publicity given to 
Moynihan’s paper, by June 1970, HUD was calling for a decision on the issues that Moynihan 
raised. In a letter filed by John Ehrlichman on 2 June 1970, an unidentified HUD staff member 
wrote, “The major remaining issue is urban growth policy. Here the orders have not been given, 
the course has not been set. The administration’s position is ambiguous.”
34
 The memo goes on, 
“Pat Moynihan has suggested as the first point of his 10-point urban policy, ‘The poverty and 
social isolation of minority groups in central cities is the single most serious problem of the 
American City today.’” The author presents two “threshold questions,” the first of which is:  
Does the Administration accept the Moynihan premise that poverty and social isolation of 
minority groups in central cities must be attacked with urgency, and with a greater 
commitment of resources than has heretofore been the case? 
 
This call on HUD’s part for clarification further forced Moynihan’s report to be the central 
reference point for the Nixon administration’s still-developing approach to urban issues. The 
author argued that the administration should accept the premise along with what was labeled the 
“Romney premise” to ensure that every American is able to live within reasonable distance of 
their workplace as the foundation of a national urban policy. The author noted as well that this 
would require vastly more resources for HUD programs and institutional change around land use 
decision-making.  
During his early time as president, Nixon demonstrated that he did not have a political 
appetite for large-scale urban programs such as those called for in the Great Society of Lyndon 
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Johnson. He scaled back or eliminated Johnson’s Community Action and housing programs 
(Nathan, 1996). However, Moynihan’s maneuvering forced a situation where members of his 
own administration were calling for a national policy to address urban social inequities. The 
“Moynihan premise,” then, became Nixon’s starting point in issues of national growth policy, 
which later fueled his motivation to support HUD as lead for national land use policy.  
Without any direct engagement with the national land use planning policy debate that 
arose around environmental issues, Moynihan had stressed very early in Nixon’s presidency the 
social and urban aspects of national land use policy. Through his staff position on the UAC, 
Moynihan leveraged the political opportunity he saw in the interim period between 
administrations to force his perspective onto the agenda. He clearly wanted urban issues to be 
treated as a national issue. While HUD resented his involvement, Moynihan’s political 
maneuverings boosted the agency’s position relative to environmental interests in the initial 
discussion about national land use policy. At least at first, urban interests were at the fore of the 
policy goals for the administration because Moynihan had forced Nixon’s hand in this regard. 
Given the extent to which environmental interests soon began to take ownership over the issue of 
land use policy and the extent to which Nixon became hostile toward what he referred to 
derisively as the “HUD Planners” (Hanson, 1982, p.23), this was essential to keeping HUD and 
the goals of urban policymakers in the discussion. 
 
4.4| Toward a National Land Use Policy 
Moynihan’s attention to national urban policy was diverted in early 1970s as the debates 
over welfare policy heated up. However, several representatives, including Congressman 
Thomas Ashley picked up the issues he had raised. Ashley was a member of the House Banking 
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and Currency Committee. He had a close working relationship with urban advocates including 
the Conference of Mayors and the League of Cities that sought to focus national growth policy 
on a social agenda. He shared their interest in issues of equity and inner city community 
development (Hanson, 1982, p.14). Throughout 1970, Ashley fought for the National Urban 
Growth Policy and New Community Development Act,
35
 which required the newly created 
Domestic Growth Council (Domestic Council) to submit to Congress a bi-annual report on 
national growth policy. The Act was primarily presented as supporting legislation for the New 
Communities program administered by HUD but included the requirement of a bi-annual report 
on the social goals for urban growth which the federal policy sought to support. Ashley’s 
legislation was a response from those concerned with inner city redevelopment to calls from 
several environmental interests for a national land use policy. It was an effort to regain control 
over the national land use policy issue on the part of community development-oriented urban 
interests. 
The call for national land use policy from environmental interests was forceful. President 
Nixon had proclaimed that the 1970s would be “the environmental decade” at the signing 
ceremony for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on January 1, 1970 (Lyday, 1976, 
p. 1). NEPA’s sponsor and Chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, Henry M. Jackson, 
argued that “intelligent land use planning and management provide the single most important 
institutional device for preserving and enhancing the environment” (Lyday, 1976, p.7).  As a 
result, Jackson proposed the National Land Use Policy Act (S. 3354) in late January 1970. For 
Jackson, the proposal was a means of asserting a strong role for the Interior Committee in the 
emerging arena of environmental regulation. Jackson wanted to get ahead of others that might 
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seek to propose land use policies in order to claim the topic for the Interior Committee. As a 
result, the initial version of the bill was put out hastily and was not envisioned as a final 
statement. Rather, Jackson commented that it “furnishes a working draft which federal, state, and 
local officials, planners, and representatives of industry, business, and public groups may 
comment upon” (ibid).  
The simultaneous but separate calls for a national urban policy focused on social issues 
and a national land use policy focused on environmental issues were indicative of a disagreement 
amongst policymakers over the proper focus for federal land use policy. As one observer wrote, 
“Within Congress, the ‘environmental’ and ‘urban’ interests were following separate tracks” 
(Hanson, 1982, p.14). Nixon had a vested interest in shaping the outcomes of both of  these 
tracks in order to support his domestic agenda and protect his doctrine of New Federalism. 
Initially, he sought to do so by combining the urban and environmental interests in one piece of 
legislation. This strategy, however, was abandoned once it became clear that such an approach 
was untenable because of the divisions between the two positions. 
 
4.4a: The Environmental Proposal for Land Use Policy  
Jackson’s draft bill provided funds to states to plan for land uses outside of incorporated 
cities and created a federal council that would approve the plans, mostly to ensure that they did 
not have unacceptable environmental impacts. The legislative purpose as stated in the bill was: 
…to establish a national policy to encourage and assist the several states to more effectively 
exercise their constitutional responsibilities for the planning, management, and 
administration of the Nation's land resources through the development and implementation 
of comprehensive "Statewide Environmental, Recreational and Industrial Land Use 
Plans"… and management programs designed to achieve an ecologically and 
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Jackson framed nearly every provision of the bill in environmental terms with few references to 
social impacts. At the hearing for his proposal, he stated: 
To a very great extent all environmental management decisions are ultimately related to land 
use decisions.  All environmental problems are outgrowths of land use patterns.  The 
collective land use decisions which we make today and in the future will dictate our success 




Importantly, the bill excluded cities from its provisions. It had a proviso that states could 
exclude “lands which are incorporated within the boundaries of any incorporated city.”
38
 Far 
from an activist, Jackson wanted to deflect claims that he was unduly impinging on local control 
over land use. Jackson was a moderate Democrat and Chair of the Interior Committee. While his 
sponsorship of NEPA made him a leading member of Congress on environmental issues, he also 
had longstanding connections with mining and oil interests. As a result, his intentions with 
national land use policy were not entirely clear. As Graham (1976) writes, “Jackson wanted a 
broader context, but he was not eager to be cast as a communist or visionary” (p.220).  
Jackson sought to rationalize the process of land use decision-making in favor of 
environmental goals. In addition to sponsoring NEPA, he was on the side of environmental 
groups in several high profile land use and natural resource conflicts during the 1960s. He 
opposed the Bridge Canyon Dam which would have flooded the Grand Canyon and the Miami 
Jetport proposal which would have threatened the Everglades National Park (see Pearson, 1994; 
Gilmour and McCauley, 1975). Jackson’s primary concern within the Bridge Canyon Dam and 
Miami Jetport debates was that multiple governmental programs were working at cross-purposes. 
This informed his approach to national land use policy. He commented at the hearings on the bill 
that “the thing that disturbed me and which led to introduction of this legislation is the fact that 
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in all 50 states…we do not have an adequate forum to adjudicate these conflicts” (as cited in 
Plotkin, 1980, p. 423, note 37).  He argued that “the solution is to be found in a framework in 
which all proposals to utilize environmental resources can be balanced against one another and 
measured against the demands they collectively impose on the environment” (ibid.).   
Jackson’s somewhat ambiguous identity relative to environmental issues and his focus on 
procedural rather than substantive concerns served him well in muting the response to his initial 
proposal for a national land use policy. While Jackson’s legislation was only meant to be a 
starting point for discussion, it did not generate any heated response, either for or against. The 
bill was vague enough and Jackson’s own loyalties were diffuse enough that a diverse set of 
interests including farmers, local governments, the energy industry, environmental 
preservationists, and the Nixon administration all saw potential benefits in its passage, at least 
initially (Lyday, 1976, pp. 12-15).   
 
4.4b: HUD’s Response to the Jackson Bill 
HUD was one of the few organized interests to express concern about Jackson’s bill. It 
seemed to several members of HUD that Jackson’s bill would be a duplication of the existing 
701 land use planning program, but without sufficient attention paid to social issues. The section 
701 grant, known as the Comprehensive Planning Assistance Program, was created in 1954 
(before HUD existed) to support metropolitan comprehensive planning efforts and was amended 
in 1965 to support the planning activities of Councils of Governments (COGs), which are 
regional governing bodies. The program was placed under HUD’s control when the agency was 
created and was amended again in 1968 to require that housing be included in regional plans 
funded by the 701 program. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 provided 
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substantially more planning funding for states and regions under the program. HUD saw the 701 
program as its primary national land use planning initiative and it was looking to increase the 
resources and profile attached to 701 plans. 
The incentive-based approach of the 701 planning program encouraged incremental 
changes in regions. It represented the stated strategy of HUD staff in developing regional 
planning capacity, even before Romney pushed it as a priority toward the end of his tenure. One 
HUD staff member wrote: 
To propose and support a quantum leap forward into metropolitan government—even if 
there was consensus on the desirability of such government—is infeasible. Rather, the 
federal government should use its leverage and leadership to make incremental 
improvements and to identify targets of opportunity—beginning with the coordinative 




The 701 strategy stood in stark contrast to the more ambitious efforts to intervene in land 
use planning that the environmental community was proposing. In the eyes of environmentalists, 
the Section 701 program was an established effort to direct urban growth from the federal level 
that had failed to reduce the environmental impacts of sprawl. The 701 program was not only 
competing with Jackson’s bill for policy turf, its incremental incentive-based approach ran 
counter to the “quantum leap” that environmental interests sought in a new national land use 
policy that would support the goals of NEPA. The restrained approach to regional and national 
planning on HUD’s part was a point of contention that pushed some legislators to argue that a 
national land use policy should be administered by another agency not invested in existing land 
use planning regimes. 
HUD, however, saw the 701 program as an effective national planning tool. In prepared 
remarks before the Interior Committee hearing on Jackson’s bill, Fred McGlaughlin, Director of 
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the Office of Plans, Programs and Evaluation, began by affirming HUD’s support for national 
land use planning policy. He went on, though, to say: 
The bill’s proposed program of land use planning grants to the States would duplicate the 
land-use planning grants already being made to State planning agencies as part of HUD’s 
Comprehensive Planning Assistance program. In fact, this program established by 
Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 and with an appropriation of $50 million for this 
fiscal year, provides assistance—already extended to all 50 states—that would cover 




As well, McGlaughlin argued in favor of HUD remaining as the primary land use agency. He 
stressed this point: 
…reference to our burgeoning metropolitan population identifies one of the reasons why 
the Federal Government’s existing grant program for broad land use and comprehensive 
planning is administered by HUD…The 701 program is important to us in helping the 
States and localities develop the comprehensive plans—in many cases required by federal 
statute—that are necessary to ensure that other HUD investments in housing, supporting 
public facilities, and new communities are wisely spent. 
 
In the agency’s written position on the S. 3354, HUD Secretary George Romney wrote: 
S.3354…does not…undertake to deal with the full range of physical, social, and 
economic issues that are embraced within the broadest kind of comprehensive planning 
that can be assisted under Section 701 or which is contemplated by some of the 




The “battlelines” that the national land use policy debate created separated HUD from 
environmental interests when it came to the preferred approach to federal land use policy. 
HUD’s interests in national land use policy that would work with its 701 program were best 
represented in its 1970 proposal for an anti-exclusionary zoning law attached to the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1970. Romney described the provision as one that would “prohibit 
local governments or their agencies from using any form of land use controls to prevent the 
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reasonable provision of low- and moderate-income housing eligible for federal assistance in 
undeveloped or predominately undeveloped areas which are in the path of development.”
42
 As 
Corrigan described it, “Unlike the National Land Use Policy…[the HUD proposal]  was 
designed to further a social—not an environmental—goal” (Corrigan, 1971, p. 605). 
While environmental interests saw HUD as too restrained in its approach to national land 
use planning, HUD saw environmental interests as too narrowly focused on physical planning to 
the exclusion of social issues. McGlaughlin’s comments go on to argue that planning must be a 
people-centered process:  
In the priority of things, we believe that a “people policy” is a prerequisite to a land-use 
policy. Too often in the past we have undertaken land-use policy as though it were an art 
unto itself, unrelated to the lives of people and the needs of our society. This has made 




This was a clear statement of the divide that urban and environmental regulators saw 
between themselves. Jackson’s bill was evidence that environmental regulators saw HUD’s 
planning program, which had been in existence for almost two decades by that time, as unable to 
account for environmental issues. HUD saw the environmental proposals as failing to account for 
the impacts of land use upon people. Each side fought for its own legislative jurisdiction over 
land use planning rather than develop programs that substantively addressed both goals.  
 
4.4c: The Scramble to Control Land Use 
HUD’s critique notwithstanding, the overall lack of organized opposition and widespread 
support for the procedural aspects of the bill, made it seem as though Jackson’s national land use 
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policy proposal would move to a vote of the full Senate in the same year it was introduced. 
However, just before the end of the session, Senator Edmund Muskie put a hold on the bill 
arguing that it overlapped with the legislative jurisdiction of the Public Works Subcommittee on 
Air and Water Pollution which he chaired (Lyday, 1976, p. 14-15). Muskie’s action forced the 
bill to be held over until the next legislative session. It also opened the door for a much wider 
debate on national land use policy. 
As the jurisdictional battle over environmental policy between Muskie and Jackson 
heated up, the Administration took the lead in the conversation on land use as an environmental 
issue. In his “President’s Message” published at the beginning of the CEQ report, Nixon 
concurred with the call for a national land use policy. He entitled a lengthy section of his 
message “Toward a Land Use Policy” (p. xi). In it, Nixon wrote (p. xii-xiii): 
We have treated our land as if it were a limitless resource. Traditionally, Americans have 
felt that what they do with their land is their own business. This attitude has been a 
natural outgrowth of the pioneer spirit. Today we have come to realize that our land is 
finite while our population is growing. The uses to which our generation puts the land can 
either expand or severely limit the choices our children will have…I believe we must 
work toward development of a National Land Use Policy to be carried out by an effective 
partnership of Federal, State and local governments together and, where appropriate, with 
new regional institutional arrangements. 
 
Now Nixon was devoted to national urban policy focused on social issues as a result of 
Moynihan’s lobbying and national land use policy focused on environmental issues as proposed 
by CEQ. Because of the issues that HUD’s opposition to the Jackson bill raised, these dual 
purposes proved difficult to resolve. 
 As the 1971 legislative session began, several competing interests were ready with 
national land use policy proposals. Jackson re-introduced his bill as the Land and Water Resource 
Planning Act in January 1971 (S. 632) and Muskie was near to completing a competing bill. As 
well, given Nixon’s statements on national land use policy in the CEQ report, Jackson 
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challenged the Administration to either support his bill or present a bill of its own. Nixon 
responded by directing CEQ staff to develop a competing proposal. They submitted the National 
Land Use Policy Act (S. 992) in February of 1971 (see Lyday, 1976, Chapter 3 for more on this 
exchange).  
The CEQ bill was written by two staff members—Boyd Gibbons and William Reilly. 
Gibbons and Reilly were both young lawyers with an interest in asserting the right of states to 
regulate private land more strongly than had Jackson’s proposal. They wanted to undo the 
exemption for incorporated cities, but also had to stay within the confines of Nixon’s doctrine of 
New Federalism. Reilly came from a social policy background. He was a lawyer and planner 
who had helped to author the American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code. In that 
process, Reilly sought to shift land use power back to states in order to undo the ability of 
localities to create exclusionary housing policies. Reilly was sympathetic to HUD’s goals in this 
sense. Gibbons had helped to write the Coastal Zone Bill which mandated states to regulate large 
ecologically sensitive zones that crossed multiple local jurisdictions. Together, Gibbons and 
Reilly had experience in policy models that shifted land use authority from localities to states in 
order to achieve both social and environmental goals. They represented the best hope for creating 
a bill that crossed this divide (see Lyday, 1976, pp. 19-22 for more on Gibbons and Reilly). 
 In the end, the CEQ bill that Reilly and Gibbons produced sought to keep national land 
use planning focused squarely on environmental goals but provided tools that could be of use to 
social policy planners. The strategy proposed was similar to Henry Jackson’s in that it created 
grants to states to carry out planning, but rather than requiring all areas with the exception of 
incorporated cities to be planned, the CEQ bill required that states identify and plan for areas of 
“critical environmental concern” and “regional benefit.” These areas were at once more narrow 
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(they did not necessarily cover the entire state) and more open to interpretation (they might 
include incorporated areas).  
The CEQ authors wanted to frame the administration bill in narrower terms than the 
Jackson bill, but leave plenty of room for interpretation once the bill had passed. As a result, the 
CEQ bill was much more concerned with disabling the ability of localities to create serious 
environmental damage or to stop development of infrastructure needed by the entire region than 
was the Jackson bill. Gibbons and Reilly saw this as a tool that could be used to fight 
exclusionary housing laws within localities through the argument that affordable housing was a 
necessary component of regional infrastructure. While this was Reilly’s intent, it was never 
explicitly written into the bill in order to avoid objections from local interests. However, 
“Ehrlichman and, according to Reilly, a few officials at HUD understood the implications for 
open housing” (Lyday, 1976, p. 22).  
Indeed, Reilly and Gibbons were in close contact with HUD as they developed their 
proposal which left the 701 program intact and supported HUD as the lead agency. In a memo 
dated 11 August 1970, Robert Paul wrote to Samuel Jackson in reference to an “advanced copy 
of Boyd Gibbons’ outline of the ‘necessary elements’ of the proposed national land use 
policy.”
44
 While no specific mention was made of the open housing potential for the bill, it is 
clear that Gibbons and Reilly directed many of their recommendations toward HUD’s interests. 
The CEQ bill also included penalties for states that did not comply with the Act. Any 
state that did not create an approved plan within 4 years would lose 7 percent of its federal 
funding for highways, land and water conservation, and airports. This would accrue each year of 
non-compliance up to a 35 percent reduction. The imposition of penalties for non-compliance 
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raised immediate internal opposition over the extent to which a national land use bill of this sort 
meshed with the principles that Nixon espoused for his presidency. In hand-written notes on the 
margins of Boyd Gibbons’ request for review of the decision paper that laid out the direction of 
the policy, Deputy Counsel Egil “Bud” Krogh, who would later become infamous as the director 
of Nixon’s Special Investigative Unit (or the “plumbers”) that was responsible for the Watergate 
break-ins, wrote: 
1) What would be the political effect of forcing the states into land use planning? How 
would National Governor’s Conference react? Would they ask that it be voluntary? Is the 
7% cut-off the wrong approach, particularly with our laissez-faire policy with respect to 
state and local authority? Isn’t planning money available inducement enough? 





Krogh then seems to resolve his own conflict with a conclusion noted separately: “Is categorical 
grant program. But strengthens hand of state with money.” The rationalization that seems to have 
been used by Krogh and others was that while national land use planning was counter to Nixon’s 
doctrine of New Federalism, it was also a states’ rights bill. It could be argued that it sought to 
further empower the role of states relative to the federal government.  
The decision paper sent to Krogh indicates that HUD, DOI, the EPA, Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), CEQ, and a new agency created expressly to administer 
national land use policy were all considered as possible lead agencies. In the end, the decision 
was made to support HUD as the lead agency with a subordinate role given to the Department of 
Interior. The decision paper indicates that CEQ staff recognized the need for HUD’s historic 
connection to land use planning to be maintained: 
HUD would administer the funds and annually certify whether State programs were in 
compliance with the policy. Interior would be empowered to certify that portion of the 
program dealing with areas of critical environmental concern.
46
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While HUD’s prescribed role assured their overall support for the CEQ bill, several staff 
members were concerned that the environmental interests that drafted the bill had inadequate 
experience with land use planning. They expressed misgivings about whether the CEQ staff 
understood the complexities of the task. In an analysis of the CEQ bill’s recommendation for 
states to exercise more fully their land use powers, Charles Markham, Acting Director of the 
Office of Planning Assistance and Standards, wrote: 
This recommendation involves very debatable complexities of what level of government 
should control land development. Although there is some support for this kind of 
recommendation (increased State control) it is too fuzzy to deal with as it stands. There is 
a hierarchy of planning and controls that must be worked out, and the State may have no 
interest nor capacity to deal with controlling the location of “major industrial, 




Despite these concerns, the CEQ proposal was supported by John Ehrlichman, who with 
Nixon’s approval pushed it as a high priority. Opposition to the bill, though, remained. The 
OMB vigorously opposed the CEQ bill on the grounds that it conflicted with the goals of 
Nixon’s platform for New Federalism (Weir, 2000). The OMB only desisted in attacking it when 
Ehrlichman stepped in with a forceful statement of support from the President (Lyday, 1976, 
p.23). HUD, for its part, was named as the lead agency for land use policy by CEQ. As a result, 
HUD staff came to generally support the strategy, but remained doubtful that empowering states 
to carry out planning was an effective strategy. Robert M. Paul, Acting Director of HUD’s 
Program Evaluation and Development Office commented in a memo to Samuel C. Jackson, 
“They haven’t thought enough about how it can be accomplished. The general goals are sound 
but someone will have to come up with a lot of ‘carrots’ (or sticks) to motivate State and local 
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 Paul was critical not because of the bill’s intent but rather its implementation 
strategy. If the CEQ approach to national land use planning was passed, from Paul’s perspective, 
it “would have a major impact on HUD,” but not necessarily a good one.
49
  
Meanwhile, Senator Henry Jackson, as Chair of the Interior Committee, was determined 
to keep national land use policy in the domain of the Department of Interior. He allowed an 
advisory role for HUD in his bill, but Interior would be in charge of the program under Jackson’s 
terms. In response to the conflicting structure of the CEQ bill and his own, Jackson asked an 
Interior Committee staff member to work on a compromise bill. During this process, Henry 
Jackson and Russell Train had a very public debate over the various benefits of the two 
approaches on the editorial pages of the Washington Post.
50
 
The combined bill that Jackson proposed retained the call for planning that focused on 
environmentally sensitive and regionally important areas which the CEQ draft called for, but also 
required a plan for how these areas fit into statewide development patterns. It also retained the 
consequences for non-compliance and created a new National Land Use Planning Advisory 
Committee comprised of members from all agencies with substantial land use responsibilities. 
Interior would direct all programs for the combined bill, which gave no mention of HUD’s 
concerns about the missing social component or the complexity of state-level planning processes 
(see Lyday, 1976, Chapter 4). 
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With the new combined bill coming out of the Interior Committee, Richard Nixon had to 
decide whether or not to abandon his hope of combining social and environmental agendas in 
land use policy by making HUD the lead agency. On March 20, 1971, The National Journal, a 
weekly insider’s report on federal policy negotiations in Washington, D.C., devoted an eleven-
page article to the maneuverings over who would control the national land use bill supported by 
the Administration. The article was entitled “Interior Department Finesses HUD in Scramble 
over Land Use Program.” It focused on a meeting that took place between Ehrlichman, Secretary 
Romney and Rogers C.B. Morton, the Secretary of the Department of Interior. Romney, should 
have had the upper hand. His agency after all had been identified as the lead on land use policy 
in the draft version of the Administration’s CEQ bill and had extensive land use planning 
experience. However, as Richard Corrigan, the environment and resources staff reporter for The 
National Journal, described it, a “last-minute power play” (p. 597) on the part of Morton undid 
Romney’s position in favor of Interior. As Corrigan described it, “the subject of land use control 
is intrinsically controversial, and…could change the current institutional framework by injecting 
a state and federal overview of local land use decisions” (p. 597). The impact this would 
potentially have upon community development and environmental regulations was not lost on 
the directors of the federal agencies vying for control over implementation. However, in the end, 
the Administration acquiesced to Henry Jackson’s desire for Interior to control the land use bill.  
With HUD pushed aside, the combined version of the National Land Use Policy Act 
which brought together Jackson’s and CEQ’s proposals passed the Senate by a vote of 60 to 18 
in September of 1972. Passage in the Senate made the combined bill the leading statement on 
national land use policy. While Muskie and a few other Senators remained critical of the bill and 
had their own competing proposals that supported extending the powers of the Water Resources 
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Commission, there was little they could do to stop the Jackson-CEQ bill from taking center stage 
in the debate, which moved next to the House. Once passed the House, national land use policy 
would certainly become law. However, the Chair of the House Committee on the Interior, 
Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall, sought to use the opportunity to push for public land review 
reform. He wanted to make it easier for private interests to access public lands and sought to 
insert this goal into the national land use policy debate. Aspinall combined his proposal with the 
House version of the national land use planning bill in order to force the Senate to consider it. 
Aspinall’s amendments were unacceptable to organized environmental interests, so much so that 
they opposed the entire House bill regardless of the land use planning aspect. Aspinall’s actions 
effectively killed any chance of the bill going to vote in 1972. It would have to be taken up in the 
following session.  
Congressman Aspinall was defeated for re-election to his post in 1972 and the new Chair 
of the House Interior Committee, Stuart Udall, favored national land use planning, creating an 
opening for the combined Jackson-CEQ bill. Once again, the combined bill was easily passed in 
the Senate, but it stalled in the House. Despite Udall’s support, a refrain arose which had been 
avoided until that point. It was the argument that had dogged all efforts at national land use 
planning throughout the history of the United States. A vocal group of opponents in the House 
forced a highly contentious debate over the issue of whether the bill would comprise a “taking” 
of private property. This was the opposition to planning as an overreach of governmental 
authority that had undone all prior efforts at national land use planning including those directed 
by Secretary Gallatin, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (see Chapter 3 of this 
report). For the first few years of the 1970s debate, such claims were muted, but by 1973 they 
became the central issue.  
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The “taking” issue stopped national land use planning policy in its tracks. It assured that 
the bill would not pass the House without considerable alteration and eventually was used as an 
argument by conservative supporters to convince Nixon to remove what had been strong and 
sustained support for the bill. Many complained that the conservatives had threatened to remove 
their opposition to impeachment proceedings connected with the Watergate scandal that had just 
come to light if Nixon did not oppose national land use planning. While Udall and Jackson 
continued to fight for its passage, the upheaval of Nixon’s Watergate scandal and the force with 
which the takings issue was used to condemn the policy made passage impossible. In the end, no 
legislation cleared the House, despite several successive efforts between 1973 and 1975. 
National land use policy was finally abandoned after the 1975 legislative session. 
The poor outcome for HUD in the battle for control over national land use policy was 
indicative of Romney’s overall disenchantment with the Nixon Administration (see Graham, 
1976, p. 255). However, while frustrated, he turned his focus to the National Growth Policy that 
had by this time been passed as a provision of the National Urban Policy and New Community 
Development Act under Thomas Ashley’s sponsorship.
51
 Environmental and community 
development interests would now officially proceed on separate tracks, with the environmental 
interests pursuing a national land use policy under DOI’s control and urban interests pursuing a 
national growth policy under HUD’s control. Neither side had much success. 
 
4.5| Toward a National Growth Policy 
Moynihan left his staff position in the Nixon Administration in 1971 to return to Harvard 
University where he had been Director of Joint Center for Urban Studies. His national urban 
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policy agenda had been picked up in a small way by Congressman Ashley’s bill. The bill passed 
in late 1970 because it was attached to the larger effort to create the New Communities initiative 
which had wide support. The national urban policy aspect of the bill was a relatively minor 
provision that required a bi-annual national growth policy report from the Domestic Council. The 
specific entity within the Council that would be responsible for creating the report was not 
established in the first year after the legislation. In response, roughly seven months after Romney 
had been denied control over national land use policy, he requested that the Domestic Council 
make HUD the lead agency in developing the report (Hanson, 1982, p. 16). The Domestic 
Council agreed and, for Romney, the national growth policy report would be HUD’s detailed 
outline of national urban policy. The report, due one year later would also be HUD’s 
counterweight to environmental interests in the national land use policy discussion.  
Samuel C. Jackson, Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Development, headed the effort 
within HUD to develop the national growth policy report and designated Fred McGlaughlin as 
project manager. Jackson had been involved in the formulation of Ashley’s national growth 
policy legislation and made it clear early on that he saw its development as an initiative with far-
reaching potential but also as one that faced serious institutional challenges. On 9 June 1970, one 
week after the memo from a HUD staff member calling for an administration position on a 
national urban policy and several months before the National Urban Policy and New Community 
Development Act was signed, Jackson gave a speech before the Institute on Comparative Urban 
Systems at Macalester College wherein he described the extent of institutional change that 
Ashley’s proposed statement on national growth policy would require. He highlighted the ways 
in which land use institutions expressed basic cultural, social, and political norms in the United 
States. This connection between the entrenched norms of 1970s America and the direction of 
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urban growth, for Jackson, was the greatest impediment to creating more socially just and 
environmentally sound cities. Before a room of young urban scholars and professors he 
summarized the extent of change that HUD sought through its National Urban Growth Policy: 
I believe that we can develop an effective urban growth policy, but it will be effective 
only if as a nation, we are prepared to accept certain basic changes in our institutions and 
in our traditional ways of managing urban growth. However, there are major obstacles to 
this kind of institutional change. If we naively ignore these very real impediments, 




  One of the biggest obstacles was the fact that by 1970 many middle class white 
Americans were running away from cities and moving to the suburbs. Jackson’s talk was given 
in the context of an America where urban areas were declining in wealth and population and 
suburban areas were growing rapidly. As one of the few high-ranking black federal officials at 
the time, Jackson was well aware of the intersecting issues of class and race that had developed 
into an urban crisis. He was politically moderate, but had been a member of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary at HUD 
and was an active member of the NAACP.
53
 He was certainly aware of the social norms that 
factored into his call for “changes in our institutions and in our traditional ways of managing 
urban growth.” He was also aware that the man who appointed him, Richard Nixon, was growing 
increasingly reticent about taking federal action to address the social roots of urban decline. In 
this context, the growth policy report, which he directed, adopted the concept of “balanced 
growth” as an organizing principle.  
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4.5a: Balanced Growth 
In addition to widespread public sentiment against cities, deeply embedded institutional 
racism in postwar development patterns, and Nixon’s unwillingness to address social issues 
directly, HUD developed its national growth policy within the context of a deep and growing 
anti-urban bias amongst federal legislators that challenged the agency’s core programs. In a note 
dated 12 October 1970 which responded to a proposal from Senator John L. Mclellan of 
Arkansas to use federal procurement, development and funding as a mechanism for decreasing 
rural to urban migration, the tenor of the anti-urban sentiment that HUD was responding to as it 
developed its policies and the tone of the agency’s position in the midst of this sentiment is clear. 
Mclellan describes “unmanageable urbanization” as comprised of a “multitude of problems 
associated with highly congested, over-populated and slum-infested cities.” He sought to create 
legislation that fostered “balanced and orderly growth,” which for Mclellan meant redistributing 
economic activities to rural and peri-urban areas and encouraging population growth to occur 
outside of cities. McClellan was fundamentally arguing for HUD to give up on existing cities and 
to start anew in undeveloped areas.
54
 
Mclellan’s suggestion was not radical at the time. It had been institutionalized within the 
New Communities program which provided guaranteed federal financing for private developers 
to build new towns outside of existing urban centers. The Housing and Urban Development Act 
of 1970 included renewal legislation for the New Communities program and the Ashley bill that 
required a national growth policy report augmented the available resources. For HUD staff 
members, the new initiatives provided a laboratory in which they could test ideas for redirecting 
urban growth patterns away from sprawling suburbs and declining inner cities. In a presentation 
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on the status and future of the New Communities program given by several HUD staff members 
to the UAC on 26 March 1970, the unspecified presenter noted, “New Communities planned to 
meet federal criteria will not in themselves bring about orderly growth on a national scale, but 
they may serve as a beginning from which we will learn and on which we will build.”
55
 Later in 
the same presentation, Samuel Jackson commented that one of the goals of the program was to 




The desire to build new cities in the hinterlands demonstrated the pervasive feeling 
among those who could afford to leave cities that they were not worth saving. Rather, for many, 
cities were overcrowded and uninhabitable—not a place to be happy. In a presentation by an 
unnamed HUD staff member given in March 1970, it was noted that “interest in new community 
development as a possible antidote for disorderly sprawl is higher today than at any time in the 
nation’s historical experience with new communities.”
57
  
McClellan’s focus on stopping the flow of rural migrants to cities through “balanced and 
orderly growth” was a bit different than the desire to create new laboratories for urban growth. 
As Romney and the HUD staff were certainly aware, McLellan was primarily making reference 
to halting the movement of African-Americans from the rural south into northern cities. The 
“Second Great Migration” encompassed the period between 1940 and 1970 during which 5 
million rural migrants moved to cities (Lemann, 1991, Chapter 1). 80 percent of black 
Americans were urban inhabitants by the end of this period and most had settled in racially 
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segregated enclaves in cities across the country, especially in California and the Northeast. As 
Graham (1976) wrote, “Translated into the perspective of many whites [in the 1960s]…urban 
growth since the early 1940s had meant a stream of black people dismounting from Greyhound 
buses and trains just in from the South, spreading the ghetto outward toward the city limits, 
sending whites scattering before them into the suburbs” (p. 194).  
The rural black migrants that were moving into cities sought improved employment and 
educational opportunities that were still largely unavailable to them due to overt and 
institutionalized racism in rural Jim Crow South (see Lemann, 1991). Conservative politicians 
like McLellan, and ultimately Nixon, used the principle of “balanced growth” as an oblique 
means of addressing the social and political upheaval that these migrations brought about. The 
need on Romney’s part to navigate between the interests of those who favored balanced growth, 
an essentially anti-urban approach, and the community development aspects of HUD’s mission 
was an especially difficult challenge.  
The issue of population planning that “balanced growth” implied was first raised in the 
early 1960s when Orville Freeman, who served under President John F. Kennedy and President 
Lyndon Johnson as Secretary of Agriculture, questioned the role of federal policy in aiding the 
decline of rural America. Freeman held a conference on growth policy in 1967 at which HUD’s 
first director, Robert Weaver, argued that “the increasing concentration of population in our great 
metropolitan centers is a phenomenon being experienced in all of the great nations of the world. 
Whatever our feelings may be about this trend, there is no evidence available that it is reversible” 
(quoted in Graham, 1976, p. 196). Weaver decisively dismissed the notion that the federal 
government should be in the business of undoing the ability of black migrants to seek greater 
opportunities in cities. Rather, HUD’s role was precisely the opposite in Weaver’s mind—to 
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facilitate the arrival of new immigrants in central cities and to undo the continued segregation of 
black populations that still limited their access to the benefits of the postwar economic boom (see 
Pritchett, 2008, Chapter 9).  
Weaver’s successor, George Romney, was less assured of HUD’s role. Romney’s 
response to McClellan’s proposal for “balanced and orderly growth” is especially telling of 
HUD’s political position within the anti-urban context of legislative talks at the time. Originally 
Romney drafted a letter which highlighted the particularly problematic nature of Mclellan’s 
proposal for HUD. Mclellan essentially sought to direct federal programming away from cities 
and HUD was almost entirely concerned with federal programming focused on cities. Romney 
offered a point-by-point response which, while couched in polite language that highlighted 
where common ground could be found, detailed why HUD could not support any of the 
proposals. Romney closed his original draft with the fact that there were a number of federal 
policy proposals, including national land use planning, national urban growth policy, aid for new 
towns, and water resource bills with which Mclellan’s proposal would contradict or overlap. He 
concluded that “enactment of the resolution might be somewhat premature.”
58
  
On Romney’s first draft, Charles Markham made a hand-written note asking whether the 
tone of Romney’s response, which was respectful throughout, was too negative and urged 
Assistant Secretary Jackson to consider this before concurring. In the end, the original draft 
received an X across it with a note that reads “rewritten.” The final draft of the response sent to 
Mclellan was far more muted than the original.
59
 Despite Mclellan’s suggestion to completely 
redirect HUD’s programmatic focus and his overtly anti-urban bias, Romney included in his final 
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response only a reference to a number of other bills being considered with which the proposal 
might conflict. Given this context, Romney wrote, it was a bit early to consider McClellan’s 
proposal. 
This interaction demonstrates that in developing its national growth policy HUD had to 
walk a fine line between its own interests and those arguing for distinctly anti-urban policies. 
Markham, Romney and Jackson all came to the conclusion that to directly critique the claim that 
American federal policy ought to simply abandon existing cities was not a tenable approach in 
the climate in which they were operating. Rather, HUD’s policy in this tense environment was to 
appease the anti-urban interests of which McLellan was a prime example. As such, what came to 
be a full commitment on Nixon’s part in support of a “balanced growth” strategy was also 
adopted as a central principle in the national growth policy report that Jackson developed.  
The balanced growth strategy in fact became the cornerstone of Nixon’s urban policy. 
Nixon mentioned balanced growth several times in reference to national growth policy and 
supported it as a guiding principle. In the 1970 State of the Union Address, Nixon said that 
future decisions would be made “with a clear objective of aiding balanced growth.”  In an early 
summary of the national growth policy report sent to Romney, Fred McGlaughlin described the 
objectives as: “(1) balanced growth (2) orderly growth and (3) strengthened governmental 
capacities.”
60
 Balanced growth was a reference to the goals McLellan had stated but was toned 
down in HUD’s usage. It referred to “shifting some future growth from metropolitan to non-
metropolitan communities.” Orderly growth referred to management of that increment of 
population growth which would remain in metropolitan areas. Governmental capacities mostly 
focused on increased coordination among federal programs (pp. 4-9). In a later memo, Jackson 
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described the balanced growth objective as “one-half of the thrust for a growth policy.”
61
 
Clearly, the primacy given to the balanced growth approach signaled a major shift from 
Weaver’s assertive support for central cities toward acceptance of the notion that people should 
move away from urban centers.  
The background materials for the National Growth Policy report, present an analysis by a 
short-lived research arm of the executive branch created by Nixon at Moynihan’s behest. The 
research office known as the National Goals Research Staff (NGRS) entitled their only 
publication Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity and Quality. The NGRS report states: 
To promote the objective of balanced national growth, several basic strategies have been 
proposed…(1) spread population by generating growth in sparsely populated rural areas 
(2) foster the growth of existing small cities and towns in non-metropolitan areas (3) 




The National Goals Research Staff report was its first and last, as Nixon dissolved the office 
shortly after Moynihan departed. Despite this, the details it offers on the proposed strategies 
demonstrate that the idea of the federal government actively undoing the growth of cities was 
prevalent at the time. HUD’s approach to the national growth policy reflected a widely-promoted 
strategy for urban policy that had deeply problematic undertones for how to deal with racial 
unrest and for controlling the environmental impacts of suburban growth.  
In one exemplary document entitled An Urban Growth Policy: From Motherhood to 
Abortion (see Appendix 6 for the complete document),
63
 Fred McGlaughlin demonstrates the 
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basic acceptance of the balanced growth premise within HUD. The brief document, which 
McGlaughlin notes is “a ‘spare’ time piece that I prepared for those people who ask me for a 
copy of our urban growth policy”, was sent to Jackson and Charles Markham, on 12 November 
1971. This was roughly one month into the process of formulating the national urban growth 
policy report. In it, McGlaughlin observes: 
Getting consensus on a broad policy statement is as easy as getting agreement on the 
proverbial virtues of motherhood…But as one goes through the various stages of defining 
the specific nature of the policy and of articulating the means for implementing it, one 
rapidly loses friends—until the whole thing aborts. 
 
McGlaughlin then goes on to offer an example of what he describes as an uncontroversial 
proposal. His example is balanced growth. He writes: 
 Policy: It shall be the policy of the nation to encourage balanced growth. 
 
Now that’s a reasonable policy. The President and the Congress have come out strongly 
for it and some federal policies are actually seeking to carry it out—in a harmless way. 
You’ve got to be for balanced growth. 
 
McGlaughlin then walks through a series of steps wherein the assumed support for balanced 
growth is complicated once numerous divergent interests become involved. This document 
stands out for its blunt description of the frustrations that HUD staff felt at the time with its 
inability to effect the kinds of institutional change that Jackson spoke of at his Macalester 
speech, but also for its acceptance of the notion that migration to cities should be reversed and 
that HUD should be doing all it can to aid this process.  
The difficulties that McGlaughlin wrote of in his From Motherhood to Abortion memo 
were not simply due to discordant politics—there were fundamental conflicts of interest with 
social and environmental goals due to the assumed unproblematic adoption of balanced growth 
as a goal for national urban policy. HUD was, in fact, supporting precisely the dispersion of 
population that many environmentalists saw as sprawl development. Of course HUD would have 
164 
 
argued that they had a more nuanced model for the growth of new population centers, but this 
position certainly elevated their suspect status in the eyes of environmentalists who were trying 
to rein in sprawl through their national land use planning efforts.  
HUD faced numerous challenges beyond just environmental interests to the balanced 
growth approach. Members of its own advisory committee representing the full spectrum of 
political perspectives also disagreed with the idea. Herb Stein, a conservative economist and 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers argued that the growth patterns of cities 
represented the market allocation of population and a balanced growth initiative would distort 
that market process. As well, the committee representative for the Department of Labor argued 
that HUD’s goals ought to be exactly the opposite of those stated in the balanced growth 
objective. From a labor perspective, dense central cities were essential to adequate provision of 
basic needs. All of these critiques were dismissed by HUD staff as incomplete or ill-informed.
64
 
In the end, these conflicts caused the national urban growth policy report to fall into precisely the 
oblivion that Jackson had commented on in his Macalester College speech. 
 
4.5b: Nixon Grows Disenchanted 
Despite the objections, HUD proceeded to develop the report with a number of new 
proposals focused on achieving balanced growth. The political context changed, though, as 
Nixon grew increasingly disenchanted with the idea of any new major urban policy initiative. By 
late 1971 Nixon was less equivocal about his New Federalist platform and developed a belief 
that there in fact was no urban crisis, at least not of the sort with which the federal government 
should be dealing. In a memo dated 17 March 1972, Staff Assistant to Nixon, Ray Waldman 
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wrote that “the trouble with…most planners’ thinking is that they see the urban forest and not the 
individual trees. The urban crisis is made up of lots of little crises…The President’s stance 
should be that we are…dealing with each one in a systematic, orderly fashion.”
65
 The implication 
of this approach was that urban issues were local problems to be dealt with on an individual 
basis. As well, by 1973, a number of articles refuting the existence of the urban crisis were 
circulating amongst the heads of the Nixon administration. These included Edward Banfield’s A 
Critical View of the Crisis marked “THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN”
66
 and There is no Urban 
Crisis by M. Stanton Evans which was circulated widely by Ken Cole, assistant to Nixon’s 
domestic affairs advisor.
67
 By the time that HUD presented its report on a national urban growth 
policy, Waldman’s suggestion reflected Nixon’s favored strategy.  
As a result of Nixon’s greatly diminished support for any new urban policy, when 
McGlaughlin discussed the draft of the report that had been created in Fall 1971 with John 
Ehrlichman, he was bluntly told that all new policy proposals had to be removed from the report, 
per the President’s instructions (Hanson, 1982, p. 17). McGlaughlin complied, but when Romney 
saw the politically impotent result of this cut-down version, he could not accept it as HUD’s 
statement of national urban policy. Romney ordered it rewritten with new recommendations that 
reflected his personal desire to build a national program of planning around regional governance 
based on what had earlier been referred to as “the Romney premise”. Romney personally 
presented this rewritten version to the Domestic Council, which had approval power over the 
report. Romney’s version was rejected. In the end, McGlaughlin’s redacted version of the 
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National Growth Policy Report was submitted to Congress with no new recommendations for 
federal urban policy. It was a reification of the status quo. Congressional supporters of the 
legislation that mandated the report be filed were intensely critical. They held hearings that 
focused on the shortcomings and labeled the report “an abrogation of the responsibility to make 
policy” (Hanson, 1982, p. 18). Indeed HUD, the report’s reluctant author, agreed. 
In the end, the national growth policy report that HUD created had little impact. 
Jackson’s warning that without institutional changes the effort was doomed to oblivion largely 
came true. In McGlaughlin’s cruder terms, the effort to address national growth policy in a 
fundamental way was aborted. The New York Times labeled the report “a mausoleum of words” 
(Graham, 1976, p. 227). When HUD delivered it to Congress as required by the legislation, it 
was a “toothless” report built on a faulty foundation. Nixon played a key role in creating this 
situation by favoring balanced growth and by resolving the contradiction between national 
planning and New Federalism himself in favor of New Federalism. The report got brief mention 
in Nixon’s 1972 State of the Union speech, but was largely forgotten thereafter.   
In the end, HUD’s only tools for national planning that resulted from their efforts were 
the incremental pre-existing 701 program and the experimental (and soon to be abandoned) New 
Communities initiative. While popular support led Nixon to encourage HUD to move forward 
with the New Communities initiative, by 1972 he sought to develop the program less in response 
to an urban crisis than as an economic development initiative which solved several of the 
functional “nuts and bolts” issues that cities faced. This entirely precluded the possibility of 
HUD thinking holistically about how New Communities and the agency’s other programs could 
interface with environmental policies as part of a larger land use strategy. In fact, Richard 
Nathan, a budget aide for Nixon, wrote to Ken Cole that with regard to funding decisions for 
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New Communities, “Conformance to National Urban Growth Policy objectives should not be 
one of the criteria. We do not have such a policy stated in operational terms, so there is no way to 
construct operational criterion.”
68
 Thus, HUD proceeded to fund new development in a 
haphazard and much criticized manner throughout the 1970s. No vision for a national growth 
policy or planning strategy was successfully passed by the community development interests at 
this time and no substantial effort to incorporate environmental issues into their programs is 
evident. 
 
4.6| Conclusion: Toward a Divided Institutional Structure 
When Fred Bosselman and David Callies authored a report in 1971 on innovative state 
level land use regulations commissioned by the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, 
they entitled it The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control and placed a graphic of the seven 
states that they highlight in the report all together within an oval shape (see Figure 4.1 below).
69
 
The graphic implied that the goal was to form a single coherent policy from these disconnected 
pieces, but that a national scope had not yet been achieved. The push on the part of the states 
toward land use controls that the graphic implied formed an inchoate undercurrent within the 
country but, in the end, only a few states participated and the product did not resemble a national 
policy on land use. Just as the image implies connectedness, but does not form a complete image 
of the country, so too did efforts at large-scale land use controls bring together the institutional 
components, but incompletely. While federal policymakers in the 1970s explored a national 
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urban policy, a national land use policy, and a national growth policy, the only result that they 
achieved was an institutional structure that divided urban from environmental interests.  
 





Initially, the source of disconnect during the 1970s was not the same as those that had 
undone national land use planning in the past. The proponents of Nixon’s New Federalism as 
well as those who forced the issue of takings did not assail the proponents of land use for 
perverting the proper role of federal government until several years into the debate. Nixon 
publicly supported national land use policy until 1974 and the takings issue did not come up until 
late in 1973. The big disconnect in the early period of the national land use policy effort was 
between the institutional bases of support for community development and environmental 
interests. This divide is exemplified in the title changes to a HUD document entitled “A National 
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Community Development, Environment, and Growth Policy.”
70
 The original version of the 
document dated 8 November 1970 is titled “A Proposal to Implement a National Community 
Development and Growth Policy.” The final version created shortly afterward shows that the 
environmental issues were a last minute addition. Indeed, though HUD includes environment in 
the title, it hardly discusses environmental issues in the pages that follow. This cursory treatment 
of environmental issues was typical of the discussions within HUD at the time. The environment 
was often listed as a concern, but never received substantive treatment. Just as McGlaughlin 
rightly accused the environmental community of lack of concern for social issues in its land use 
proposals, the environmentalists could rightly accuse the community development interests of 
lack of concern for environmental issues.  
Both sides were developing large and growing institutional structures at the federal level 
in the early 1970s and the divide between them was embedded in these structures. Crucial to 
HUD’s approach is that it did not see planning that accounted for environmental issues as 
sufficient. It saw environmental land use strategies as insufficiently concerned with the 
communities that exist within the metropolitan regions that would be affected, and the agency’s 
concerns were well founded. As well, its focus on expanding urban territory as a means for 
dealing with urban issues through the New Communities initiative contrasted directly with the 
focus of environmentalists upon conservation strategies that limited growth. In turn, 
environmentalists argued that the results of existing planning efforts had excluded environmental 
goals and they developed proposals of their own.  
The narrow focus on the part of both sides did not serve either well. The shift away from 
urban issues as the center of the national land use policy that the compromise bill between 
Jackson and Nixon contained was a reflection of the evolution of Nixon’s shrinking desire to 
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address the “urban crisis.” Meanwhile, the abandonment of national land use planning even as a 
narrowly construed environmental issue reflected Nixon’s conservative thought about the proper 
role of the federal government that had doomed national land use planning in the past. HUD’s 
directors did not agree with Nixon’s position and they could have helped to fight off this 
conservative turn which led to the only defeat for a major piece of environmental legislation in 
the early 1970s. For their part, environmental activists could have pushed for urban issues to stay 
on the agenda. In the end, despite beginning from a position where nearly all observers assumed 
that a potentially far-reaching set of national land use policies would be enacted in the early 
1970s, none came to fruition. 
The incentive to close the divide between urban and environmental policy at the federal 
level was there for both community development and environmental interests, but neither group 
accomplished it. Given the social and ecological challenges faced by metropolitan areas 
following two decades of largely uncontrolled postwar sprawl, HUD Assistant Secretary Samuel 
C. Jackson was correct to argue that there was a need to alter “traditional ways of managing 
urban growth.” However, neither HUD nor any of the other agencies and politicians that pushed 
for a new federal level approach to managing urbanization processes at the time actually 
attempted to bring about the “changes in our institutions” that Jackson recognized was needed. 
Rather, they sought to further a narrow economic, environmental, or social agenda within the 
confines of existing institutional boundaries. While the public rhetoric around the debates over 
national land use policies highlighted the need for regulation of both social and natural impacts 
of urbanization, there was little actual concern for how these institutional structures related.  
The failure to create national land use policy in the 1970s resulted from and reflected the 
divided institutional context which generated competing agendas. Several factors, though, have 
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changed since the 1970s. If Bosselman and Callies were to draw the map of state and regional 
land use planning initiatives today, it would much more closely resemble a complete picture of 
the country. Their quiet revolution died down in the 1980s, but has gained in volume lately. With 
the advent of smart growth initiatives and transit-oriented development, states have entered the 
planning arena much more so than in the past. The states and regions that seek to address the 
urban and environmental issues of growth, though, continue to struggle with the divided 
institutional context that was reinforced in the 1970s. It is to these contemporary efforts at state-
































Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
California’s Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act 
 
5.1| Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from a case study analysis of California’s Sustainable 
Communities and Climate Protection Act passed in 2008, commonly referred to as SB 375. It 
examines coalition-building efforts across community development and environmental interests 
within the context of open negotiations amongst political interest groups. First, I provide an 
overview of the Act and the interests that supported it. Next, because SB 375 combined several 
pieces of legislation from the regional planning, housing, transportation and environmental 
policy sectors, I review the prior legislative context for the Act. Following the introduction of SB 
375 and its legislative context, the final section of this chapter analyzes the bill formulation and 
early implementation of the Act. 
Chapter 2 of this paper describes the methods of analysis in detail. Briefly, though, the 
findings are drawn from 32 semi-structured interviews with representatives of organizations 
involved with the formulation and early implementation of the Act.
71
 All interview data is 
reported anonymously. In addition, this chapter utilizes extensive review of public documents, 
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5.2| The Impossible Coalition  
If you ask people involved with state politics in California, they will likely tell you that 
Sacramento is a small world, both socially and politically. Especially for those who have worked 
in state politics for a long time, tales of chance meetings that had big political impact are 
common.
73
 Like most state capitals, the city of a half-million residents provides ample 
opportunity for state and local politics to intermingle.
74
 It is unsurprising, then, that a far-
reaching statewide land use policy was initiated at a 2004 birthday party for a longtime 
Sacramento community development activist.  
When State Senator Darrell Steinberg ran into Mike McKeever, the Director of the 
Sacramento Area Council of Governments, he had just been elected to the California Senate after 
serving as Assembly Member. Steinberg was a well-known supporter of environmental 
legislation. For his part, McKeever had just completed a popular regional planning process for 
the Sacramento area known as the “Blueprint” with a focus on environmentally sensitive growth. 
The setting was a perfect metaphor for the key institutional challenge faced by urban 
environmental planners: a representative of California’s activist environmental government met 
with a leader in regional planning at a local community development-oriented event. The 
divisions that kept these interests apart at the institutional level did not exist at the individual 
social level. Steinberg inquired about how he could support the implementation of the Blueprint 
plan with new state legislation. This conversation planted the seed in McKeever’s head about 
possibly connecting the Sacramento regional planning process to a statewide land use initiative.
75
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Taking the Blueprint statewide was an intriguing proposition. The conversation did not go much 
further at the time, but both men carried the idea with them after the meeting.  
Such serendipity in Sacramento can have an especially big effect when it comes to 
environmental policy. California has an activist environmental government, often serving as the 
model for other state and federal governments (see Fitzgerald, 2010, p.182; see also Davoudi, 
Crawford & Mehmood, 2009, p. 125). The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
passed in 1970 contains substantive prohibitions against developments that will have a major 
environmental impact. In contrast, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) passed in 
1969, is solely procedural. NEPA requires that the environmental impacts of large developments 
be considered, but does not prohibit development even if mitigation cannot be performed. While 
NEPA has been referred to as “the natural environment’s Magna Carta” (Lindstrom and Smith, 
2001, p. 4) and is an expression of the fundamental “visions and values” of the environmental 
policy community in the United States (ibid., p.7), the strongest regulation and innovation in this 
area has come from the so-called “little NEPAs” passed by the states. Of these, CEQA has been 
the model. It has always been considered one of the strongest environmental policies in the 
country (Baldwin, 2009, p.788). With the status of CEQA as a standard-bearer, many legislators 
in California have been keenly aware of the trendsetting role they play in the environmental 
policy world.  
In the end, the serendipitous meeting at the birthday party did lead to action and is likely 
to affect higher-level policy. As one respondent involved with the negotiations said, “Some 
version of this will be incorporated in the reauthorization of the Federal Transportation Bill.” 
California’s Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), entitled the Sustainable Communities and Climate 
Protection Act linked McKeever’s approach to regional planning with the environmental goals of 
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two additional early sponsors of the bill: The California League of Conservation Voters and the 
Environmental Defense Fund. The Act was signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
on September 30, 2008 (See figure 5.1 below). The goal of SB 375, which will be implemented 
statewide by 2013, is to incentivize regions and localities to plan for and create more compact 
land use patterns that will reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by bringing places of home and 
work closer together. In order to achieve this goal, the bill requires urban regions to create land 
use plans that link regional transportation and housing development to statewide greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets set by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). 
However, SB 375 did not come about easily. The interim period between the initial 
chance meeting of two of the bill’s original supporters and the signing was filled with political 
hurdles. In order to achieve the environmental goals that the sponsors established early on, they 
had to align housing and transportation policy within diverse regional land use planning regimes. 
This brought a number of organized interests into the conversation, including private developers, 
local governments, affordable housing advocates, environmentalists, and numerous community 
development interests, among others. The final list of supporters of SB 375 was termed “The 
Impossible Coalition” in a report released by two environmental organizations (Adams, Eaken, 
& Notthoff, 2009). The report states: 
SB 375 was sponsored by environmental groups and gained the support of local 
governments, builders, affordable housing advocates, major employers, and labor unions. 
This coalition was not easily assembled…It came about because parties were willing to 
face new realities. AB 32 had been passed and the state was poised to enact far-reaching 
policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions…SB 375 enjoyed a process of principled 
compromise that can produce more widespread success in the legislative arena. Reaching 
agreement on complex, large-scale, and controversial issues is the strongest path for 
durable achievements. (p. 11) 
 




…this coalition of homebuilders and environmental groups and affordable housing 
advocates and local governments is unprecedented, even in California. I mean, these 
groups usually hate each other and they very seldom work together and we were able to 




The use of the term coalition, though, is a slight misnomer. Caplow, in the Encyclopedia 
of Sociology (2001) defines a coalition as “any combination of two or more social actors formed 
for mutual advantage in contention with other actors in the same social system.” While this was a 
case of social actors coming together, they were not doing so solely “for mutual advantage in 
contention with other actors in the same social system.” This was part of the motivation, but they 
overcame the contentions amongst themselves in order to meet the complex demands of 
statewide land use policy. Normally, the members of the “impossible coalition” would be sub-
divided into various smaller coalitions fighting with one another. In this case, though, for a brief 
moment—and it did not last long—contention over land use goals was largely removed from the 
state legislative arena. This was something different than a coalition. It was a moment when the 
institutional norms of land use were open for discussion because the effect of new climate 
policies in the state created a high degree of uncertainty for all of the organizations involved.  
California’s regulatory structure largely mirrors that of the federal government with 
regard to the institutional divide around land use. Issues of land-use regulation have long divided 
community development from environmental activists and have been at the center of state-level 
struggles to develop effective urban environmental policies. Affordable housing advocates in 
California have fought for decades to fund more affordable housing in the far-flung suburbs 
where they argue that the schools and resources are the best and the demand is the greatest. 
Environmentalists have countered that this strategy fuels sprawl development.
77
 As one 
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community development activist stated of the historic position of environmentalists, “You know 
the environmentalists are interesting because they…they have significant power and especially in 
terms of public opinion. And so they can and have for years sort of gone it alone. And they could 
continue doing that, you know, sort of with or without us.”
78




Figure 5.1. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signing Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), the Sustainable Communities and 
Climate Protection Act, into law on September 30, 2008. Pictured with Governor Schwarzenegger are several 
representatives of the “impossible coalition” that negotiated and supported the legislation. 
 
 
Because the historic divide between community development and environmental 
advocates was undone within the formation of the “impossible coalition,” the SB 375 case yields 
important lessons for the field of urban environmental planning. At least for a brief while, the 
institutional divide was removed and the potential for the two interests to be combined under a 
single urban environmental banner was created. The coming together of community development 
and environmentalists in fact was one of the key levers that forced the broader “impossible 
coalition” into existence. While the overall success of SB 375 remains to be seen, it has created a 
new institutional arena in California where urban environmental policy is more possible than 
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ever before. As several respondents remarked, this arena may be the most lasting outcome of the 
bill. One respondent said: 
While…SB 375…is obviously a greenhouse gas reduction bill, there’s so many more 
reasons on a local community level to support what SB 375 is doing...[it’s] improving 
people’s quality of life…saving the local governments money, looking at issues like 
asthma and obesity.
79
   
 
Another respondent commented: 
  
 The most powerful thing [SB 375] did, and it is a very, very powerful thing, is it changed 
the conversation.
80
   
 
 
5.3| Description of the Bill 
The Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, commonly referred to 
as SB 375 for its Senate Bill designation,
81
 is part of a series of climate change prevention laws 
that were passed in California between 2005 and 2010. The Act requires every large urban region 
to develop a land use plan called a Sustainable Communities Strategy (SCS) which growth 
forecast models must show will reduce air emissions over the next 25 years by a given target 
amount. SB 375 is first and foremost a regional land use planning law that seeks to encourage 
higher density development with special attention to the location of employment centers relative 
to residential areas. For some regions, especially in the southern portion of the state, the land use 
strategies that are supported in the bill require a radical shift from the sprawled development 
patterns that have historically been preferred. For this reason, the bill has been called “the 
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 Senate Bill 375 of 2008 was officially designated as “An act to amend Sections 65080, 65400, 65583, 65584.01, 
65584.02, 65584.04, 65587, and 65588 of, and to add Sections 14522.1, 14522.2, and 65080.01 to, the Government 
Code, and to amend Section 21061.3 of, to add Section 21159.28 to, and to add Chapter 4.2 (commencing with 
Section 21155) to Division 13 of, the Public Resources Code, relating to environmental quality.” 
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strongest state-level smart growth law in the country” (Snyder, 2011, paragraph 14). Indeed, the 
regional planning agency responsible for the Los Angeles area known as the Southern California 
Association of Governments (SCAG) expressed concern over the shift that SB 375 requires: “SB 
375 is a high priority…because it has the potential to dramatically influence growth patterns and 
erode local land use authority” (GCCOG, 2009, p. 3). 
Several proponents of the bill have pointed out that the shift toward more compact 
development which a serious reduction in vehicle miles traveled would require is actually just a 
reflection of changing market demand, even in southern California (see Berg, 2011; Eaken, 
2011; Nelson, 2011; Bizjak, 2011). They cite recent surveys that found that the majority of 
Californians at all income levels stated a preference for inner-city, transit accessible options for 
living, and that this was the case in all regions of the state.
82
 The argument that SB 375 simply 
reflects existing market trends was an important factor in the negotiation process around the bill, 
as discussed below. In the end, the effectiveness of the Sustainable Communities Strategies will 
be heavily influenced by the extent to which real estate markets support the development patterns 
called for, which in turn will impact the extent to which localities cooperate or push back with a 
strong assertion of local control over land use.   
In order to develop regional plans that will reduce vehicle miles traveled by bringing 
places of work closer to places of residence, SB 375 employs a complex multi-stage set of 
requirements (see Institute for Local Government, 2011). First, the bill mandates CARB to create 
targets for greenhouse gas reductions for every large urban region in the state and to update the 
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 See Reznick(December 20, 2011), accessed on January 5, 2012 at: 
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/comment/reply/9675; and Eaken (December 12, 2011) accessed on 
January 5, 2012 at: http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/aeaken/new_study_confirms_sprawl_is_d.html and Nelson 
(2001) available at: http://www.uli.org/ResearchAndPublications/~/media/ResearchAndPublications/Report/ 




targets every four years. The first targets were set in February 2011 (see Figure 5.2 for a listing 
of approved target reductions by region). The target reductions that SB 375 calls for are set by 
the California Air Resources Board (CARB). CARB set the emission reduction targets according 
to what was termed “ambitious but achievable” standards (Regional Targets Advisory 
Committee (RTAC), 2010, p. 26; see also Cool Connections, 2010, para. 4). The targets for 
reduction in each region take into account local conditions, including current land use patterns, 
geography, and political realities.   
The targets were decided with consultation from the Regional Targets Advisory 
Commission (RTAC), a group of diverse stakeholders comprised of representatives from local 
and regional governments, homebuilders, community development organizations, affordable 
housing groups, transportation advocates, public health specialists, and environmental justice 
organizations (for a complete list of members, see CARB, 2009, Appendix 7). The RTAC was 
mandated by SB 375 to guide CARB in the process of developing the regional greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reduction targets. As well, the RTAC created standards for the models that would be used 
to measure the amount of GHG reductions that a given plan would generate.  
Once the GHG reduction targets were established, the eight largest Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs), the entities responsible for regional housing and transportation planning 
in California, were required to create a new regional land use plan—the Sustainable Community 
Strategy (SCS). The new SCS regional plans can employ a number of strategies for meeting the 
target emission reductions, including higher efficiency standards for fuel and industry, but the 
essential intent of the law is to reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by bringing places of work 
closer to places of home. They must use standardized computer-based growth forecasting models 
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to project the environmental impact of the proposed plan. The models must show that planned 
growth in the region will reduce air emissions to the target level by 2035.  
 
Figure 5.2. California Air Resources Board approved regional greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for all 
major Metropolitan Planning Organizations in the state.
83
 The table demonstrates that all of the large urban regions 
were given reduction targets of 7 to 8 percent less emissions by 2020 and 13 to 16 percent less by 2035.  Source: 
California Air Resources Board, available at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/SB 375/final_targets.pdf 
 
Once a region has an approved SCS, the plan must then be used as the basis for deciding 
how housing and transportation infrastructure will be distributed throughout the region. First, the 
SCS is linked to a pre-existing housing allocation process known as the Regional Housing Needs 
Assessment (RHNA). RHNA involves a process of distributing the “fair share” of housing units 
for each locality based upon projected population growth forecasts. As well, the SCS must be 
used as the basis for deciding how state and federal transportation money will be spent in each 
region. Provisions for aligning the schedules used to decide housing and transportation 
allocations were also built into SB 375. By linking pre-existing regional housing and 
transportation planning processes with the SCS, SB 375 created a standardized and unified 
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 SCAG=Los Angeles, MTC=San Francisco, SANDAG=San Diego, SACOG=Sacramento. 
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regional land use planning process in all major MPOs. As an incentive for developers to follow 
the provisions of these plans, the legislation also stipulates that all new developments within an 
SCS boundary that would normally come under California Environmental Quality Review 
requirements are eligible for streamlined or exempted review status as long as they meet the 
goals of the SCS.    
As some critics have pointed out, the extent to which an SCS affects actual development 
in a region is still largely dependent upon the cooperation of localities (Altmaier et al., 2009, p. 
ii). Any MPO that cannot get all of the localities within its boundaries to agree on a regional plan 
may opt out of the SCS process. In such cases, the MPO must produce what is called an 
Alternate Planning Strategy (APS). The APS must demonstrate what changes would be 
necessary to meet the goal, even if such changes are deemed infeasible under current political 
and economic conditions. The APS does not have to guide any planning decisions in the region. 
If a region adopts an APS, though, it loses the right to access the streamlined environmental 
review for new development projects that would come with adoption of an SCS. Regardless of 
whether and SCS or an APS is adopted, all regions must still align their housing and 
transportation planning processes so that they occur at the same time and inform one another. 
While removal of the streamlined environmental review provides some consequence for failing 
to plan to reduce emissions through land use, there are widespread concerns over whether it is 
enough to induce regions to comply (see Urban Habitat, 2009, para. 6). This is especially the 
case with the southern regions which have an established sprawl development culture and 
contain localities that have historically been disinterested in infill development.  
The southern regions were the first to complete an SCS and their results have been the 
first big test of the policy. San Diego submitted a draft SCS to CARB for initial review on 
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September 21, 2011. Los Angeles did the same on December 1, 2011. Generally, many 
environmental advocates were displeased with the results of San Diego’s SCS plan. While the 
region shows a reduction in emissions that meet its target, many proponents of SB 375 have 
argued that they skirted the intention of the bill by over-estimating the impacts of new 
transportation technologies and not planning for enough high density development. The State 
Attorney General’s office released a highly critical legal review of the San Diego SCS and is 
currently challenging it in court (see ClimatePlan Blog, 23 December 2011). However, Los 
Angeles met CARB’s target reductions with a plan that seems to contain relatively robust land 
use alterations (see ClimatePlan, 2012). Los Angeles’ draft SCS has been a cause for hope 
amongst proponents of the SB 375 approach to greenhouse gas reductions, as it was widely 
considered to be one of the regions likely to opt out of the SCS process in favor of an APS.  
Some environmentalist, though, have argued that if these archetypal sprawl regions can 
reduce vehicle miles traveled and emissions according to the targets set by CARB, perhaps the 
targets themselves should be more aggressive (Newton, 2011).
84
 This is almost certain to be an 
area of political contestation in the future. In all, the mixed results thus far have led to a 
continued political push to further strengthen the consequences for regions that do not develop an 
effective SCS (see Rose, Bernstein & Cohen, 2011; Michele, 2011; Center for Biological 
Diversity, November 28, 2011
85
), but have also raised hopes amongst many about the prospects 
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5.4| Prior Legislation 
 Between 2006 and 2007, one of the toughest strategic decisions that the early regional 
planning and environmental sponsors of SB 375 had to make in the bill formulation process was 
whether or not to engage with existing housing, transportation, and environmental review laws. 
There was reticence to do so, especially amongst the experienced lobbyists that initially 
sponsored the bill because each of these laws had well-established state lobbying organizations 
that supported them and would require extensive negotiation.
86
 One of the initial sponsors of the 
bill summarized the scenario by saying, “We combined land use, transportation, climate and 
housing policy into one single bill…if you’d asked anybody to do that in a single bill before we 
started, you would have been laughed out of town.”  He went on, “the issues with the builders, 
the local governments and the affordable housing advocates were each very difficult and each in 
different ways.” 
In the end, the initial sponsors of SB 375 decided that an effective regional planning law 
was not possible without incorporating existing housing, transportation, and environmental 
review programs. This decision created potential benefits for the bill sponsors in that the 
established legal authority of the other laws could be leveraged to give greater power to SB 375. 
This was especially crucial with the housing law because existing affordable housing mandates 
had the power to supersede local zoning ordinances. However, the risk that came along with this 
potential benefit was also great. Any one of the lobbying interests that were associated with the 
existing laws could refuse to negotiate and greatly hinder the ability to pass any legislation. The 
decision to engage with prior legislation, then, was one that required a calculated risk on the part 
of the bill’s sponsors.  
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In the process of negotiations, the bill had to incorporate major amendments to three 
existing pieces of legislation. Amendments included streamlining the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA) which requires large real estate developments to show that they will not 
cause significant environmental harm; adjusting the timeline and allocation formula for the 
Regional Housing Needs Assessment (RHNA, known locally as “REE-NA”) which mandates 
that localities plan for a certain number of housing units based on population growth estimates 
and requires that local zoning reflect the mandates; and the Regional Transportation Planning 
(RTP) process which determines the allocation of state and federal transportation dollars across a 
region. The sponsors engaged these other policy areas from the position of a new regime of 
climate change and regional planning laws that had recently been created in the wake of a 
landmark greenhouse gas reduction law known as AB 32. 
 
5.4a: AB 32 
At the 30 September 2008 bill signing, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger referred to SB 
375 as the sequel to California’s 2006 Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), the Global Warming Solutions 
Act. The incentive for the bill’s sponsors to engage with the housing, transportation, and 
environmental review lobbies comes from the justification for a land use approach to climate 
policy embedded in AB 32. AB 32 created the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and 
empowered it to enforce regulations that reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020. This goal was later expanded to include an 80% reduction below 1990 levels in 
California-based emissions by 2050.
87
 The Act amended the California Health and Safety Code 
(HSC) by directing CARB to reduce “greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of 
sources of greenhouse gases by 2020” (HSC, §38561). In essence, the Global Warming Solutions 
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Act empowered CARB to operate in all economic and planning sectors necessary to achieve its 
mandate. 
AB 32 was the first bill in the United States to set an absolute limit on carbon emissions 
and has been a model for similar actions in other states and regions across the country 
(Environmental Defense Fund, 2011). As well, AB 32 established the first renewable energy 
goals for a state and includes a “cap-and-trade” strategy for reducing industrial emissions which 
will take effect on 1 January 2013. The cap-and-trade program, similar to the one that has been 
proposed but not passed at the federal level (see Broder, 2009; Hulse and  Herszenhorn, 2010), 
limits the overall emissions that certain industries can release and allows low-emitters to sell 
emission credits to high emitters (CARB, 2008, p.30).  
In order to implement the climate protection goals in AB 32, CARB has developed a 
number of policy strategies across multiple sectors. As outlined in their December 2008 Climate 
Change Scoping Plan (CARB, 2008), CARB will utilize direct regulations of certain industries, 
monetary and non-monetary incentives, voluntary programs, and market-based programs (such 
as cap-and trade) in order to meet its directive. CARB’s actions are focused on various sectors 
including transportation, land use, energy, agriculture, manufacturing and construction. The 
regulatory initiatives outlined in the Climate Change Scoping Plan, with the exception of cap-
and-trade, took effect on 1 January 2012. SB 375 provides the framework for implementing 
CARB’s AB 32 directives for emissions reductions in the land use and personal transportation 
sectors.  
The broad regulatory authority granted to CARB within AB 32 served as a strong 
motivation for a separate legislative effort that addressed land use. In order to reduce personal 
transportation-based emissions, CARB put forth what came to be known as the “three-legged 
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stool” approach. The “three legs” included requirements for vehicle efficiency, cleaner fuels and 
reduction of VMT. More specifically, they consisted of incentivizing and requiring new high-
efficiency vehicle technologies (e.g. hybrid and electric vehicles), requiring lower intensity 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor fuels sold in the state (e.g. requirements for cleaner fuels), 
and programs for creating new travel behaviors that would lead to less vehicle miles traveled 
(reduce VMT). California has already passed regulations and legislation addressing the first two 
legs of the stool. Vehicle efficiency requirements have been a part of the law in the United States 
since the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards passed in 1975. California 
recently implemented stronger standards than the CAFE legislation requires. As well, while low 
carbon fuel standards are facing legal opposition, they were recently passed in the state (see 
Gullo, 2012 for more on the court challenge to these laws). However, legislation that effectively 
changes driver behavior rather than specific technology or production-based processes has been 
much more difficult to devise (see Malaczynski and Duane, 2009). SB 375 is the first law that 
specifically seeks to address this “third leg” of the personal vehicle emissions reduction stool 
(Hilliard, 2010, p. 6) by bringing places of work and residence closer together and thus reducing 
the need for car trips. 
The justification for legislation that addresses travel behavior was clear from the outset of 
the bill’s negotiation process. Studies showed that an increase in personal vehicle miles traveled 
would overwhelm the gains made from any regulation of low carbon fuel standards and high 
efficiency vehicles. Since personal transportation was the source of 30% of all greenhouse gas 
emissions in California, there was no disputing the fact that unless rising VMT was addressed, it 
would be impossible for CARB to lower California-based emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 
(Adams, Eaken & Nothoff, 2009, p. 9). The graph below (Figure 5.3), taken from a widely 
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distributed report advocating for passage of SB 375, demonstrates the roughly 70% rise in 
personal vehicle miles traveled expected by 2030. While fuel carbon standards and vehicle 
efficiency measures are projected to result in a reduction of the total Carbon Dioxide output over 
this same time, the increase in VMT more than erases the gains. In essence, the chart below 
makes clear that unless travel behavior is addressed in such a way as to drastically reduce VMT, 
the gains from technological improvements will not have any effect on overall greenhouse gas 




Figure 5.3. Expected Greenhouse Gas Reductions: This figure shows that expected increases in personal vehicle 
miles traveled will overwhelm any possible gains made from low carbon fuel standards or high efficiency vehicles. 
Source:  Adams, Eaken &Nothoff, 2009, p.9. 
 
The purpose of SB 375 is to slow the increase of vehicle miles traveled and, in doing so, 
make a reduction in carbon emissions from personal vehicles possible. In its AB 32 scoping 
report, CARB states that it expects at least a 4 percent reduction in VMT per capita to result from 
the implementation of SB 375. Overall, this should drop carbon dioxide emissions in 2050 by 
approximately 40 million metric tons. This reduction would reduce the slope of the expected 
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VMT in Figure 5.3 above and make overall carbon dioxide reductions in the personal 
transportation sector possible in the long run. Figure 5.4 below, taken from CARB’s Scoping 
Plan, demonstrates the expected reductions from SB 375. It is, however, emphasized in the report 
that this is an estimated result not based on actual implementation models. 
   
  
Figure 5.4. This chart demonstrates the expected effect of SB 375. CARB estimates that the total expected emissions 
from personal vehicle travel without SB 375 would be roughly 230 million metric tons. With SB 375 in place, it 
estimates that this number should reduce to roughly 190 million metric tons. Source: CARB, 2008, p. 50. 
 
 As CARB began developing its standards for reducing emissions, it became clear to 
many that the personal transportation sector could not be addressed without finding a way to 
change driver behavior. Malaczynski and Duane (2009) identified a “‘VMT gap’ in the current 
regulatory structure for GHG emissions reductions envisioned under AB 32” (p.74). SB 375 was 
devised as a legislative fix for the “VMT gap” in climate policy. Land use planning became the 
preferred mechanism within the legislation for changing individual driver behavior. The starting 
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point for developing the model of land use planning that would effectively do so was a popular 
regional planning effort that Steinberg and McKeever discussed at the community development 
activist’s birthday party and had been recently completed in the Sacramento area.   
 
5.4b: The Blueprint 
The planning strategy required in SB 375 was influenced by a regional planning model 
finalized in 2006 by the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (SACOG) known as the 
“Blueprint”. SACOG is the equivalent of the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the 
Sacramento region and, as such, is the primary regional planning entity. The Blueprint is a 
popular and generally well-received regional land use strategy developed in partnership with 
local governments and designed to reduce the environmental impact of future development in the 
area. It designated ecologically sensitive and important agricultural lands for preservation, 
increased mixed-use development goals for existing urban centers, and increased transit option 
goals.  
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) funded the Blueprint program for 
MPOs to engage in voluntary collaborative regional planning efforts in 2005. The SACOG 
Blueprint was one of many produced throughout the state. The goal was to help MPOs make 
more informed decisions about how to spend state and federal transportation funding based upon 
a collaborative planning process that widely engaged all of the localities within the region (see 
Caltrans, 2010). SACOG received between three and four hundred thousand dollars in funding 
each year between 2005 and 2009 under the Caltrans Blueprint planning program (Caltrans, 
2011). While Blueprint plans were generated by all of the other major MPOs in the state as well, 
and by a number of smaller Regional Transportation Planning Associations, Sacramento’s 
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Blueprint was by far the best received and most widely publicized (see Wall Street Journal, 
2008). 
One reason for Sacramento’s success was that it was based upon two prior successful 
regional planning models. Before becoming the director of SACOG in 2004, Mike McKeever 
had been a planning consultant for Portland’s Metro Council, the regional planning authority for 
the Portland, Oregon area (see SACOG Biography, 2004). Portland’s Metro Council is a widely-
cited success story in the effort to convince localities to give up some of their land use authority 
to achieve regional planning goals (see Bragdon, 2003). McKeever carried the lessons from 
Portland with him to his work in Sacramento, giving them a somewhat unique focus on building 
consensus amongst localities. As well, the SACOG staff relied heavily on technical and 
procedural advice from staff members at the Salt Lake City-based regional planning 
organization, Envision Utah (Hilliard, 2010, p. 134). Envision Utah had also just completed a 
well-received regional plan that relied heavily on innovative public outreach methods. Based on 
advice from the Utah agency, SACOG did extensive market research on households within the 
region to understand the preferences of Sacramento area residents and employed a new 
computer-based planning tool developed originally by the California Energy Commission called 
I-PLACE3S. This tool allowed SACOG staff to quickly run through several development 
scenarios with representatives from localities in order to build consensus about the most desired 
scenario. In the end, SACOG achieved broad consensus amongst localities and wide popular 
support on a regional plan that reduced the urban footprint of the region from the projected 
“business-as-usual” scenario by 20 percent. It did so even while providing for the same number 
of projected jobs and housing as the business-as-usual scenario would have. Figure 5.5 below 





Figure 5.5. These maps demonstrate the expected effect of  the Blueprint process. They show a 20% smaller urban  
footprint in 2050 than would occur under a business-as-usual scenario. Source: Adams, Eaken & Nothoff, 2009, p. 
10 
 
One of the guiding principles employed by the SACOG Blueprint to achieve the reduced 
urban footprint was the need for a jobs-housing balance based upon the jobs-housing ratio for 
each locality. The jobs-housing ratio is a measure of number of jobs to the number of housing 
units in a given area. It is assumed that areas with very high or very low ratios generate longer 
commutes, and thus more vehicle miles traveled. Therefore, SACOG sought to create balanced 
jobs-housing ratios throughout the region (SACOG, 2008, p.94). The notion later became a 
guiding principle in the early formulation of the SCS goals within SB 375.
88
 However, SACOG 
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 Cited by respondents from the housing and community development sector as one of the key issues they were 
focused on. For example, one community development activist stated,  “we’re very, I’m personally very concerned 
with what the methodology is, what gets included into, what MTC and ABAG are looking at in order to attain that 
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and most of the proponents of SB 375 have recently moved toward a “jobs-housing fit” model. 
The traditional jobs-housing ratio does not account for the number and type of workers being 
accommodated, the affordability of housing relative to the jobs in the area, or the need of certain 
businesses to agglomerate (see SACOG, 2011, Attachment 3).  The jobs-housing fit model uses 
more subjective definitions of job centers as well as wage data on workers to try to not only align 
jobs and housing geographically, but also align jobs and workers geographically. This more 
nuanced approach has been a part of the ongoing discussion around implementation of SB 375.
89
    
Translating the SACOG Blueprint into state law that could be applied to all regions, 
though, was both politically and practically complex. SACOG spent approximately two years 
doing market research and outreach to localities in order to build support for its plan. San Diego 
and Los Angeles only recently began their SCS planning in earnest. As well, Sacramento’s effort 
was well-funded by Caltrans. Further, the physical, demographic, and political dynamics of the 
regions are intensely varied, making it uncertain whether the outcomes produced in Sacramento 
are possible in other regions. Therefore, the focus in developing the statewide approach for SB 
375 shifted away from the specifics of a new planning process and toward aligning existing 
statewide requirements for housing allocation, regional transportation planning, and 




                                                                                                                                                             
target.  So one of the challenges that we’ve had with the advanced methodology up until now is they treat every 
house as a house no matter how big it is, no matter how expensive it is, and every job as a job no matter what it 
pays.  So if you, you know, Marin County for example, one of the wealthiest places and one of the wealthiest 







5.4c: California Housing Element Law and the Regional Housing Needs Assessment  
Since 1969, California’s housing element law has mandated that the State Department of 
Housing and Community Development (DHCD) ensure that local governments “adequately plan 
to meet the existing and projected housing needs of all economic segments of the community” 
(DHCD, 2011).
90
 According to DHCD’s description, the housing element law empowers the 
state to decide how many housing units will be needed in each region and to require the regional 
Council of Governments (COG) to allocate those units across all of its localities.
91
 Each locality 
must then accommodate all new units in its allocation within a new zoning resolution. DHCD 
calculates the number of units each region receives, or the Regional Housing Needs Assessment 
(RHNA), every eight years (amended in 2008 from the earlier five-year cycle by SB 375). In 
their calculation, DHCD uses projected population growth estimates from the State Finance 
Department to determine a required number of housing units that each region must accommodate 
and the affordability levels that the units must have. Once the RHNA determination is given to 
each COG, the regional council then allocates the required units to its localities. The result is a 
“RHNA allocation” which each locality is required to accommodate within the “housing 
element” of its local general plan. General plans are also required of all localities according to 
prior legislation. DHCD must approve the general plan amendments made by each locality in 
order to ensure that each region is meeting its housing goals. Once the general plan has been 
approved, localities must change their zoning ordinances to reflect the new housing element of 
their approved general plan. These zoning ordinances have typically been the target of lawsuits 
over whether they actually allow for the required amount of affordable units. 
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 A COG is a regional planning entity similar to an MPO but with responsibility only for housing plans. 
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Since its inception, RHNA has been an anti-exclusionary zoning law. The RHNA process 
does not guarantee that new and affordable housing units will be built. Rather, it ensures that 
localities throughout the state have zoning ordinances that accommodate new and affordable 
housing units. In the end, the efficacy of RHNA relies upon the actions of private developers and 
the cooperation of localities to accomplish the goal of affordable housing provision statewide. As 
a result, RHNA processes and enforcement of housing element law have long been a contentious 
area of politics in California (see Lewis, 2003). As one League of California Cities representative 
wrote, “Typically, as soon as these [RHNA] numbers are proposed, they are challenged by local 
governments as far exceeding local realities” (Carrig, 2002). DHCD staff members frequently 
declare local general plans to be in “non-compliance” with the state housing element law (see 
Lewis, 2003, pp. 4-5), but localities are often slow to respond or non-responsive. A declaration 
of non-compliance from the State makes a locality ineligible to receive state housing funds, 
complicates their bond-issuance process, and generally raises legal challenge from housing 
advocates. However, certain localities sometimes prefer these measures to DHCD required 
alterations of their zoning ordinance. Statewide, affordable housing advocacy groups in 
California spend a large portion of their time and resources trying to force localities to meet their 
responsibilities under the housing element law (see Shigley, 2010).  
Due to the impact that the regional housing needs assessment and the local allocation of 
housing units have on regional planning, the RHNA process became a focus during the SB 375 
negotiations. Generally, local governments that do not want more housing have argued that 
RHNA allocations are unreasonable and poorly reflect the reality of real estate markets. Housing 
advocates, in turn, argue that localities are constantly seeking to sidestep and subvert their 
housing element responsibilities. The local governments and the housing advocates both sought 
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to “gain ground” in this conflict through their support for SB 375. In the end, the localities got a 
longer timeline between housing element updates, which lessens their burden relative to 
rezoning.  
In order to align the regional housing allocations with regional transportation planning 
processes, the requirements to update housing elements were lengthened from every five years to 
every eight years so that it could be matched with the four-year transportation planning process. 
From the localities’ perspective, this makes them less vulnerable to lawsuits. For their part, the 
housing advocates strengthened the RHNA process, with greater penalties for non-compliance. 
Within SB 375, all housing allocations must be aligned with the goals of the Sustainable 
Communities Strategies. As well, if a locality does not adopt an element in time (delayed 
submission of housing elements was a common tactic for subverting the law) then that locality is 
required to move to a four-year housing element cycle, removing the benefit of the longer 
planning cycle. As well, the law has penalties for untimely and incomplete housing element 
submissions. 
SB 375 also gave housing advocates new tools for addressing the failure on the part of 
many localities to adopt new zoning ordinances that reflect the approved housing element in their 
general plan. Now, if a locality has not passed a new zoning ordinance within three years of an 
adopted housing element, a developer may as-of-right (without seeking approval from the 
locality) build on any site to the specifications of the general plan, regardless of local zoning 
laws (Housing California, 2010). In effect, for the first time, the state has given the housing 
element of the local general plan (which is subject to state approval) greater power than local 
zoning laws. As well, even if a builder does not seek to develop a site, any interested party may 
sue to compel a city that has missed the deadline to change their zoning laws. In essence, 
197 
 
housing advocates have been given recognized standing in court cases to sue not only over non-
compliance with the housing element aspect of the law, but also over failure to pass a new 
zoning ordinance that reflects the housing element. These new remedies are considered an 
important gain for the housing advocacy community.  
 
5.4d: Regional Transportation Plan  
In addition to directing the RHNA housing allocation, the SCS process requires that state 
and federal transportation project funding be allocated according to the plan’s priorities. The 
regional transportation planning process (RTP) has been in place since the mid-1970s in 
California. The RTP is a long-range plan developed by MPOs or, in the case of smaller regions, 
Regional Transportation Planning Agencies (RTPAs) and revised every four years to decide 
which transportation projects will receive state and federal funding (including all funds from the 
Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration and Caltrans). The RTP is 
the state version of the federally-mandated Metropolitan Transportation Plan (MTP). RTP and 
MTP are interchangeable in California. The RTP was added to California state law because the 
MPOs required by federal law only represent large urban regions. The RTPAs represent all 
regions not required by federal law to have an MPO (for complete description of the regional 
transportation planning process in California, see Caltrans, 2010). 
The RTP reflects all transportation projects expected to be built in the region over the 
next 20 years. The plans are required to be financially realistic in the sense that they can only 
include projects for which funding sources can be identified (Rose, Bernstein, Cohen, 2011, p.5). 
If a project does not appear in an approved RTP, it cannot be funded (Caltrans, 2010, p. 3). The 
financially realistic requirement in the RTP process was also extended to the SCS plans under 
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SB 375. That is, neither an RTP nor an SCS plan can employ unrealistic methods for achieving 
its goals. The projects must be possible within current financial, physical, and political restraints 
(Housing California, 2010).  
According to the 2010 California Regional Transportation Plan Guidelines produced by 
Caltrans, “The inclusion of the sustainable communities strategy as a part of the RTP represents 
a significant change to an MPO’s traditional transportation planning process by adding the 
strategy as a new element and requiring internal consistency among all elements of the RTP” 
(Caltrans, 2010, Foreword). Whereas RTPs had been developed in isolation from other land use 
or housing considerations, within SB 375 the transportation projects proposed must promote the 
housing and greenhouse gas emission reduction goals expressed in the Sustainable Communities 
Strategy for the region. If an RTP is found in non-compliance with an SCS, the State Department 
of Transportation is instructed to reject the RTP, requiring revision before any transportation 
projects can be funded.  
 Another important aspect of the RTP process that was altered by SB 375 involves the 
travel demand models used by the MPOs. Travel demand models employ statistical algorithms to 
predict human travel behavior. As a result, “model results are only as good as the data that go 
into them” (Caltrans, 2010, p. 35). Large MPOs that have in-house modeling offices develop 
their own household travel surveys in addition to employing up-to-date demographic data from 
the U.S. Census. Prior to SB 375, the travel assumptions built into the models were unique to 
each region’s process. For example, the assumed price of gas (one variable that affected assumed 
vehicle miles traveled per capita) was different in each region and sometimes had a large impact 
upon the expected emissions from the region. Under SB 375, Caltrans was directed to develop 
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standard variables for each model to use in calculating the assumed reduction of emissions from 
the new planned growth (SB 375, 2008, Chapter 728, Section 1). 
 In addition to standardizing the models, SB 375 required that MPOs expand the variables 
that they include. In its 2010 guidelines for modeling, Caltrans directed all MPOs to “quantify, to 
the extent possible, the co-benefits associated with the achievement of their greenhouse gas 
reduction targets” (Caltrans, 2010, p. 48). Co-benefits include: 1) increased mobility from greater 
transit options and better traffic flow management; 2) economic benefits from more efficient and 
cost-effective use of the transportation system; 3) conservation of open space from a reduced 
urban footprint; and 4) public health benefits from safer, more active transit options that result in 
greater transportation equity throughout the region. As of 2012, co-benefits are an optional 
aspect of the modeling process. However, the mandatory inclusion of co-benefits has been a 
component of the ongoing advocacy from social equity groups engaged with SB 375 (see Urban 
Habitat, 2010). 
 While SB 375 does have several substantial impacts upon the normal RTP process, some 
transit advocates have pointed out that the ultimate decision about which projects get funded still 
remains with the boards of the regional transportation agencies. While their decisions must 
reflect the priorities set forth in the SCS, these boards are largely controlled by representatives of 
local governments and are still likely to favor traditional transportation projects such as highway 
expansions that support local economic development (Fulton, 2008). Despite the considerable 
leverage that those seeking to challenge car-oriented RTP decisions now have, MPO boards 
which have traditionally favored highway construction will continue to be the primary decision-
makers of transportation projects. As critics point out, this is a potentially problematic situation 
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that may limit the ability for any change to the typical transportation planning process in the near 
future (Elkind, 2010).  
The SCS process links land use planning with the RHNA and RTP process in order to 
connect housing goals with a larger regional planning framework that reduces vehicle miles 
traveled. As such, SB 375 is essentially a regional planning tool that uses travel demand models 
to link existing housing and transportation law within a single land use plan. Because the goal of 
an SCS is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by building a transportation system that requires 
less driving, the new planning process necessarily favors transit projects, though the push to get 
regional boards to accept them involves a political battle. Beyond the local zoning changes that 
the RHNA process involves, the building trades also have state-level incentives to construct new 
developments that conform with an SCS. SB 375 offers selected exemptions and streamlining of 
the state’s environmental review process contained within the California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA). As a result, CEQA is the final major legislative foundation upon which SB 375 is 
built. 
 
5.4e: California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
One of the major “carrots” provided by SB 375 is the potential for development projects 
that meet SCS goals to receive an exemption or streamlined version of environmental review as 
required in the California Environmental Quality Act (see Cohen, accessed 2011). CEQA was 
passed in 1970 and since 1976 has required that all government regulations, both state and local, 
affecting development be subject to environmental review and require mitigation where feasible 
for projects that have negative environmental impacts (Altmaier et al., 2009, p.8). This has meant 
that projects receiving state funds can only proceed if they are ruled to have insignificant 
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environmental impacts. It has also meant that all public and private projects subject to regulatory 
approval, as well as changes to zoning resolutions, general plans, and infrastructure 
improvements are subject to the environmental review process (California Resources Agency, 
2005). 
CEQA has been a powerful tool for protecting natural resources. It has been credited with 
stopping conversion of the San Joaquin Reservoir to sewage storage, which might have polluted 
Newport Bay (Johnson and Hanson, 2011). As well, CEQA was integral in preserving a critical 
habitat for the Bighorn sheep (Brechtel, 2011) and in safeguarding the tributary streams that feed 
Mono Lake (Roos-Collins, 2011). It has been relatively effective at preservation of natural 
resources and, as such, is a carefully guarded component of the environmental lobby’s toolkit in 
California.  
Developers critical of CEQA have argued first that the law is used as a “not-in-my-
backyard” or NIMBY tool. That is, development interests have pointed out that environmental 
review is used as a cover for keeping out projects that are unwanted for social reasons, such as if 
it is expected to serve a low income population. Some researchers have supported this claim with 
the finding that ecological challenges and mitigation measures often relate more to “quality-of-
life” issues than to ecological preservation (Johnston and McCartney 1991; Barbour and Teitz 
2006, as cited in Altmaier et al., 2009, p.8). Second, the building trades have argued that CEQA 
has limited the ability to build infill development, or projects within already-developed areas that 
would enhance “smart growth” efforts in regions. The infill developers argue that project-by-
project reviews run counter to larger-scale planning goals which might encourage infill 
developments in order to achieve less sprawl. They further point out that, because infill sites are 
located within existing communities, they often receive the highest level of scrutiny and raise 
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greater political opposition. The result, they claim, is that many developers shy away from infill 
development sites in favor of sites in undeveloped areas with more predictable review processes. 
 CEQA “reform” efforts since the mid-2000s have sought to remove the disincentives for 
infill development (Fulton, 2011). As Ziegler and Kang (2011, para. 9) put it, “The 
Environmental Quality Act is not very good at distinguishing big-box stores on green fields, 
miles from population centers, from desperately needed housing close to jobs and transit in cities 
and towns.” As a result, the trend since the mid-2000s amongst some planning and development 
interests, and increasingly amongst some environmental interests, has been to advocate for 
CEQA exemptions for infill projects (see Barbour and Teitz, 2005, p. 1). SB 375 took a step in 
this direction by offering reduced CEQA review, up to a possible exemption, for projects that are 
within designated transit-oriented areas and meet the goals of an approved SCS. Since SB 375’s 
passage, further CEQA legislation has expanded the exemptions available for infill projects. 
Because CEQA has always been carefully guarded by the environmental lobby in 
California, the sponsors of SB 375 knew that it would be difficult to raise the prospect of 
including CEQA reform in the proposed bill. However, the ultimate push to do so was indicative 
of the overall negotiation process that developed during the bill’s formulation. Despite the desire 
on the part of the bill’s sponsors to stay largely out of the territory covered by other legislation, 
the expansive reach of issues related to land use planning that would serve climate policy goals 
forced an evolution of thinking that resulted in deep and ongoing engagement with the lobbying 
communities associated with RHNA, RTP, and CEQA. The Blueprint planning process that took 
place in Sacramento could not, it was realized, effectively serve as the mechanism for filling in 
the “VMT gap” in climate policy without incorporating and aligning the interests of state-level 
housing, transportation, and environmental advocates. Only in doing so did the bill gain the 
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momentum needed to, as one respondent put it, “change the conversation around land use 
regulation in California.”  
 
5.5| The Early Formulation Process: Before the Bill 
Each of the pre-existing legislative programs that were combined within SB 375 had 
entrenched lobbying interests attached to it. This required the sponsors to engage in an intensive 
negotiation process over roughly a two-and-a-half year period between 2006 and 2008. The 
negotiations required a hands-on approach by the elected representative sponsoring the bill, State 
Senator Darrell Steinberg, who was elevated to a leadership position in the California State 
Senate halfway through the negotiations. Steinberg and his staff, by all accounts, were closely 
involved in sorting out the details of the bill. They served as the primary communication hub that 
bridged competing interests.  
Before negotiations could yield an alignment across the affordable housing, 
transportation, home building, local government, and environmental lobbies, all of the key 
interests had to be convinced to start the talks in the first place. The impossible coalition that 
supported SB 375 took shape, in large part, because most of the interests involved realized that if 
they did not engage with a legislative process which decided how land use would be regulated 
under AB32, then they would likely be subject to regulatory mandates from CARB. The natural 
opponents to a climate-based land use bill came to feel that they would have much greater 
capacity to direct the final outcome within the legislative process than within the regulatory 
process. As a result of this dynamic, as well as some fundamental shifts in the focus of the bill 
that occurred halfway through the negotiations, what at first looked like a typical environmental 
lobbying process that faced heavy opposition from economic development interests became a 
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unique legislative process characterized by relations across organized interests that had the 
potential to create broad institutional change around land use.  
 
5.5a: The CEQA Reform Roots of SB 375 
 
 When in 2004 McKeever and Steinberg discussed the possibility of legislation to support 
the Sacramento Blueprint, the setting portended the institutional accomplishments that would 
characterize SB 375. The bill ultimately used regional planning as a bridge between the 
institutional division that separated the environmental and community development sectors. 
McKeever representing the regional planning community and Steinberg the environmental 
community met at the birthday party of a community development activist with no notion of 
creating a climate bill or of taking on the political challenges involved with SB 375. AB 32 
would not be signed for another 2 years. The intent during that initial conversation was largely to 
support implementation of McKeever’s new regional plan. While the Sacramento Blueprint 
process was less prominent as the bill discussions jumped from regional planning to reduction of 
vehicle miles traveled and then to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the regional planning 
bridge remained integral. The bill became part of the AB 32 climate change legislative agenda 
and planning became only one aspect of the issues that had to be resolved, but it was the issue 
around which environmental and community development interests came together. 
 Shortly after his meeting with Steinberg, Mike McKeever was appointed as a member of 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Task Force on Smart Growth. The Task Force resulted from 
a March 2004 briefing report sent to the Governor by a lobbying group known as the Better 
California Campaign (BCC). The briefing report urged the Governor “to immediately appoint a 
Smarter Development Task Force composed of agency secretaries and department directors to 
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develop… a proposed program of specific, short and long-term actions for implementing the 
Governor's Smarter Development vision” (Better California Campaign Coalition, 2004, p. 6). In 
the briefing paper, the group framed their idea of sustainable growth around the well-known 
“three Es” model of economy, equity, and environment. It sought to build a legislative agenda 
that supported economic development, but in a socially and ecologically sustainable manner. 
Governor Schwarzenegger then directed Sunne Wright McPeak, his Secretary of Business, 
Transportation, and Housing to chair and assemble the task force in time to have 
recommendations ready for the 2005 State of the State address.  
CEQA reform was the focus of the Smart Growth Task Force. One of the key elements in 
the BCC briefing report was a call for greater certainty in the development process, especially for 
infill development. The report stated (p.9):  
A complex system of land use planning comprised of multiple laws, regulations and court 
decisions has led to virtual gridlock among competing interest groups, as the uncertainty 
of the system makes all of them reluctant to yield on any issue or position.  
 
The authors were primarily referencing the project-by-project court battles that CEQA caused 
around land use decisions. The focus of BCC was upon fixing the political stalemate that they 
argued CEQA had created, but several members on the panel made clear that their intent was to 
direct CEQA reform toward exemptions for infill development. One planning advocate described 
the view of CEQA that BCC represented, and that a number of the task force members shared at 
the time: 
CEQA, the California Environmental Quality Act was an impediment to smart growth, 
and a serious impediment to smart growth…CEQA is really a process statute. It’s a – it’s 
not a statewide land use planning law. It’s an environmental process law. And I’m not 
saying that not a lot of good has come out of it, but it’s definitely no excuse for … a 
statewide land use planning system. 
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This perspective raised the ire of a number of environmentalists who saw the task force as 
threatening the integrity of the CEQA process. Echoing the “battlelines” language used during 
the 1970s national land use policy debates, the state legislative director for the Sierra Club wrote 
of the Governor’s summary of the Task Force’s results, “it immediately indicated to me that 
CEQA would be under attack” (Allayaud, 2004, para. 5).  
In the end, disagreements over CEQA reform led the Governor’s Task Force to make few 
recommendations. No specific legislation grew from this effort. One member from the 
environmental community later characterized it as “useless”. The task force did, however, serve 
as a platform for connecting the regional planning strategy being developed in Sacramento with 
the growing community of advocates involved with the then-developing AB 32 climate policy. 
At the bill signing for SB 375, Mike McKeever stated, “As the SACOG board adopted the 
blueprint three-and-a-half years ago we knew that we needed some regulatory reform help in 
order to implement it. The Governor appointed a task force to look at what could be done to 
improve the California Environmental Quality Act…[and] I had a conversation with Senator 
Steinberg and I said we really need some regulatory reform to help us achieve these smart 
growth goals” (California Office of the Governor, 2008). McKeever directly referenced the role 
of the task force as a CEQA reform effort. While he glossed over the relative ineffectiveness of 
the task force in his public comments, he acknowledged the centrality of the connections made at 
the time between CEQA reform, land use planning and environmental goals. These connections, 






5.5b: Propping up the Three-legged Stool: The Shift toward Climate 
SB 375’s legislative agenda was not always attached to climate change. The idea grew 
out of a small working group of environmental, local government and regional planning 
advocates who sought to create mandates for reduction of vehicle miles traveled, but did so 
before AB 32 had passed and thus before CARB existed. The working group was initiated by 
conversations between McKeever and Tom Adams, President of the California League of 
Conservation Voters and a longtime environmental lobbyist in the state during the Governor’s 
Task Force on Smart Growth. Adams eventually became the most prominent public supporter of 
SB 375. He describes how he came to the idea of connecting a land use bill with VMT reduction 
measures: 
One day we were sitting in there [the Governor’s Task Force meeting] and a city council 
member…said, why can’t the State just set one single goal for the local governments and 
then let us figure out how we’re going to achieve it…just as he said that, VMT popped 
into my mind.  Why not make VMT the goal? And so then that’s what the first drafts of 
SB 375 did.   
 
This revelation led to initial discussions between McKeever and Adams around the idea of 
connecting a statewide land use bill that addressed some of the implementation challenges 
embedded in McKeever’s concerns around CEQA along with the VMT reduction mandates that 
the climate policy community knew were needed. Their conversation led to the creation of an 
informal working group to discuss the possibilities for such a bill. Of this group, one respondent 
that was involved commented: 
We had a bunch of meetings, sort of to the side, because the [Governor’s Task Force] is 
too big, a lot of people with other agendas and stuff, so [with representatives from the 
local governments, regional governments, and environmental groups]…we started having 
meetings on the side to talk about this kind of framework. And the meetings were good, 






Another member of the informal working group said: 
 
God, we had long meetings…we were focused on vehicle miles traveled as a metric to 
sort of organize the world around.  And we just couldn’t make a deal. We just worked 
and worked at it. Couldn’t make a deal [between the local, regional, and environmental 
groups]. 
 
While the initial conversations among members of the informal working group did not 
yield agreement, they were, by all characterizations, promising. The idea was intriguing to all 
members. Through a combination of McKeever’s, Adams’ and, more indirectly, Steinberg’s 
influence, the land use regulatory community of California turned its attention toward CEQA 
reform through the creation of a statewide land use law that employed regional planning 
strategies in order to address what would later be called the “VMT Gap” in climate policy. 
However, the connection between VMT and climate policy was not immediately evident to all 
members of the informal working group. Both VMT and land use planning were very much on 
the minds of the environmental, regional planning, and local government political communities 
at the time. But AB 32 had not yet passed and CARB did not yet exist to argue that addressing 
VMT was required within climate policy.  
VMT reduction as a goal unto itself simply did not have the political support to undo the 
traditional conflicts between local government interests, environmentalists and regional planning 
interests. However, these early discussions laid the foundation for what would later be a crucial 
shift in the environmental advocacy community toward a “pro development in the right place” 
position. When asked how this shift in position came about, most respondents pointed to a 
“learning process” within the environmental community. That learning process occurred in large 
part during the discussions over CEQA reform and the year of debate amongst the working 




The informal conversation did not shift toward climate until 2006. One participant said:  
And then what happened next is it was the evolution of AB 32 implementation. Climate 
change was then a front page issue and inconvenient truth.  And…there was a whole 
wave where suddenly that issue was more in the popular press and we had a governor 
who was unusually good at getting national and international attention for himself and for 
this state … and he sort of made global warming his signature issue. And so the idea was, 
well instead of sort of focusing this regional planning idea on reducing VMT [vehicle 
miles traveled], maybe it ought to be focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
which are very similar. I mean if you reduce VMT you reduce carbon… shifting that 
metric from VMT to greenhouse gas emissions was the first critical thing that allowed the 
bill to – you know to start to look like it might figure out how to get enough momentum 
to get passed.   
 
With the shift to a climate policy frame, the two mainstream environmental organizations that 
had been involved with the informal conversation and had a strong interest in VMT reduction 
strategies—the California League of Conservation Voters and the Environmental Defense 
Fund—asked Senator Steinberg to sponsor a two-page bill proposal written by the environmental 
groups (see Appendix 8 for the proposal as introduced in the Senate). 
This move coincided with the passage of AB 32. AB 32 established for the first time in 
the United States a government role in limiting anthropogenic sources of climate change. It 
created the California Air Resources Board (CARB) as a new state agency with strong 
connections to the environmental advocacy community to regulate all sectors of activity that 
generated emissions. As one respondent put it, “the environmental community has [more people 
that used to work at] CARB…and now work at such and such foundation as a rotating [set of 
positions].”  
Some lobbying interests from the local governments and building industries knew that 
AB 32 potentially gave broad powers to the CARB to supersede local land use controls. Several 
organizations hired land use lawyers to analyze the powers that AB 32 granted CARB. As one 
respondent characterized the consensus from these analyses, CARB, in fact, could potentially use 
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AB 32 to create land use regulations that would override local zoning ordinances. As the legal 
analyses argued, the largest sector of greenhouse gas emissions in the State was transportation. 
Since CARB had a mandate to regulate all sectors that caused emissions it would certainly have 
to focus on transportation. This fact meant that CARB would soon have to turn their attention to 
land use as the source of vehicle miles traveled. Respondents from the building trades and local 
governments especially identified this as a reason to engage the bill. The following is exemplary 
of responses about why a group chose to engage with the SB 375 discussion: 
I think there were a couple different pressures… and this was the first thing that 
motivated compromise. AB 32 having given CARB fairly broad regulatory authority in 
the direction that the various state agencies were headed gave us all a little pause to try 
and come up with a resolution, legislatively. Because I don’t think anyone felt like we 
were going to be heard to the…you know in the regulatory process to the extent that we 
were able to shape and influence the legislative process. 
 
As the quote above demonstrates, the perception of political crisis caused by the threat of a 
regulatory fix for land use by CARB changed the political dynamic. It forced interests to engage 
with (and in the end support) SB 375 that, under normal circumstances, would have opposed the 
infringement upon the right of localities to regulate land use. This was largely because they saw 
such engagement as the only way that their interests would be protected. The political crisis of 
CARB as a possible new entrant in the land use regulatory regime, then, was an essential element 
in the creation of conditions that allowed for compromise.  
The shift to climate change policy as the framework for land use regulation attached the 
negotiations around VMT reduction and CEQA reform to a perception of political crisis for 
lobbying interests concerned with CARB’s role in land use regulation. The political crisis 
stemmed from the perception that some interests—especially those of local governments and the 
building trades—would be ignored in the regulatory process defined by CARB, and thus a 
legislative compromise was preferable. However, even within the legislative process, there was a 
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great deal of uncertainty about what role CARB would actually play. As well, the public 
perception of a climate crisis created a strong demand for legislation. Thus, when the two-page 
bill proposal was announced by Steinberg, a number of potential stakeholders including 
community development activists entered the political conversation. 
 
5.6| The Negotiation Process: A Multi-Dimensional Chess Game 
Senate Bill 375 was introduced by Senator Darrell Steinberg on 21 February 2007 as 
what is known within the legislature as a “spot bill” (Henderson and Cammarota, 2009, p.2). 
Essentially, this meant that the bill was a skeletal version of what would eventually be a much-
amended final draft. The spot bill closely mirrored the two-page proposal written by the 
California League of Conservation Voters and the Natural Resources Defense Fund.  
The normal session of the California State Senate runs from January to September and 
spot bills such as these are usually introduced early in the session with the hope that they can be 
negotiated and signed in the same year. Generally, spot bills meet one of three fates: they are 
successfully negotiated and signed that year, they are killed by opposition, or they become what 
are known as “two-year bills.” The latter case occurred for SB 375. While the bill was not killed, 
during the 2007 legislative session there was sufficient opposition from the local government and 
building trade lobbies, as well as disagreement over the regional planning model, as to require 
that negotiations be slowed and occur over two legislative sessions. As it turns out, the fact that 
SB 375 was negotiated over two sessions is one of the keys to the formation of the “impossible 





5.6a: Year One Negotiations: Typical Environmental Legislation 
The negotiation process around SB 375 was derived from the prior political relations that 
had developed around land use policy in California and was a departure from “politics as usual.” 
Certainly, as with every political process, each interest group involved in the negotiations 
approached the situation strategically; they carefully weighed the impact of different portions of 
the bill and decided what trade-offs were acceptable. The first-year negotiations when the spot 
bill was being transformed into a full piece of legislation were characterized by intensive and 
detailed discussion of every point that the bill contained: 
I can’t tell you how many sessions we had with ten people sitting around the table and the 
bill up on the big screen literally going line by line. Ok, so is everybody ok with this 
clause? Ok, now we’re going to the next one. Then we’d get to one and there’d be this 
huge blow up and somebody would be mad.
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In order to achieve compromise Senator Steinberg and his staff were unusually engaged 
in these talks. Respondents including environmentalists, builders, local governments, regional 
agencies, affordable housing organizations, and transit advocates all highlighted the importance 
of the role played by Senator Steinberg. When disagreement over a specific item arose, Steinberg 
often stepped in to address it: 
He’s a lawyer and so he devoted personal time. In a lot of the sessions he was at – and I 
know he wasn’t at all of them, but a lot of them were in his personal office, and he was 
capable of reading the technical language in the bill and as a lawyer putting ideas on the 
table. You know, well you’re saying this and you’re saying this, or why couldn’t we write 
it this way? You know if we use this word it goes back to this case log and that shouldn’t 
bother you. And I mean he was technically really valuable to that process. And then it 
turns out…he has very good mediation skills.
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Generally, respondents felt that without this central organizing force played by Steinberg and his 
staff the complex set of issues would not have been resolved. As one respondent said, “this was a 
multi-dimensional chess game.” Another commented:  
It’s a complicated bill.  I mean, there’s a lot going on in there and so to have somebody 
like Steinberg… really understand the bill well enough to talk intelligently about it and to 
be able to identify the key issues and get them out on the table, get them negotiated and 
hammer out some sort of agreement is pretty unusual, very unusual.
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As might be expected, though, those who most favored the bill had the most positive 
account of Steinberg’s role. However, there was disagreement over how much knowledge he had 
about the bill. One early opponent said of the initial discussions around the bill: 
It was clear to us he [Senator Steinberg] didn’t know everything that was in his bill …He 
said that there’s no mandates in the bill…when he said that we both…we both pointed to 




The respondent clarified the mandate that they saw: 
 
I think the phrase that…came to capture the essence of what the bill was doing [in its 
early formulation] at least among those discussing it was that it kind of forced concentric 
circle growth. In other words if not here then there, then there, then there kind of out 
and…it was making a set of decisions…It’s about power distribution, right?...And so this 
was telling us that we couldn’t make certain decisions. 
 
As well, all parties were divided over the extent to which the land use planning strategy should 
contain certain traditional environmental goals such as habitat preservation. The environmental 
lobby had sponsored the initial legislation and was authoring much of the proposed text. It 
included a number of their prior legislative goals (e.g. patch and corridor habitat protections, 
natural resource protections, and growth boundaries). However, these issues were among the 
major points of disagreement that threatened to shut down negotiations. As one respondent close 
to the debate commented: 
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They did create a statewide standard and so when they got to things like trying to define a 
habitat and habitat protection and open space, they started running into all sorts of battles 
over trying to find what does that mean that can apply in Los Angeles County and in 
Alpine County or Sierra County? And I think it just, the more defining they tried to do 
the more resistance they got, to the point where it just, it wasn’t going to work, and I 
think that’s why they ended up pulling some of that stuff out as there just was no way we 
were going to come up with a definition that everybody could accept of what that 
meant.
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Of the local governments’ response to the perceived planning and environmental mandates in the 
early drafts of the bill, one respondent said: 
…the local governments just had a shit fit…we had the bill in the Assembly but we put 
the bill on a slower bus and decided to bring it up the following year to finish the bill and 




In addition to disagreements over the extent to which the bill included mandates for a 
specific type of land use planning and for ecological preservation, all respondents—from 
environmentalists to regional governments to builders—described internal factions within their 
own constituency. Many of the interests that supported SB 375 in the end were in opposition at 
one point during the first year. This included the local government interests, the building trades, 
and some of the regional planning interests. Representative of the difficulties that internal 
divisions amongst the various interests raised, even Mike McKeever’s SACOG, whose board 
became disillusioned over the extent to which the bill prescribed a certain type of land use 
planning for all localities and regions, shifted to an “oppose unless substantially amended” 
position. At this point in the negotiations, there was enough division within and amongst all of 
the interests involved to put the bill’s passage in doubt. 
As a result of the fundamental divide over how far-reaching the planning mandates in SB 
375 should be, year one of the negotiating process looked very much like a typical environmental 
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land use bill. The environmental groups lobbied directly to state legislators to try to achieve their 
traditional goals of habitat protection and resource preservation. They were blocked by local 
development interests including the building trades and local governments. At this point, the 
process was also typical in that there was an effort to position the affordable housing community 
against the environmental lobby. Local development interests argued to the affordable housing 
groups that the proposals for land use planning being made would limit the ability to build 
affordable housing. Far from the unique experience implied by the “impossible coalition” 
language that came to be used after the bill was passed, year one of the negotiations ended 
acrimoniously.  
 
5.6b: Year Two Negotiations: The Development of Agreement 
 Year two of the negotiations began with a pivotal moment. The bill’s sponsors made two 
fundamental shifts that altered the way that all of the organizations involved related to each 
other. First, Senator Steinberg was elevated to Senate Pro Tem, making him a member of what is 
known as the “big five.” That is, he became one of the five representatives that approve the final 
state budget, one of the most powerful positions in state politics. Second, the environmental 
community, and especially the organizations that sponsored the bill, made a fundamental shift in 
their position. They moved toward a more nuanced approach to housing development that would 
allow for growth to occur, but in a less sprawling fashion than it had in the past. Prior to this, 
environmentalists acknowledged that the default position had been to oppose all developments. 
The shift in the environmentalist position grew out of their involvement with the CEQA reform 
efforts and altered their relationship with the affordable housing community.  
Senator Steinberg’s elevation to Senate Pro Tem heightened the sense of political crisis 
perceived by the supporters of the existing land use regime. It was not just that CARB was a 
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potential new entrant into the land use regulatory regime, but also that the sponsor of the leading 
legislative option was suddenly a very powerful politician. One respondent commented:  
So Darrell Steinberg is an, all of a sudden he is an exceptionally powerful…he’s like a 
big deal guy. And he’s gonna be around unless they – unless he loses the votes in his 
caucus.  Everybody assumes he’ll be the pro tem of the senate for five years. So it’s a 
little bit harder to think if you’re, you know … one of these major lobbying organizations 
who has a lot of issues to deal with at the state. It’s a little bit harder to think about do I 
want to make a five-year permanent enemy out of the pro tem of the senate over this bill. 
And so … [groups] decided ok, we’re actually gonna come to the table and try to make 
this bill work.  We’re not gonna try to kill it. We’re gonna – you know we don’t like it 
necessarily but we’re gonna come to the table and we’re gonna try to make it work. And 




 The elevation of Steinberg to Senate Pro Tem coincided with a shift in the environmental 
position relative to housing construction in the state. This shift enabled the institutional divide 
between environmentalists and the affordable housing community to be bridged and removed the 
capacity of opponents to play the two sides against one another. Of the default environmental 
position prior to SB 375, one observer argued: 
There’s a really strong no growth flavor to a lot of the local environmental politics. You 
know it’s like neighborhood associations that form to stop something. That’s how they 
start is to stop the development project in their neighborhood that they don’t like. And 
getting them to transition from we’re against growth to we’re for good growth, that’s in 
terms of big megatrends here, that’s the battle…But the statewide and the national 
organizations typically are more sophisticated and sort of technocratic and rational about 
those kinds of things.  And so it’s easier for them to get to ok, what does good growth 
look like, and how do we support that?
99
   
 
In fact that is exactly the position that the national environmental groups sponsoring SB 375 
took. One member of an environmental organization described the fundamental shift within the 
classic environmentalist position that had to be enacted in order to allow for the alliance with 
affordable housing groups and infill developers. He said: 
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There was a light bulb moment for us [some environmentalists], we said, oh my god, the 
default position of the environmental community cannot be to just oppose every housing 
project that comes along. We have to be willing to be for the projects in the good 
locations. And it also, it’s a dangerous spot for us, because it kind of separates us from 




This shift had an immediate effect. It brought environmentalists and affordable housing 
advocates closer together in the negotiating process, undoing the split that had previously been 
exploited by cities and sprawl developers. Of the effects this shift in position had upon the 
governance structure around land use issues, the same respondent continued: 
…this was a paradigm shift, the environmental community got to a point where we 
recognized that we wanted housing to actually be built in the good locations, because if it 
wasn’t built there, there would be pressure to build it in the bad locations. We had to 
figure out a way to make the good locations succeed. So we kind of became housing 
advocates as long as it was in the right place. And that completely shifted our relationship 
with the builders and the affordable housing advocates, vis-à-vis the cities. Because we 
now, we and the cities had been allies for years to fight these efforts to essentially jam 
housing approvals through, and now we shifted position in order to support housing that 
would be built in the good locations.  And so it was kind of us, the builders and the 
affordable housing advocates, and that we were trying to have to work with the [cities] 
and the counties in order to get them to make some changes in housing policy to give 
greater certainty to housing policy.  And that was a dramatic shift in sort of the political 
dynamic around those issues that existed for a long time. 
 
Along with this shift in position, environmentalists agreed to focus on the planning goals 
of SB 375 rather than the ecological protection goals that they initially supported. Not all 
environmental groups agreed with this move. One member of the discussion described the 
divided position amongst environmentalists: 
At one point the bill had a lot more language in it about where growth could occur and 
where growth could not occur, and we ended up taking that out…but by taking it out and 
taking out the language about ag-land preservation and habitat and wildlife corridor 
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Another respondent highlighted how crucial this shift was: 
So in terms of substance, the environmentalists had to be willing to take out – they were 
trying to get basically some, in my world what I would call organ style natural resource 
planning standards into the bill. And it was just not gonna happen. You know it just, I 
mean it just was not going to happen. And they needed that for some of their more hard-




Another respondent highlighted the importance of the resolution that was reached: 
Part of getting the bill passed was the enviro-, the environmentalists sort of in exchange 
for taking the natural resource stuff out got the builders to agree to let the air resources 
board set the targets. And that was a big win for them because they’re – the air resources 
board is seen as an environmental agency and world leading and so the fact that the 
environmentalists could take that back to their membership and say, “Ok, well we lost 
this, which was heartbreaking, but we got this” was important to keeping the bill 
going.
102
   
Affordable housing interests also had to shift their position in order to form the coalition 
with environmentalists that would help to re-align relations amongst all of the organized 
interests. Previously, they had been at odds with the environmental position that housing should 
not be built in all localities, especially not in the far-flung suburbs. Now that environmentalists 
had backed away from that position, they had to decide if they would also compromise on the 
application of RHNA in order to align it with SB 375. In the end, they decided to compromise. 
One affordable housing advocate argued that, “the best thing that’s come out of all of it from our 
perspective is the alliances that it’s created among those of us who are working to improve the 
lives of the same people.” She focused on the alliance with environmentalists: 
In some cases I think it’s really more we who have benefited from being able to ally with 
them and help both them and policymakers understand how the things that we’ve been 
fighting for, higher density affordable homes near jobs, advances this much 
larger…environmental goal which frankly has much more pull with policymakers and the 
public than our issue does.
103
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The respondent went on: 
 
I think they [the environmentalists] benefit from being linked with us in two ways.  One 
is simply that they do largely share our values I believe. But also they’re susceptible and 
have been for years to the charges of being elitist, not caring about (poor) people 
basically in their overwhelming sort of rush to save the environment…And so it certainly 
helps them to be seen as having a social equity focus.
104
   
 
The coalition between affordable housing and environmental advocates combined with 
the elevation of Steinberg to Senate Pro Tem created a powerful shift in the political scene that 
eventually led all other interests to perceive greater benefit in cooperation than in contestation. 
One respondent said of the reason why local governments felt the need to compromise: 
… the builders were agreeing to some of the significant changes in supporting the 
sustainable community strategy in exchange for some CEQA exemptions or 
considerations. And so that added a lot of pressure to resolve the local government 
differences … It’s kind of like the perfect storm, you know. You had the AB 32 pressure.  
You had the pro tem [Steinberg] attention on the issue. And you had regional agencies 




In the end, the coalition between community development (e.g. affordable housing) 
advocates and environmentalists combined with fortuitous political circumstances to create an 
alignment of competing interests around land use laws. This alignment arose during a time of 
perceived crisis when all involved saw changes to the status quo as inevitable. However, the 
coalition between environmental and community development interests fueled the sense of 
inevitability. The coalition was a key factor that motivated the building trades to make a deal and 
then, in turn, brought the local governments into support for the bill as well. 
 Even if the local governments and building associations wished to try to align against the 
bill in typical fashion, they no longer had the ability to play the affordable housing community 
against the environmental community. Regardless of Steinberg’s position in the Senate, this 





 Interview with participant in the negotiations, Recorded 24 August 2010. 
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might have remained an available tactic if the environmental community did not shift toward a 
more pro-development position. The historic model of organizational relations which gave local 
governments and developers power in the California land use regulatory regime had been 
fundamentally altered.  
The move toward a temporary flattening of the otherwise hierarchic power structure 
around land use, had profound impact on the negotiation process. Of the ability to create 
compromise in the process, one respondent representing the community development interests 
said: 
There was this table…with five parties around it and everybody thinking they knew 
where their bottom line was. But it turned out as they went on people really did want the 
bill. So they kept changing their bottom lines. They kept working on it…there were a ton 
of politics in the room. I’m not being naïve here, but it turned into the part of the dynamic 
that was really, you know we’re kind of getting interested and sucked into this issue, and 
we really do want to find out how to make this work started to – that portion of the 
dynamic kept growing as it went on.   
One respondent remarked on the evolution of the talks: 
The people started to actually get along with each other more, because a lot of these 
people… could barely stand to be in the same room together. I mean they…battles and 
battles and lobbyists tend to get into this “you’re the devil;” “no, you’re the devil” kind of 
war-like mentality. And so it was fascinating to watch them…actually starting to develop 
some friendship and genuine mutual professional respect for each other.  
In the end, the set of interests that the revolving negotiations were able to bring into 
alignment resulted mostly from the conditions of perceived crisis. Steinberg, though, leveraged 
this moment and continued his hands-on approach in order to bring the negotiations to a close. 
Of the method that Steinberg used to negotiate the final text for the bill, one respondent said: 
I think it was from about 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Friday, which is really smart of Darrel 
because everyone wanted to leave. Go home, go to happy hour. Where he, we basically 
did serial negotiation where he would literally we would, we would come into Darrel’s 
office…and then…we’d talk through an issue for half an hour, 45 minutes. And then we 
would leave by this door, and the [next lobbying interest] folks would come in this door, 
and have the same conversation with Darrel and it was just this literally this revolving 
conversation. Where sometimes one of us would leave and go tell, [for example], hey 
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local gov, get, it's your turn you guys go in there and they’d go in. So that was the, sort of 




Eventually, all of the key interests supported SB 375. Of the role played by climate 
change as a rhetorical tool for enabling this alignment between environmentalists and housing 
groups, one member of the negotiations argued, “So climate in a sense has provided kind of a 
new tool to achieve a goal that had never been possible before.”  The organizational dynamics 
that arose opened up a wider range of outcomes for land use policy than was possible in the past. 
Now, the typical alignment between local governments seeking to protect their control over land 
use decisions and the building trades seeking to protect the ability to build anywhere was 
disrupted. The result was that a wider set of interests were represented in the discussion about 
what would actually be put forth. The possible outcomes were more open to discussion and new 
paths for land use were made possible by the temporary re-alignment of power.  
 
 
5.7| After The Bill: New Institutional Arenas 
 
The SB 375 negotiations led to an alignment of community development and 
environmental advocates. As a result, urban environmental interests were considered on equal 
footing relative to local governments and private developers when it came to the goals of land 
use planning. The test of this new balancing of political interests lies in the implementation of 
the policy. SB 375 has created new opportunities for social equity groups (e.g. community based 
organizations, environmental justice groups, and public health groups) that were not a part of the 
policy negotiations to engage with state land use policy. Their voices have been given a new 
institutional arena in which to be heard. For example, as a result of SB 375, local social justice 
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groups have entered the climate discussion because they can now tie these issues to local 
community impacts. One respondent from a community-based organization said: 
…it became clear that in all of our existing programs most notably land use and 
transportation, our staff were constantly being confronted with both challenges and 
opportunities and how they integrated a climate justice analysis into their work… Our 
funders felt it was important from a movement building perspective because there were 
not many people of color-led and -serving organizations that were involved in the 
formulation of SB 375. And they wanted to make sure that as it was implemented at the 
regional and the local level that as it was really something that was locally owned and led 
and was benefiting low income communities and communities of color.
107
   
 
One representative involved in the negotiations described the role for local community groups by 
saying: 
…the statewide fight on 375 is done.  It’s now…region by region…And what we did is 
we kind of set up a framework and now we’re handing it off.  And now the community 
interests…are starting to work within that regional framework that we had the discussion 
about…In the end it was a very narrow group of people that cut deals…I mean, in the 
end, you know, twenty people had a say in what the final version of 375 was, you know, 
in terms of the negotiations that went on…I mean it was a narrow, even a narrow group 
of enviros. I mean half the environmentalists opposed it, right.  So it was just enough of 
each group to get it over the finish line.  But I wouldn’t say that the local community 




Of the opportunity and challenge presented, one community organizer stated: 
 
I think we have some real challenges with our social movements because our social 
movements…are not quite fully engaged in understanding that there’s this big 
opportunity to reframe the social issues in such a way that they actually can be more in 




 The opportunity that the community organizer referenced was seized upon by some social 
justice groups in the first phase of implementation of SB 375. In its process of deciding what 
emission reduction targets for each region should be, CARB was required to convene a 
“Regional Target Advisory Council” (RTAC) to instruct it on proper guidelines. The RTAC 
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process involved a number of roundtables with stakeholders from across the state. Mike 
McKeever, the SACOG director who had been a part of SB 375 discussions since the beginning, 
chaired the RTAC. During its deliberation over proper criteria for setting targets, a number of 
social justice groups representing public health and environmental justice perspectives inserted 
themselves into the conversation and had a substantial impact on the final recommendations.  
The RTAC final report contained a substantial section on social equity, which reflects 
issues raised by a letter sent to RTAC from a statewide coalition of social equity organizations. 
The letter states (Public Advocates, 2010): 
A socially-equitable approach will analyze the potential beneficial and harmful impacts 
of targets and SCSs on lower income Californians and communities of color specifically, 
and select alternatives that maximize both GHG reduction and positive equity impacts 
while avoiding or offsetting any negative impacts… an approach that does not build 
social equity criterion in at the front end runs the risk of unleashing an extreme wave of 
gentrification and displacement in the urban core and along transit lines, excluding more 
lower-income families, segregating them at the geographic periphery and forcing them to 
commute in the cheapest and highest  polluting vehicles or on unaffordable and 
unreliable transit systems.  
 
Of the letter, one co-author said, it describes: 
what we think CARB needs to do to ensure that SB 375 is implemented in a way that 
doesn’t exacerbate conditions that are bad for disadvantaged communities right now, but 
also then, not only prevent the exacerbation, but also measure and help set a standard for 





The final RTAC report reflects the assertions of the letter from social equity groups. It states 
(p.94): 
 
The affordability of housing and transportation and access to employment play a critical 
role in determining where Californians live, how much they travel and, therefore, directly 
affect the level of achievable greenhouse gas reduction.  Land use based greenhouse gas 
reduction strategies, however, could have beneficial or adverse effects on social equity 
concerns such as housing affordability (increased land prices), transportation access and 
affordability, displacement, gentrification, and a changing match between jobs, required 
skill levels and housing cost (“jobs-housing fit”). 
 
                                                 
110
 Interview with participant in the negotiations, Recorded 26 August 2010. 
224 
 
The expansion of the SB 375 discussion into the realm of social equity did not sit well with all 
involved. One member of the RTAC commented: 
if you read the…RTAC report..there’s this very technical side of it. I mean 
there’s…there’s kind of like you read this one part and it says this is how we’re going to 
model. And then you get to the part where it’s the kitchen sink part, right, where 
everybody’s throwing in their own, you know, and the housing advocates want this and 
the public health advocates want co-benefits.  And…and, you know, our position was 
look this is a greenhouse gas bill you know. You guys are wanting modeling less asthma. 
You’re not going to find asthma in there. 
 
In the end, despite the fact that some RTAC members did not see the point of going 
beyond the technical requirements of the law, RTAC became an effective arena for social equity 
interests. This is because the negotiations over the creation of SB 375 opened up the issues that 
would be considered with regard to land use planning in California. Prior to SB 375 there was an 
implicit hierarchy of issues, wherein individual property rights and economic development had 
supremacy. After SB 375, there was not a complete undoing of that hierarchy, but issues were 
open for discussion in a way that they had not been before.  
The letter from social justice groups to the RTAC was drafted within a committee of a 
newly formed coalition of organizations known as ClimatePlan (see Appendix 9 for a full list of 
members). It was formed immediately following the passage of SB 375. Its stated goal is to 
advocate for the creation of urban environmental policies in California that “protect our climate, 
our health, our communities, and our environment.” Its priorities include “building and 
supporting diverse coalitions in key regions”, “developing a stronger, broader movement for 
sustainable transportation and land use in California,” and pushing for strong implementation of 
SB 375. Of the group, one environmentalist stated: 
I was active in forming an organization called The ClimatePlan that’s a coalition of now 
it’s probably up to like thirty-five environmental, social equity, affordable housing, 
public health, farmland conservation kinds of organizations.  And through that process I 
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think we worked much more closely with affordable housing folks than we ever have 
before.
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The alignment between environmental and affordable housing interests that formed 
during the negotiation process carried over to the implementation process as well. ClimatePlan 
serves a central coordinating function with list-serves and regular meetings to learn about the 
issues of importance and to garner support for new proposals. One respondent described it as, 
“an educational forum until you’re ready to kind of push a policy.” ClimatePlan grew directly 
out of the SB 375 policy formulation and implementation process. It has focused especially on 
the SCS planning process. The coalition leverages the opportunity created by more open 
discussions over what goals should be most valued in land use policy. It also represents an 
important means by which alternative regional planning goals can be turned into policy. 
 SB 375 brought several legislative processes together. It employed the regional planning 
strategy developed in the Sacramento Blueprint, expressed in the form of an SCS, as a 
framework for aligning the RHNA and RTP processes. It also offered some streamlining of the 
main environmental policy in California, CEQA. The CEQA changes provided incentives for 
builders to support the bill and are meant to encourage more infill development. As well, SB 375 
fills in the VMT policy gap created by AB 32. It offers a specific set of criteria by which CARB 
can address the land use component of its mandate to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
state. 
 SB 375 also brought together interests that normally do not work together. In a typical 
environmental bill that tried to affect land use, the goals would be focused on limiting 
development in order to achieve greater habitat and resource protections. However, in this bill, 
the goals were shifted to engage much more closely with urban form. The environmentalists 
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moved toward a “pro-development in the right place” position. This shift first allowed them to 
align their interests with those of the affordable housing advocacy community which added the 
legislative power of RHNA to their effort. Once this alignment occurred, the building trades and 
local governments, which would normally block land use bills proposed by either 
environmentalists or affordable housing advocates, were forced to reconsider their position. This 
was due in part to the increased political power of an affordable housing-environmental coalition 
and in part to the general uncertainty over the direction of land use policy in the context of the 


















Chapter 6: Case Study 2 
New York’s Superfund and Brownfield Law 
 
It would be a lot better to have a plan and money and power. But if you don't have money 
and power, it's better to at least have a plan.   





This chapter examines coalition-building efforts across community development and 
environmental interests within the context of a formal consensus-building process. It presents the 
findings from a case study analysis of the formulation and early implementation of the New 
York State Superfund and Brownfield Law passed in 2003. It provides an overview of the 
legislative context of the brownfield law and the three concurrent efforts to devise brownfield 
policy that occurred between 1998 and 2003. The focus is upon a 1998 consensus-building 
process known as the Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields (Pocantico 
Roundtable). This chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the early efforts to implement the 
Brownfield Opportunity Area (BOA) program which was developed during the Pocantico 




6.2| The Roots of the BOA Program 
 
In May 1998, numerous philanthropic organizations attended a conference in San 
Francisco, California to explore potential paths for funding in the community development 
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the Pocantico Roundtable and the implementation process for the BOA program. In addition, this chapter utilizes a 
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sector. One of the invited panelists at the conference was Jody Kass, Director of Regulatory 
Initiatives and a registered lobbyist for the New York City Partnership and Chamber of 
Commerce. Kass was asked to speak about her recent work as part of the “New York City 
Brownfields Initiative” that had been funded in 1996 by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). For the EPA-funded initiative, Kass was one of the organizers of a 150 person task force 
that developed broad strategies for converting dormant, contaminated formerly-industrial sites 
throughout New York City into clean, active development sites. These sites, referred to as 
brownfields, were the physical remnants of the steep decline in the manufacturing economy and 
industrial culture that had been occurring steadily since the 1950s (Bluestone and Harrison, 
1982, Chapter 2; Freeman, 2000, Chapter 6).  
Formally defined as “any real property where the actual or suspected presence of 
contamination is an impediment to redevelopment” (Brownfields Coalition Report, 1999, p. 24), 
brownfields are a hindrance to economic and community development in formerly industrial 
cities like New York City. By the mid-1990s, as the flip side of regional efforts to control sprawl, 
they had become a high-profile urban environmental planning issue. If planners were going to 
encourage more compact development, then the contaminated sites that were lying dormant in 
formerly industrial inner city areas needed to be re-activated. As Aaron Mair, an environmental 
justice organizer with the Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corporation pointed out, “As we talk 
about suburban sprawl, you cannot contain it without brownfield redevelopment strategies.”
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As a result of the need to make brownfields active development sites again, the issue of how and 
to what level they should be cleaned took on rising urgency for the environmental advocacy 
community (McCarthy, 2002).  
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The wider interest in addressing brownfields amongst urban and environmental advocates 
made it an attractive issue at the California philanthropy conference. Kass was approached by 
funders from three philanthropic groups interested in sponsoring a project that addressed 
brownfields in New York City. The funders, Penny Fujiko Wilgerodt of the Joyce Mertz-
Gilmore Foundation, Ben Rodriguez-Cubenas of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Anita 
Nager of the New York Community Trust initially thought they would jointly sponsor a model 
redevelopment of one brownfield site. Instead, they were convinced by Kass and other local 
community development activists in New York City to provide ongoing support for efforts to 
design brownfield legislation in New York State. These efforts required extensive negotiation 




Kass brought a unique perspective to the brownfields issue. In addition to helping to 
organize the 1996 EPA-funded task force, she had been involved since 1989 with issues related 
to the redevelopment of dormant sites through her work on affordable housing with the NYC 
Housing Partnership.
115
 The NYC Housing Partnership was one of the first organizations to use 
federal subsidies to finance affordable housing on donated city land in disinvested communities. 
The group began in the South Bronx, but the model that it pioneered became the standard 
method in New York City and across the country. Kass’s work with the NYC Housing 
Partnership provided her with in-depth knowledge of how resources from the public and private 
sectors could be leveraged to accomplish wide-scale redevelopment. As well, Kass’s subsequent 
position as a representative of The New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce 
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allowed her to focus on both the economic and community development aspects of the 
brownfields issue.  
The New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce formed in 1979 out of the 
original New York Chamber of Commerce, which was founded in 1768. Both entities 
represented business and economic development interests in New York City. However, when 
David Rockefeller founded the New York City Partnership and affiliated it with the Chamber of 
Commerce, he sought to move the group beyond its traditional business advocacy role. During a 
time of financial distress and a huge reduction in public services in New York City, he sought to 
create a structure which would allow the group to be more directly engaged with government 
agencies and civic groups that were addressing social and economic issues. Primarily, 
Rockefeller wanted the combined organization to step in where public money had run out to 
provide funding and programming support for selected initiatives. The effect of Rockefeller’s 
efforts was to permanently append a philanthropic community development arm onto the 
Chamber of Commerce. Today, the organization has been renamed as the Partnership for New 
York City. Its mission is to “contribute directly to projects that create jobs, improve 
economically distressed communities and stimulate new business creation.”
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The New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce’s interest in brownfields in 
the mid-1990s was primarily related to the development potential of formerly industrial sites. 
However, Kass also approached brownfields as a community development issue. She wanted to 
link brownfield redevelopment with both the economic and the community development goals 
established by Rockefeller. Through her work with affordable housing, she had a strong sense of 
the negative impact that high concentrations of dormant sites had upon communities. Her 
perspective on the issue is well-expressed in her statement for Governor George Pataki’s 





Superfund Working Group Report, released on 2 June 1999. In the report, Kass wrote, “New 
Yorkers have a tremendous opportunity to benefit from increased private investment in vacant 
and abandoned properties, most of which are already well-served by infrastructure.” She went 
on, “Refinancing and reforming the State’s cleanup programs is critically important to the public 
health and environment of New York. It is also an opportunity for community development.”
117
  
 With funding from the three foundations that approached her in San Francisco, Kass led 
the development of a legislative program that expressed her vision of brownfields as both an 
economic and community issue. In order to build upon the work completed by the EPA-funded 
1996 brownfields task force, she asked Alan Zerkin, the Director of the Program on Negotiation 
and Conflict Resolution at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner School of Public Policy to 
help her and the foundation representatives conceptualize an effective process for designing the 
legislative program for brownfields.
118
 At this time, more foundation funding for the effort was 
secured from The Ford Foundation, The Robert Sterling Clark Foundation, and The Chase 
Manhattan Foundation (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p.32). 
Zerkin designed a process for facilitating dialogue across a wide set of stakeholders. The 
goal was to ensure that public, private and non-profit resources would be leveraged for high 
quality remediation and timely redevelopment of sites. Zerkin suggested that rather than focus on 
the policymakers themselves, the effort should create a consensus position amongst various 
influential political constituents that could then lobby for their recommendations to be turned 
into legislation. Zerkin’s proposal was designed to “foster a dialogue that would address where 
New York State stood in terms of brownfields remediation and redevelopment, and in what 
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direction the state needed to head in order to improve the situation” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 33). 
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund offered its conference center in the Pocantico Hills just north of 
New York City as the host site for the dialogue. With Zerkin’s strategy adopted and foundation 
support in place, The Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields (the Pocantico 
Roundtable) was born.      
 
6.3| Prior Legislation 
 
Prior to the start of the 1998 Pocantico Roundtable, no statewide legislation specifically 
governed the cleanup of contaminated industrial sites in New York State. New York was one of 
only ten states at the time that did not have a so-called “mini CERCLA”
119
 to augment the 
federal law governing cleanup and liability of large, heavily contaminated sites. Further, it was 
the only state with a significant history of manufacturing that did not have such legislation 
(Siska, 2004, para. 3). Since 1993, numerous proposals were put forth in the state legislature to 
create a brownfields law, but each was blocked either in the State Assembly or Senate. The 
business, environmental, community development, and local government interests were too 
divided in their goals to garner the necessary support for any one proposal (Galvez, 2002, p.3). 
Rather, until the New York State Superfund and Brownfield law was finally passed in 2003, two 
voluntary regulatory programs along with federal superfund law governed brownfield cleanup. 
Federal law created the impetus for most states to develop their own policies on 
brownfield cleanup standards. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund Act, was passed by the United States 
Congress in 1980. The Act established a trust fund for the cleanup of environmental hazards that 
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endanger public health or the environment and have no clear liable party. It also established 
“joint and several” liability for parties responsible for environmental contamination. This meant 
that both buyers and sellers could be held responsible for the cleanup, including banks that held 
notes on properties as a result of lending activities (US EPA, 2011). The government established 
its right to seek recovery of costs to respond to the cleanup and for any injury or destruction 
caused by the environmental hazards contained on the site. The recovery clause introduced new 
risk for developers and property owners as the amount of damages could rise to an unknown and 
unlimited expense (Segerson, 1997).  
As well, CERCLA established the “Superfund” process for long- and short-term 
remediation of sites listed on the EPA’s National Priority List. These include large sites with 
extensive contamination and multiple liable parties (US EPA 2011). The superfund process and 
the establishment of funds for cleanup represented tremendous progress in ensuring public health 
and limiting environmental contamination from the remnants of the industrial urbanization 
process that occurred in most large cities in the U.S. The liability clauses in CERCLA, however, 
also created uncertainty for developers interested in redeveloping potentially contaminated 
properties. This uncertainty affected the ability to obtain financing for inner city sites that were 
suspected to be contaminated. So-called “brownlining” on the part of banks made it difficult to 
finance redevelopment projects in areas with a concentration of sites with real or perceived 
environmental contamination. Banks simply avoided lending in such areas for fear of being 
assigned liability for cleanup costs (see Meyer and Reaves, 1997).  
In response to the uncertainty around remediation and liability, many states passed “mini 
CERCLAs” in the 1980s and 1990s. These laws spelled out the cleanup standards and liability 
rules for all smaller brownfields that were not included on the EPA’s National Priority List, and 
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thus did not fall under Superfund rules. The intent of the state legislation was to ensure the 
extension of CERCLA-like regulations to the many smaller contaminated sites that would not be 
addressed by federal law. However, the state provisions were generally more circumscribed. 
They sought to create certainty and limited liability for banks and developers in order to ensure 
that development moved forward. Generally, states that passed these laws were more concerned 
with economic development than environmental protection, but both interests were represented.  
At the time CERCLA was passed, New York was a leader in policy dealing with 
remediation of contaminated sites. One year before CERCLA, in 1979, the New York State 
legislature enacted Title 13 of the Environmental Conservation Law. Title 13 was one of the 
earliest laws in the country to deal with brownfield remediation. It focused on requirements for 
managing inactive hazardous waste facilities (New York Environmental Conservation, § 13). 
However, Title 13 was drafted with the expectation that it would be augmented by the pending 
federal law, though legislators had no knowledge of what gaps would need to be filled after the 
federal legislation was passed. Once CERCLA was passed, a legislative gap remained in New 
York State with regard to the small facilities that did not fall under federal superfund status. As 
such, other states that were slower to act on the remediation issue had stronger statutes once they 
passed follow-up legislation to CERCLA (see Galvez, 2002). The New York State legislature, as 
it turned out, was unable to pass amendments to Title 13 or create new brownfield legislation 
until 2003. Thus for 24 years the brownfields legislative gap remained. 
In lieu of legislation, by the late 1990s two voluntary programs governed the cleanup of 
brownfields in New York State. They included the Brownfield Bond Act and the Voluntary 
Cleanup Program. The Brownfield Bond Act was part of Governor George Pataki’s Clean 
Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996. One section of the Act was devoted to providing funds to 
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help municipalities that have possession of large brownfields investigate the extent of 
contamination and cleanup that was needed. The Environmental Restoration Program, created 
from the Brownfield Bond Act, funded up to 75 percent of remediation costs to return sites to 
pre-contamination conditions (New York Department of State, 2004, paragraph 1). While the 
program was popular and widely supported, it only addressed municipally owned sites with real 
or perceived contamination.
120
 Many cities, especially in the upstate region outside of New York 
City, had taken possession of large brownfields from former manufacturing owners, but these 
sites still represented only a small portion of the overall stock of brownfields in the state.  
To address cleanup at the numerous privately owned brownfield sites throughout the 
state, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and Department of 
Health (DOH) jointly used their regulatory powers to create a voluntary cleanup program (VCP). 
The goal of the VCP was to incentivize private owners. The VCP did not provide funds for 
cleanup, nor did it establish uniform rules for all sites of a given type. Rather, the agencies 
negotiated acceptable cleanup standards for each site in the VCP based upon the next expected 
use. The program relied upon a liability release from the two departments administering the 
program as an incentive for owners to voluntarily become involved. Under the program, if an 
owner cleaned up a contaminated site as negotiated within the VCP agreement, the Department 
of Environmental Conservation and the Department of Health would not hold that owner and all 
subsequent owners of the property liable for any costs associated with prior contamination issues 
as long as the use of the site did not change.
121
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The VCP left many issues unresolved. Even with the release from liability, owners could 
still be sued by other private parties or other governmental agencies for costs associated with 
cleanup. In addition to the uncertain liability, the lack of uniform standards resulted in cleanups 
that many communities found to be unacceptable (Steil and Connolly, 2010). The DEC 
promulgated regulations saying that the goal should be to return the land to a “pristine state,” but 
that goal and more specific guidelines for acceptable levels of each contaminant were rarely met. 
Instead, state officials negotiated deals with each polluter on a case-by-case basis (McKinley 
2002: B1). This let major polluters evade liability and forced community organizations to engage 
in long, costly battles to ensure the safe cleanup of toxic sites.  
A case in point is Starlight Park, a public park along the Bronx River. In 2000, Starlight 
Park was found to be heavily contaminated from the remains of a coal gasification plant that had 
been operated on the site by a predecessor of the Con Edison utility company in the late 19
th
 
Century. A local community organization, Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice (YMPJ), 
mobilized residents to assure that the DEC and the New York City Parks Department (the current 
landowner) held Con Edison, the identified liable party, to minimal standards for remediation. 
The cleanup finally began in the fall of 2006, and included reparations paid by Con Edison to the 
Parks Department for construction of the park. This rare victory for a community group came 
through determined political struggle and was the exception not the rule for the cleanup program. 
The Voluntary Cleanup Program often let polluters avoid responsibility at minimal costs, 
resulted in incomplete remediation and had no mechanisms to ensure that future development in 
the area would not repeat the same destructive cycles. When comprehensive cleanups were 
conducted it was only because of the vigilance and advocacy of local organizations that were 
able to bring public attention and political power to bear on the landowners and polluters.  
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The need for a legislative answer to the issue of brownfield remediation was clear to all 
involved at the time that The Pocantico Roundtable was proposed. The Environmental 
Restoration Program created from the Brownfield Bond Act was only meant to last a limited 
time. It ran out of money in 2008. As well, most developers, community development interests, 
and environmental advocates saw the Voluntary Cleanup Program as too uncertain with regard to 
liability and cleanup standards. As one respondent pointed out, “there were rumblings within the 
environmental community that there was no statutory basis” for the program. While the fact that 
some developers had entered the VCP demonstrated that there was a “market for a program,”
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the cleanup levels were inconsistent and the costs of participation for owners could not be 
calculated in advance. This meant that development financing remained difficult to obtain and 
environmental conditions were not necessarily safe at former brownfield sites. As Mark Izeman 
of the Natural Resources Defense Council pointed out, “predictability of costs and clean-up 
criteria (which should be designative of the most protective levels achievable), as well as up 
front schedules and time frames are important considerations in remediation and redevelopment” 
(Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p.15). In addition to the lack of predictability provided by the VCP, many 
community development interests such as YMPJ saw the Voluntary Cleanup Program as ill-
suited for ensuring the most achievable levels of protection. These factors combined to make 
VCP sites increasing targets for political opposition from communities and environmentalists. 
The opposition created a strong demand from developers for a legislative answer that would 
resolve battles over cleanup and acceptable use up front. For everyone involved, there was a 
need for greater certainty when it came to brownfield cleanup. 
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6.4| The Governor’s Superfund Working Group 
In response to the widespread concerns about the VCP, Governor George Pataki 
established his Superfund Working Group to develop a legislative answer to the uncertainty 
around brownfield remediation in New York State. The group began work on 7 August 1998. 
Formed only one month before the Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields, the 
group was charged with recommending financing and other changes to the State’s Superfund 
law, as well as improvements for all programs which addressed contaminated sites (Superfund 
Working Group, 1999 , p.10). The working group met over the course of a year and was 
comprised of 17 members representing government agencies, environmental organizations, and 
business interests (see Appendix 10 for a full list of members and their affiliations). Eight of the 
members were from government agencies, four members were from environmental 
organizations, and five members represented business interests. As well, two members of the 
Superfund Working Group, Jody Kass and Jim Tripp of the Environmental Defense Fund, were 
also on the Pocantico Roundtable and 6 other members’ organizations were represented in both 
efforts. Clearly the work of the two concurrent groups informed and affected one another. 
Importantly for the Pocantico Roundtable members, community development interests 
were not represented in Governor Pataki’s group. Jody Kass was invited at the last minute to join 
the Superfund Working Group, but her formal affiliation was with the New York City 
Partnership and Chamber of Commerce. Her identity on the Superfund Working Group was as 
an advocate for business interests who could also speak to the parallel Pocantico Roundtable 
process. Governor Pataki’s administration did not regard the community development world as 
pertinent to superfund cleanup and brownfield redevelopment. Pataki’s perspective is made clear 
in a 2005 public statement about one of the DEC’s brownfield programs. He said, “Thanks to 
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strong support from municipalities, the business community, and environmental organizations, 
we are succeeding in cleaning up and returning an unprecedented number of brownfields to 
productive use in the community” (DEC, 2005, paragraph 1). Even after years of lobbying on the 
part of community development interests, Governor Pataki still did not include them in his 
description of those that had worked to make brownfield policy effective. In his estimation, 
communities were beneficiaries of, but not active interests in, the brownfield redevelopment 
process. He did not see a role for them in the policymaking process in 2005 when he made the 
statement and he certainly did not see a role for them in 1998 when he excluded them from 
membership on the Superfund Working Group. 
Almost immediately, Governor Pataki’s Superfund Working Group focused on the issue 
of financing cleanups. As one member commented, “The big difficulty was…who’s going to 
pay. And you know the Business Council wasn’t… about to sign on to a proposal that it would 
be your chemical companies would pay an additional tax or anything like that. But there was 
certainly plenty of discussion about that.” In the end, the group suggested financing large-scale 
cleanups at state superfund sites through a “pay-as-you-go” system where a permanent account 
was to be funded on an annual basis from both public and private funds to ensure that money was 
available for ongoing cleanup of major environmental contaminants. 
In terms of cleanup standards, the Superfund Working Group’s final report recommended 
that a risk assessment measurement be used to determine acceptable levels of cleanup dependent 
upon the next expected land use for the site; the report recommended that there be fewer cleanup 
requirements for an industrial or manufacturing reuse than there would be for a residential 
development (see Superfund Working Group, 1999, p. 25). This approach essentially 
standardized and formalized the method that had been used by DEC for site-by-site negotiations 
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under the Voluntary Cleanup Program. It also reflected the heavy representation of state agency 
officials on the working group. The agency officials from the DEC and DOH were invested in 
the existing Voluntary Cleanup Program.  
The Working Group’s proposal for liability was the same as it was for federal Superfund 
sites under CERCLA—both buyers and sellers of property could be held liable. The report also 
recommended limiting the liability attached to groundwater, especially in areas with widespread 
contamination. Finally, the report addressed issues of defining hazardous materials, off-site 
cleanup requirements, and public participation. It called for the creation of a technical assistance 
grant program for community groups to use for independent investigation of site conditions in 
their area and for community outreach. 
In addition, the superfund working group included a recommendation for a “Brownfield 
Redevelopment Area (BRA)” program. The BRA program resembled what came to be called the 
Brownfield Opportunity Area program which was first proposed at the Pocantico Roundtable and 
is the clearest indication that ideas were traveling across the two policy arenas. The BRA 
program called for the designation of special areas with high concentrations of brownfields to be 
eligible for separate planning and assessment funds. The funds would enable municipalities to 
plan for redevelopment of entire disinvested and potentially contaminated areas rather than have 
to address the issues on a site-by-site basis. Largely because of lobbying efforts on the part of the 
community development interests that were on the Pocantico Roundtable, this “area-wide” 
approach to brownfield redevelopment would remain an essential component of the policy 
discussion for several years after the Superfund Working Group submitted its recommendations. 
As one member of the group commented, “there was recognition by most members that it [area-
wide planning] made sense.” 
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The straight-forward list of recommendations that came out of the Superfund Working 
Group was in fact a veneer put over a deeply divided process. Despite its narrow membership 
and skew toward government and business interests, the group did not achieve consensus on any 
of the recommendations in its final report. It did present all of them as final, but only some were 
unanimously supported. The report contained substantial dissenting opinions. Importantly, the 
recommendation to tie cleanup standards to a risk assessment model based upon the next 
expected land use was opposed by State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and Rhea Jezer of the 
Sierra Club. Both Spitzer and Jezer declined to sign off on the entire report, largely due to their 
opposition to this tiered system of cleanup standards. All of the other environmental organization 
representatives (besides Jezer), which included Jim Tripp of The Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF), Paul Elston of the New York League of Conservation Voters (LCV), and John Adams of 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) were opposed to the land use-based system for 
cleanup standards as it was written. In a combined dissent, the three environmental organizations 
wrote that they could support such a system only if properties adjacent to residential areas were 
always required to clean to residential standards, regardless of expected end use. They also 
sought to empower the Department of Environmental Conservation to require the highest level of 
cleanup in any case that it deemed to be a special circumstance, the interpretation of which they 
gave wide latitude. These extra conditions were included in the dissenting opinions section of the 
report, but only as a brief note that agreement could not be reached (Superfund Working Group, 
1999, pp. 28-29). As a result, all of the environmental groups dissented at least partially from the 
report’s recommendations.  
For their part, the business interests also made their agenda clear through written dissent. 
Marke Alesse of the Federation of Independent Businesses, Diana Hinchcliff of The Alliance of 
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Chemical Industries of New York State, Frank McKenna of Merrill Lynch, Ken Pokalsky of the 
Business Council of New York State, and Robert Fischer of the State Superfund Management 
Board wrote an almost superfluous dissent, as none of the issues they were concerned about were 
in the report’s proposals. They opposed any inclusion of a mandate to clean sites adjacent to 
residential areas to residential standards. The business interests also rejected the notion that DEC 
should have discretion to require the highest level of cleanup for special circumstances. Finally, 
the business interests opposed a provision to raise funds through new taxes and fees on certain 
businesses, mostly in the energy sector. The strong statement against environmental proposals 
made it clear that business and environmental interests on the Governor’s Superfund Working 
Group did not find the common ground that Governor Pataki saw when he made his 2005 
comment on the DEC brownfield program. 
Jody Kass played an interesting bridging role in the Governor’s Superfund Working 
Group. She opposed the imposition of new fees for the power industry, a move that coincides 
with her business affiliation, and called for more funding for community-based planning around 
brownfields in recognition of her community development connection. In her dissent which 
indicated her greater allegiance to the Pocantico Roundtable, she wrote, “For years, stakeholders 
have been talking at ‘cross purposes’ on the issues surrounding brownfields and Superfund and 
the result has been confusion, misinformation, and a framework for doing business that is 
enforcement-driven and is based on mistrust, that has left all sides dissatisfied.”
123
  
By the time Kass wrote her critique of the Superfund Working Group, the final report that 
came out of the Brownfield Coalition, a follow-up to the Pocantico Roundtable, had just been 
completed. However, its recommendations were also written largely without the support of any 
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environmental groups. Kass had seen the interests of community development organizations 
greatly furthered in both the Superfund Working Group through the proposed BRA program and 
the Pocantico Roundtable. However, especially in the Pocantico process, she had also seen the 
mistrust that had characterized the conversation for decades lead to environmental and 
community development interests being pitted against one another. In the end, most mainstream 
environmental interests declined to sign on to any of the policy formulation efforts. Kass would, 
as it turned out, work for years following these processes to mend the bridges between business, 
community development, and environmental interests concerned with brownfield policy in New 
York State. That path primarily began in 1998 with the formation of the Pocantico Roundtable 
for Consensus on Brownfields. 
  
6.5| The Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields 
 The Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields occurred over the same time 
period as the Governor’s Superfund Working Group. It officially commenced at a three day 
retreat at the Pocantico Conference Center between 8 December, 1998 and 10 December, 1998. 
 There was some overlap in membership across the two efforts and several of the Pocantico 
Roundtable members who were not on the Superfund Working Group attended and participated 
in public meetings about the recommendations developed in the working group (see Superfund 
Working Group, 1999, Appendix C). As one respondent familiar with both groups remarked, 
“there were some of the same players there [on the Pocantico Roundtable] but, you know, a lot 
more community groups, more environmental groups.  It was sort of the constituents there were 
more the NGO community rather than developers…[and] banks.” 
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The Pocantico Roundtable was hosted by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and organized 
by Jody Kass and Alan Zerkin. The organizers’ backgrounds shaped the way in which the 
Pocantico group was formed and structured. Kass’s connection to both business and community 
development interests ensured that the two sides would be represented. While it was usual for 
business interests to be a part of the policy discussion around state land use policy, the Pocantico 
Roundtable did create a rare level of access for community development interests. As Aaron 
Mair, an environmental justice organizer in Albany, New York stated, “the roundtable 
discussions…really mark a sea change…Environmental justice communities and communities of 
color, in the past, have had limited access and opportunity to have substantive, and I underscore 
substantive, input on the process, the science, as well as the impacts of what’s going on relative 
to these particular communities.”
124
 
 Zerkin’s background also had a strong impact on the Pocantico Roundtable. He was a 
mediation specialist and structured the Pocantico Roundtable as a formal consensus building 
project with ground rules for complete participation (no proxies or replacements could be sent); 
for communication (especially with regard to respecting others’ right to speak); and for decision-
making. After discussing the ground rules, all members were asked to formally ratify them. As 
the name implied, Zerkin imposed a full consensus rule on the proceedings. This meant that the 
entire program had to have unanimous consent from all members. If consensus could not be 
achieved on an entire program, then the group would not issue any report (see Fiszel-Bieler, 
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6.5a: Establishing the roundtable 
Just as Kass and Zerkin began formulating a strategy for developing a list of invitees, 
they were informed of a related effort being undertaken by Ira Rubenstein of the Environmental 
Business Association. After reaching out to Rubenstein, the three decided to join forces. 
Rubinstein emphasized that whatever recommendations were formed had to be ready in time to 
affect the 1999 state legislative calendar. He pushed Kass and Zerkin to structure the Pocantico 
Roundtable to have as much political potency as possible. They agreed. As one respondent who 
helped draft the legislative proposals that eventually came out of the Pocantico Roundtable 
discussions said, “it was intended…to create legislation because we all knew that without 
legislation you didn’t have the certainty needed by everybody…to get the job done.” With the 
Superfund Working Group already announced, it was generally believed that Governor Pataki 
intended to include new recommendations for state remediation policy in his next budget 
proposal for the 1999 session. In order to have a completed report by January 1999, the list of 
invitees would have to be determined quickly.  
Kass, Rubinstein and Zerkin formed an unofficial steering committee to move the 
selection process along. Kass asked two prior acquaintances, Annette Barbaccia of the New York 
City Mayor’s Office of Environmental Coordination and Jim Tripp of the Environmental 
Defense Fund, to join the roundtable and advise on the process of deciding who should be 
invited. While Kass had been connected with the community development field in New York 
City through her affordable housing work, she did not feel qualified to select the community 
groups. She asked Mathy Stanislaus of the Minority Environmental Lawyers Association to join 
the steering committee in order to help with this process. Stanislaus suggested that a forum be 
convened to let the community groups decide for themselves who should represent them on the 
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Pocantico Roundtable. The forum was convened quickly and representatives were chosen mostly 
from New York City’s environmental justice community. Stanislaus, however, remained a 
constant liaison with the wider community development world. He performed a “shuttle 
diplomacy” role wherein he connected conversations he had with non-represented community 
groups to the formal Pocantico Roundtable process.
125
  
In the end, the Pocantico Roundtable brought together a diverse set of interests that had 
longstanding disagreements over the right direction for brownfield policy in New York. As one 
respondent described it, “what she [Kass] essentially did was bring all the enemies together on 
brownfields.” There were four representatives of municipal interests; six environmental groups; 
nine business interests including developers, the power industry, bankers, lawyers, and insurance 
representatives; and five community development organizations, mostly with an environmental 
justice focus (see Appendix 11 for a full list of all Pocantico Roundtable members). One 
participant said of the Pocantico Roundtable: 
Typically the pattern is, you know, somebody introduces a bill in the assembly, it passes 
unanimously because it's what all Democrats want…And someone else introduces a 
completely incompatible bill on the same subject in the Senate and they pass it 
unanimously.  And the two bills can never get reconciled, so… they were trying to do 
something different and saying “Let's see if we can get the points of view that are the 
power basis of both parties on board with this and then we can somehow work this 
dysfunctional legislative process.” 
 
Zerkin and his mediation partner Jean-Ann McGrane, without connections to any of the major 
stakeholder groups, served as non-voting facilitators of the conversation. In order to provide 
instant feedback on the policy strategies that were proposed, three representatives of state 
agencies were asked to serve as non-voting ex-officio advisors. Representatives from the 
foundations that sponsored the groups occasionally observed.  
                                                 
125
 Stanislaus described his role as “shuttle diplomacy” between the Pocantico Roundtable and the community 
development organizations in New York City. 8 August 2009. 
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 The first meeting of the Pocantico Roundtable was held on 14 October 1998 in Albany to 
make introductions and establish the ground rules for the process. However, before the ground 
rules could be discussed, the group got caught up on the definition of brownfields. The working 
definition put forth was, “Any real property where the actual or suspected presence of 
contamination is an impediment to reuse.” While this remained as the rough working definition 
throughout the discussions, many argued that it was too narrow. They argued that it should 
include a broader set of reasons why reuse might be impeded such as disinvestment in an area.  
There was also some doubt early on about the efficacy of a full consensus rule, even 
among the community development interests who potentially stood to benefit the most given 
their former exclusion. Members were concerned that the potential for it to function as a “veto” 
rule wherein any one party could overrule all others was problematic. As one respondent said:  
You know to get absolute consensus is impossible. There was a consensus process for 
decision making that I absolutely oppose because it puts one entity, one person in 
charge…and they can kill it. 
 
Another respondent said of the consensus rule: 
I didn’t think that was going to happen…sometimes with these things…all you can really 
hope for is that people begin to have that conversation with each other and how much can 
you really resolve in…a two or three-day conference? You can’t. You bring a lot of 
people together. You air a lot of stuff for follow-up, and that’s really what’s key here. 
   
While the concerns over the fact that some members might, for various reasons, have 
motivations to cause the process to fail were present and expressed, these concerns were put 
aside for the sake of letting the discussion move forward. The facilitators argued that the process 
should be about “leveling the playing field” and that full consensus was needed in order to make 
that possible. Everyone agreed with this goal and, as such, decided to continue with the 
consensus process despite the initial concerns. 
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While the full consensus rule gave each individual equal power to halt any 
recommendation with which they did not agree, there was concern amongst the participants over 
the extent to which coalitions of interest would direct the conversation. Several respondents 
commented that the main concern was over uneven knowledge about the current brownfield 
redevelopment process; those with more knowledge or experience were better positioned to 
direct outcomes. This resulted in an immediate push to train everyone with a full understanding 
of the legal and technical issues involved. The first meeting ended with uncertainty about the 
process but a broad desire to move forward. The goals for the group’s recommendations that 
were agreed upon during this meeting were: 1) Maximize benefits that accrue from brownfields 
projects to communities, municipalities, and regions, 2) Improve competitiveness of New York 
State communities in attracting development, 3) Promote equity, and 4) Ensure credibility with 
and accountability to all stakeholders (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, pp. 42-43). 
 At the second planning meeting held on 28 October 1998 in Manhattan, the political 
dynamic between the interests became clear. The facilitators initially proposed that the group 
break down into three subgroups to develop approaches for maximizing “public and community 
benefit; viability of reuse projects and competitiveness; and credibility and accountability” 
(Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 48). However, before the subgroups were formed, Anne Rabe 
representing the Citizens Environmental Coalition—one of the environmental groups on the 
Pocantico Roundtable—argued that while the proposed subgroups were reflective of the goals 
that had been discussed at the first meeting, they did not represent her main goals for the 
Pocantico Roundtable. She and others pushed for an expanded list of goals at this point. The 




1. Ensure quality cleanups that are protective of health and the environment 
2. Have consistent equitable cleanups…that do not limit a community’s growth 
3. Ensure direct participation 
4. Focus on sustainable reuses 
5. Compare qualitative development versus quantitative growth 
6. Establish a credible process that instills trust  
7. Aim for streamlined decision-making and one-stop shopping   
 
While the initial goals clearly represented community development, business and 
municipality interests, the new goals were a broader representation of the groups involved, 
especially environmental interests. The group now had 11 stated goals, an unwieldy list. The 
environmental organizations had ensured that high cleanup standards would be a strong part of 
what the Pocantico Roundtable was trying to create. Following the development of new goals, 
the group organized into subgroups according to similar interests. At this point, environmental 
and community development organizations had informal discussions about each other’s issues.  
 Two more preparatory meetings were held in November 1998. During the November 
meetings, a discussion method known as the “Samoan Circle” was utilized to force participants 
to recognize their pre-existing biases. The Samoan Circle involved a small group of rotating 
participants sitting in the center of a circle and leading the questioning and discussion. Anyone 
could ask or be invited to sit in the center. While many participants observed that people became 
much more aware of the positions of others during these exercises, it was still the case in the 
eyes of at least one participant that “people really had not moved an inch from their position 
when they walked into the room the first day” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 55).  
During the fourth preparatory meeting, five working groups were established that would 
be used in the formal Pocantico Roundtable process. They were: 1) Reuse and Community 
Development 2) Liability 3) Standards and Institutional Controls 4) Administrative Process and 
Expediting Reviews and 5) Financial Programs. These groups represented the issues that 
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organizers identified from prior discussions as in need of being addressed. Two of the working 
groups came to exemplify the promise and problem of Pocantico. The promise of the Pocantico 
Roundtable was that it would leverage a diversity of perspectives to uncover new, innovative 
strategies for dealing with the complex issues involved with brownfield redevelopment. Working 
group 1, Reuse and Community Development, realized this promise when it agreed on the first 
day that an “area-wide” approach to redevelopment in communities with high concentrations of 
brownfields would be appropriate. The area-wide approach, which would eventually become the 
Brownfield Opportunity Area (BOA) program, developed into a major component of New 
York’s remediation law. A variant of the program developed by the Reuse and Community 
Development group was also carried by Jody Kass to Governor Pataki’s Superfund Working 
Group and adopted in the form of the Brownfield Redevelopment Area (BRA).
126
  
The Pocantico Roundtable, though, faced other intractable problems to which innovative 
solutions were not found. While early efforts to align the interests of environmental and 
community development groups held up within several of the working groups, the connection 
broke down over the discussion of cleanup standards that took place within the Standards and 
Institutional Controls group. As Fiszel-Bieler’s report (1999, p. 66) points out, “the issue of 
clean-up standards [was] the most difficult issue at all of the meetings leading up to the first 
Pocantico summit.” It remained a challenge throughout the talks. One respondent speaking from 
the community development perspective said: 
They [environmentalists] wanted the land to be pristine, that the cleanup had to be 
pristine. We felt that the cleanup should be based on end use and that if the standard was 
so high that it would make the cost prohibitive for redevelopment that the land would just 
stay there neglected and toxic and our communities would still be exposed to those 
toxins. So we wanted a standard that made sense. And of course we were not going to 
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http://epa.gov/brownfields/areawide_grants.htm, accessed January12, 2012 
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sacrifice a standard that would harm our community’s health but it had to make sense in 
terms of redevelopment and had to sort of depend on end use of the land.   
 
Environmental interests, business and development interests, state agencies, and community 
development representatives each had divergent positions and disagreement within their own 
ranks on the issue of cleanup standards. One respondent described the most extreme position of 
the mainstream environmental groups as: 
We [some environmentalists] want it to be really clean no matter how much it costs and 
no matter how long it takes and if the technology’s not there, of course, then that site is 
going to stay there until the technology and the money are there to clean it up.   
 
6.5b: How clean is clean? The battle over cleanup standards 
Four strategies for setting soil cleanup standards were discussed during the first session 
of the Pocantico Roundtable. They included (1) adopting the existing criteria for cleanup at 
superfund sites, (2) appointing an advisory board of scientists to amend the Superfund criteria to 
make cleanup more achievable at smaller sites, (3) shifting to a “risk-based” standards approach 
that established acceptable levels of contamination that would still preserve public safety, and (4) 
tying cleanup levels to the expected next use for the site wherein industrial and commercial uses 
would require lower levels of cleanup than residential. The issue of what standards should apply 
for cleaning groundwater under the site was also discussed. This discussion centered on whether 
it was appropriate to move away from the existing requirement that all groundwater be 
remediated to drinking water standards, regardless of location and if liability exemptions for 
groundwater should be given for properties in areas with widespread contamination. 
Several environmental interests initially supported adopting the existing superfund site 
cleanup standards for all brownfields. Essentially, this meant that site owners and responsible 
parties would have to return all soil and water to pre-contamination conditions before any 
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development could proceed. Superfund criteria include both on- and off-site contamination, 
meaning that if any pollutants had leached onto neighboring sites those would also have to be 
remediated. Other members of the Roundtable argued that these would be impossible standards 
to meet at a great majority of the smaller brownfield sites. Superfund criteria had been designed 
to address the largest sites of contamination that posed immediate public health threats and had 
substantial federal resources to aid in cleanup and enforcement. The concern expressed in 
interviews with many members at Pocantico including business, community development, and 
municipal interests was that this level of public resources would be unavailable for the thousands 
of small sites. And that the economic incentives to develop the sites would not cover the costs of 
such cleanups. A report from the New York chapter of the National Brownfields Association 
summarized this position:  
While the cleanup of more heavily contaminated properties is driven by the need to abate 
a hazard to public health and the environment, brownfield sites will generally be cleaned 
up only if incentives are provided to encourage their reuse and redevelopment. Failure to 
provide these incentives will primarily hurt the economically disadvantaged and racial 
minorities who cannot afford to move to the suburbs or chase after higher-paying jobs. It 
will also hurt the State’s older cities, towns, and villages which are already straining to 
maintain aging infrastructure and more costly community services in the face of a rapidly 
declining tax-base. 
 
If the right incentives are not provided to stimulate the cleanup and reuse of brownfields, 
it will not hurt the wealthy or land developers. They will simply go to the suburbs or to 
“greenfield" areas not yet marred by urban decay or pollution. This will require more 
public resources to be spent on costly infrastructure (new roads, public water, and public 




This argument represents the position of business, community development, and municipal 
interests who sought a more flexible system for the smaller brownfield sites than the Superfund 
program provided. However, this position ran directly counter to that of some environmentalists 
who sought to ensure high-level cleanup at all sites. Further, some members of the environmental 
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community at Pocantico saw loopholes in the federal superfund criteria and believed that even 
these criteria would not be stringent enough to ensure that sites were properly remediated (see 
Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 68). 
 The rift between the various interests represented at Pocantico and within the 
environmental community became clear once the discussion over cleanup standards focused on 
the details. As one environmentalist described the situation:  
There was within the environmental community up until the time that the 
legislature…passed the 2003 Act…a divergence of view between what I call…the 
pragmatists and the purists. And…the purists wanted… the most stringent possible 
cleanup standards, everything cleaned up, the groundwater cleaned up.  
 
The respondent went on to describe the pragmatists as more willing to discuss standards that 
would balance the need to redevelop brownfields in a timely manner with the need to achieve 
safe levels of remediation. Another respondent who was sympathetic to the “pragmatist” 
approach said: 
I mean…the purists did not want the use of the parcel to be a factor at all in deciding how 
the cleanup was going to be done. So if somebody was going to come in and build a new 
industrial or retail site and, you know, build a parking lot and do all these kinds of things 
the cleanup was going to be the same as it was going to be if it was, you know a toddler’s 
center. So the final law that was passed was sort of a mishmash of those competing ideas.   
 
One approach that sought to mediate between the “purist” environmentalists and the 
community development perspectives favored a strategy where adjustments would be made to 
the Superfund criteria by an expert panel of scientists for different types of sites. The panel 
would be tasked with closing loopholes and easing cleanup standards where appropriate. 
Environmentalists and private development interests argued against this approach. They pointed 
out that it simply moved the question of standards into another arena without specifying the goal 
of cleanups. There was a fear that the expert panel could be manipulated both in who was 
appointed and what procedures they used to determine “appropriate” cleanups. Many members 
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held predictability for developers as a main goal in setting the cleanup standards and, as a result, 
favored including a specific and unchanging strategy within the brownfields legislation. 
The conversation over cleanup standards became the most contentious when it shifted 
toward the third and fourth strategy proposed for setting standards. These strategies involved 
designing a system of site-specific standards that would vary according to the parameters of a 
given brownfield. Two measures for relaxing the clean-up requirements were discussed in this 
context.  First, championed by the state agency ex-officio advisors, several members favored 
shifting toward “risk-based” measures. This would mean that a calculation of the health risks 
associated with the actual contaminants present would be made for each site and a certain level 
of risk would be tolerated. In short, site owners would not be required to remediate their sites to 
pre-contamination levels, but rather to levels considered to be acceptable for preserving public 
health. As one member of the Brownfield Coalition observed: 
There was so much misunderstanding about the risk-based standards. There was such 
misunderstanding about what the state would require, what the city would require…that 
was one of the biggest arguments in Pocantico…People didn’t understand how the sites 
could get remediated. They didn’t believe they could. I think there was no clear 
understanding of testing…And I don’t think there was any satisfying people either. 
 
The second approach discussed in this context was a tiered system that would establish 
different levels of clean-up requirements according to the next expected land use. A combined 
risk-based and tiered approach was essentially the strategy that the Governor’s Superfund 
Working Group, heavily populated by state agency representatives, adopted. One community 
development participant described this point in the conversation by saying: 
The mainstream enviros balked at the idea that those standards would vary based on the 
end use of the land.  I mean that was the thing that the business folks really wanted and 
that the community development folks also really wanted.  Because community 
development projects like affordable housing were getting hit the hardest.  Like you 




The risk-based and tiered strategy remained highly contentious within the Superfund Working 
Group and the Pocantico Roundtable.  
Certain representatives of the environmental community on the Pocantico Roundtable 
were especially opposed to any shift away from strong absolute standards for remediation. 
Fiszel-Bieler (1999, p.67) observed that Anne Rabe of the Citizens Environmental Coalition 
strongly objected to what she saw as an affront to the priorities she had expressed during the 
planning sessions. She saw the discussion “leading toward a complete paradigm shift in the way 
New York State initiates cleanups and that the members were viewing the brownfield discussion 
as an economic issue and not as an environmental one.” Several members disagreed with Rabe’s 
assessment and identified her position as extreme. Business interests stressed that the goal must 
be to create a predictable and feasible system of standards in order to encourage any cleanup and 
reuse of sites. A rift formed at this point over the issue of linking expected reuse to cleanup 
standards. The community development organizations that adopted more of a local neighborhood 
redevelopment orientation and the environmental groups concerned with larger-scale ecological 
issues began to see each other’s interests as at odds. One member of the Pocantico Roundtable 
who wanted to balance the environmental and community issues said: “This [divide over the 
right level of cleanup] was really what I think caused the consensus to breakdown. And it 
continued to be a contentious issue until the legislature…finally voted.”   
The community development groups on the Pocantico Roundtable generally viewed 
environmental issues through the lens of environmental justice. They were concerned with 
ameliorating the inequities in the distribution of ecological hazards, which meant that cleanups 
needed to be encouraged within communities that had high concentrations of brownfield sites. In 
the words of one community development representative, “There was no appreciation for this 
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perspective on the part of the environmentalists that were pushing for pristine cleanups.” The 
community development groups asserted their interest in preserving human health and safety as 
well as creating conditions for economic development and job growth. Over the course of the 
first day of discussions at the Pocantico Roundtable, this divide between community 
development and mainstream environmental interests grew. In the words of one Pocantico 
member: 
The community groups and the environmental justice groups were much more 
sympathetic to the idea that the…the kinds of cleanups that were required should have 
something to do with how the site was going to be used.  And they also recognized as a 
practical matter the challenges even with certain kinds of subsidies and so on of getting, 
you know, private owners of these properties where they were privately owned to step 
forward and do something. 
   
Interestingly, this was precisely the position that the private development interests took as well. 
The business council emphasized at this point that the “goal of the program is to encourage 
people to clean up and reuse sites, and that if you demand pre-release cleanups, even in 
ubiquitously contaminated areas, you may hinder redevelopment and deter cleanups” (Fiszel-
Bieler, 1999, p. 67). 
At this point certain members of the environmental groups were interested in discussing 
alternative cleanup standard measures, but the Citizens Environmental Coalition remained 
obstinate. Anne Rabe “plainly stated that economic development should not take the place of 
environmental standards” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 68). She and a few others refused to consider 
any standards that did not require sites to be returned to pre-contamination conditions. This 
position was identified by several respondents as among the most difficult to contend with in the 
effort to build consensus. 
On the final day of the Pocantico Roundtable, the participants divided themselves into 
two working groups to discuss the biggest issues that remained: cleanup standards and linking 
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financial incentives to the area-wide planning strategy. At the end of the first Pocantico meeting, 
an accommodation was achieved on cleanup standards. There was a general agreement that for 
soil only (meaning groundwater remained unaddressed), a tiered approach to cleanups where 
developers had the option of what level of cleanup they would choose according to their desired 
land use would be acceptable if there was a strong incentive and enforcement structure put in 
place to push developers toward the highest level of cleanup. However, they were still far from a 
consensus on the details of such an agreement or any method for addressing groundwater 
contamination. As a result, it was decided that a second session would be needed. The members 
scheduled the second retreat for the weekend of 8-9 February 1999. This, it was suggested would 
still be in time to affect whatever proposals were developed in the next legislative session. 
In the interim between the first Pocantico retreat and the second, several meetings were 
held with the members of the roundtable to work out the details of a tiered cleanup standard 
system with considerable incentives for high cleanup levels. Early on, this strategy seemed, for 
some, to have some hope of achieving consensus. As well, the meetings were meant to address 
the issue of regulating groundwater cleanups. While groups including the Citizens 
Environmental Coalition, New York Public Interest Research Group, and Environmental 
Advocates remained highly skeptical of including risk-based standards in the tiered system, the 
discussion of which owners and responsible parties would receive incentives, especially liability 
release, proceeded fruitfully. A strategy which created seven classes of responsible parties, each 
eligible for different levels of liability release was created and a decision was made to propose 
linking the brownfield legislation with the superfund legislation that the Governor’s working 
group was designing. In hindsight, this seems to have been a pragmatic decision since there were 
several members on both committees and the Governor’s Working Group was discussing general 
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brownfields policy in addition to the state superfund program. However, financing strategies for 
the “one big program” approach proved to be highly contentious. 
The second interim meeting focused on the issue of groundwater remediation. It led to a 
proposal to create a fee system paid into by developers to enable regional groundwater 
remediation to be carried out by the state government. While there seemed to be agreement over 
soil and groundwater remediation strategies, the third interim meeting would demonstrate that 
the agreement was fleeting. As Fiszel-Bieler’s report states, during the third meeting, Anne Rabe 
renounced the notion of linking cleanup standards to expected land uses. She argued that if 
industrial sites were allowed to cleanup to minimal standards, contaminants on those sites could 
still potentially leech out to neighboring areas that might include residences. This presented an 
unacceptable level of risk for Rabe, who also repudiated risk-based processes altogether. She 
demanded that an absolute and stringent standard be placed on all sites. The possibility of 
consensus over cleanup standards was already in jeopardy when Rabe stated, “The reason why 
we have these problems is because of the current Governor. If the prior administration were still 
in office, we would be realizing far better cleanup levels” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 89). In 
response to this statement, the ex-officio members representing the State Department of 
Environmental Control and the State Department of Health, both of whom had been appointed 
by the Governor, walked out of the meeting. Several respondents identified this as a moment 
when it seemed as though the consensus process would fail.  
At this point, the ability of the Pocantico Roundtable to continue was threatened over 
disagreements about how to set cleanup standards. The group did reconvene for the second 
retreat at the Pocantico Conference Center, and formed two working groups: cleanup standards 
and “everything else” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 96). Several respondents commented that the 
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stance of some environmentalists was unwavering. One respondent representing private 
development interests commented on the fact that several issues, including public participation 
requirements and cleanup standards, remained intractable at this point: 
I mean we were screaming at each other until two or three o’clock in the morning…we 
were wrong I think. I mean having now done the additional public participation both in 
this process and in the Brownfield Program, I’m…I’ve come completely around on 
public participation. I completely agree with that. I think it’s a big mistake when 
developers don’t do it. I did come completely around on it. I don’t know or don’t think 
that the environmental groups have done that on the cleanup standards. 
 
As it turned out, disagreements on both sides continued to unravel the hope for full consensus. 
By the end of the second Pocantico retreat, the New York Public Interest Research Group stated 
it would not sign the agreement and everyone agreed that the remaining issues were too unclear 
to be decided. Yet again, the deadline was extended to a “drop dead” date of 6 April 1999 for the 
final report.  
The months after the second Pocantico retreat saw the political dynamic around 
brownfield policy “heat up” in New York State when Governor Pataki’s Superfund Working 
Group report became public. The report was leaked before its official release. Several members 
of the Pocantico Roundtable were upset that it seemed as though their best ideas were being 
given to the Governor’s working group, but not all interests were represented in that group. 
The community development interests had served as key intermediaries between 
environmental and private business interests in the search for acceptable cleanup standards. As 
one representative of municipal interests commented: 
I think the Environmental Justice and community based development groups were a 
mediator between the pure environmentalists and the development community…So while 
the big greens were looking for very pristine, clean sites, and the development 
community was looking for the cheapest way of developing the sites, the environmental 
justice groups were looking to move these sites towards development but at the same 
time realizing that they wanted them cleaned and saved. They sort of spanned the two and 




Community development interests had argued for the necessity of dealing with both cleanup and 
redevelopment issues at the same time. However, while several business and environmental 
groups sat on both the Pocantico Roundtable and the Governor’s Superfund Working Group, the 
community development interests were represented only on Pocantico. When it became clear 
that the Superfund Working Group intended to address general brownfield policy as well as the 
overhaul of the state’s Superfund policies, the community development interests felt as though 
their good faith efforts had been co-opted by a group that did not represent them. Further, it 
seemed likely that the Governor would push the Superfund Working Group proposal, giving it 
greater political weight than Pocantico. Aaron Mair of the Arbor Hill Environmental Justice 
Corporation argued that “the governor’s process was taking the best ideas from Pocantico and 
incorporating them into the Superfund Working Group report while leaving the environmental 
justice communities without a voice” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, 102).  
Within the more pragmatic side of the environmental community, the concerns that were 
expressed in their dissents within the Governor’s Superfund Working Group report were raised 
within the context of Pocantico as well. For the tiered cleanup system to work, the environmental 
groups argued that DEC needed to be empowered to require the highest level cleanup for any site 
it deemed to be a special circumstance. As well, it wanted residential level cleanups to be 
required for all sites bordering residential neighborhoods. This raised a great deal of opposition 
from various Pocantico members including business, municipal and community development 
representatives. Finally, on 18 May 1999 the Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on 
Brownfields dissolved without producing a final document. In the end, an issue that had not been 
a focus of the discussions undid the Pocantico Roundtable. Formal opposition to the financing 
structure which combined brownfields and Superfund sites in “one big program” forced 
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dissolution, but consensus had been eroding over longstanding issues around cleanup standards 
for some time. The financing questions were simply the issues that pushed the talks toward a 
pervasive sense of hopelessness. 
 
6.5c: What role for communities? The development of BOA 
 During the fourth preparatory meeting before the first Pocantico Roundtable retreat, the 
question addressed by the Samoan Circle exercise was: “How can communities stimulate and 
effectively influence brownfields reuse for maximum community benefit, and how can they 
effectively ensure that projects are carried out as intended?” This exercise led to nearly 40 
proposals from members of the Roundtable (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 56). The working group that 
was formed to consider these proposals identified two difficult issues: (1) the need to decide if 
end use should be tied to cleanup standards and (2) the need to align municipal zoning with 
community plans. City representatives and environmental interests were heavily impacted by the 
outcome of these issues. Cities had a vested interest in maintaining their control over zoning and 
environmentalists sought to create the most stringent cleanup standards possible. 
 Despite the difficult issues involved, the discussion that grew out of the Samoan Circle 
exercise laid the foundation for a key agreement on the first official day of the Pocantico 
Roundtable. With considerable guidance from Mathy Stanislaus of the Minority Environmental 
Lawyers Association and Ron Shiffman of the Pratt Institute Center for Community and 
Environmental Development, members of the Reuse and Community Development working 
group suggested a program for area-wide planning of brownfields in locations with high 
concentrations of contamination. This suggestion was meant to be in contrast to the state 
agencies’ site-by-site approach. Also on that first official day, West Harlem Environmental 
262 
 
Action Coalition (WE ACT) suggested that the end uses developed within the community-based 
area-wide program be tied to strong financial incentives for developers that conform to the 
community plans. This would give the area-wide plans implementation power. In describing the 
early conversation about area-wide planning, several people commented on the motivations for 
the strategy: 
Because the experience on brownfield’s around the country and state brownfield law has 
been relieving liability of responsible parties. Resources going to high-end projects, and 
really brownfield redevelopment being limited to big size, big boxes or high end users, 
and hot markets or emerging markets. Leaving behind the low-income communities… So 
[responding to] that was kind of a foundation.  
   
A lot of it was a veto over…waste transfer facilities. I mean that was sort of the 
proverbial, you know…bad kind of facility. It was almost more that than really 
shaping…what kind of housing we were going to have and those kinds of things.   
 
By the end of the first day of deliberations, the major issues associated with community-
led area-wide planning for brownfield redevelopment had been identified. The cleanup standards 
issue, it was clear, spilled into the community planning arena as well.  
I do remember it getting to the point where we had already sort of gotten the BOA 
concept, okay general agreement, but everything was beginning to hinge on this cleanup 
objective issue and I remember [an environmental justice representative], in particular, 
coming over to me and really upset saying, and it was pretty colorful language, how do 
we get [the environmental “purists” that were taking a hard line] to agree to something a 
little bit more rational so we can move the whole thing because we were still a go with 
that consensus and pretty similar model or proposed legislation and I remember him 
being pretty upset that we weren’t getting past this issue and that it was jeopardizing the 
whole concept of the BOA program. 
 
It was essential to decide if cleanup standards could be tied to end use in order to know what 
kinds of planning processes would be possible. Several respondents commented on the bridging 
role played by environmental justice groups in this conversation: 
To some degree they [the environmental justice groups] were a counterbalance to more 
extreme environmental groups…[The environmental justice groups] basically said, you 
know, “We want a real cleanup and we want it now. We don't want a perfect cleanup 




Okay so the trade was…the environmental groups that were present…they still wanted 
the perfect cleanup at this time. You know they wanted it so that every site gets pristine 
cleanup standards.  So the trades were we [local government and development interests] 
get use-based cleanup standards for industrial, commercial, residential, different kinds of 
residential in exchange for we would give you more public participation. That was one of 
the trades that brought the community groups closer. It wasn’t the only one.   
 
The issue of the role of municipalities in the planning process was another problem area 
for the discussions around community-based planning strategies. Cities controlled zoning and 
there needed to be clarity on the relationship between the area-wide plans and local land use 
controls. At this time, the discussion over the relationship between municipal and community 
interests in the area-wide planning process became an argument: 
Most of the fights over BOA were between the municipal representatives and the…and 
the CBOs [Community Based Organizations]. And the sections that were most 
contentious…were you know legally you just can’t take over the planning function for a 
municipality. That’s a violation of home rule law…you might want to do that, the 
community based organization, and you just can’t do that unless you change that law. 
And I don’t think they’d have a snowball chance in hell of doing that, you know.   
 
Several representatives of municipal interests were especially averse to the idea of giving 
community plans statutory control over land use. Their position was described as: 
His perspective [a representative of a city government] on BOAs was you’re just 
diverting resources to nonprofit groups that maybe haven’t experienced anything, that 
they really wouldn’t know what to do with this, wouldn’t have the capacity to really run 
these projects… and not the least of which was also the concern…of how do we know 
that what nonprofit community groups would be doing would be consistent with our 
municipal comprehensive plan, objectives, and that sort of thing. 
 
And she [a city government employee] was dead set against communities having a direct 
relationship with the state that was not mediated by the city.  So she was not going to let 
that happen.  
  
For their part, the community development interests, especially those from New York City, 
expressed a longstanding mistrust of municipal government. As one respondent observed, “The 
community groups commented frequently on running up against city policies or initiatives that 
were counter to what they were trying to accomplish.” One respondent who was engaged in the 
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discussion with the municipal interests described the trade-offs that allowed the tensions between 
community development groups and municipalities to be eased. The final deal required 
municipal approval for all BOA applications: 
The original proposal was CBOs can do it independent of local governments. And the 
local governments objected…One of the compromises was to delay designation [of a 
BOA] until the municipality approves. The local government and the CBO…have got to 
be partners…which I think is a good thing. Because even the CBO recognizes that you 
have to work it out through local government, you know? And if you don’t do that, 
you’re simply not going to be successful…But it does give communities a seat at the 
table in that process.  
 
Finally, the issue of tying financial incentives to the area-wide plans was raised. As it was 
considered infeasible to simply usurp local zoning powers, it was necessary to ensure that 
developers would voluntarily comply with area-wide plans. On the second day of the first 
Pocantico Roundtable retreat, the Finance and Community Development working groups 
decided to join together in order to align their strategies. The joint working group developed a 
financing strategy for provision of technical assistance grants to communities for planning and 
initial environmental testing in areas with high concentrations of brownfields. Their position was 
described by a member of the Finance group as: 
What we hoped is that a meaningful connection between landowners participating in the 
BOA process and, you know, buying in by whatever means to the goals of the BOA for 
their particular sites and then being able to access state money and also…and having, you 
know, kind of an express line through the state program…otherwise BOA is another sort 
of well-meaning exercise.   
 
 One member of the negotiations argued that, in order for the community-based planning strategy 
to work, the partnerships were as important as the money. The respondent stated, “It’s not only 




As well, a number of details about the role and structure of the area-wide planning 
program were developed in the first Pocantico Roundtable retreat. There was general consensus 
among all members that the conversation was headed in a good direction and should continue. 
However, the developers in the room remained suspicious of trying to shape a new model for 
development, as did the municipalities. As one proponent of the area-wide strategy remarked:  
It took a lot of persuading to get people off the idea that you deal with brownfields one at 
a time.  I mean that the only thing that would help communities in New York City is to 
deal with them comprehensively across a whole area. 
 
One developer commented: 
 
Doing the whole neighborhood was really not in our interest.  We were interested in sites 
that we could turn around relatively quickly…and in fact, doing whole neighborhoods 
has proven to be extraordinarily difficult for private developers.   
Despite these lingering reservations, the area-wide planning strategy was generally supported by 
the Pocantico Roundtable. Most of the interim meetings between the first and second Pocantico 
Roundtable retreats focused on other issues, including cleanup standards and political strategy.  
However, the joint Finance and Community Development working groups did refine their 
proposal during this time. 
 The first formal proposal for an area-wide brownfield redevelopment initiative was put 
forth in the interim period between the first and second Pocantico Roundtable retreat. It was 
entitled the “Empire State Brownfields Reclamation and Neighborhood Revitalization Program.” 
It quickly became clear from the discussion that followed the presentation of the program that 
the success or failure of the area-wide planning strategy would be tied to cleanup standards. At 
the same meeting where the ex-officio representatives from the state agencies walked out of the 
room, many questions were raised about groundwater contamination in the area-wide planning 
program and how the proposed system would connect with various strategies for cleanup 
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standards. As well, several environmental justice representatives reiterated the questions over 
how much financial incentive would be provided to develop sites in accordance with the plan.   
Allen Zerkin and Joan Byron of the Pratt Institute Center for Community and 
Environmental Development wrote up the new version of the still-developing area-wide proposal 
after the second Pocantico Roundtable. The draft that they wrote became the foundation for the 
future development of the BOA program. However, that program did not get finalized in the 
Pocantico Roundtable. Shortly after the area-wide strategy was drafted, the roundtable dissolved.   
The goal to “open thinking and even the playing field while democratizing what might 
otherwise be a dysfunctional process” (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 44) was not realized. As a result, 
consensus was not achieved. Environmentalists, for their part, were described by some 
community development activists as conspirators happy to leverage the position that 
representation in both the Pocantico and the Governor’s Superfund Working Group afforded 
them. Environmentalists and community development organizations had a brief moment of 
alignment early in the Pocantico process, but finished it pitted against one another.  
The formal goal of consensus over brownfield policy in New York State failed to be 
achieved by the Pocantico Roundtable, but the program for area-wide planning around 
brownfield redevelopment that was eventually incorporated into state law was almost fully 
developed in the process. All along, the concept of area-wide planning for redevelopment in 
communities that had high concentrations of brownfields was a relatively uncontroversial 
innovation within the context of the Pocantico negotiations. Compared to the divisions over 
cleanup standards, liability, and overall financing, the opposition to area-wide planning was 
minor. There was some difficulty in getting the developers and state agencies to agree to a robust 
community participation element, but these were largely overcome. As one respondent stated: 
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There’s no question we [the developers and state agency representatives] went kicking 
and screaming into the fact that the eventual Brownfield Law which did evolve from that 
process that happened at Pocantico, was going to involve more public participation than 
your average developer would like, okay. Developers want to do their project with as 
little public participation as possible, right. One of the big trades in this whole legislation 
was the public participation component.  
  
As a result of the progress made, the environmental justice groups especially wanted to continue 
the conversation. The majority of the members of the Pocantico Roundtable agreed to participate 
in a newly formed “Brownfields Coalition” in order to continue their work, but only two 
environmental groups and no municipal representatives remained.  
 
6.6| The Brownfields Coalition 
  The Brownfields Coalition served as the follow-up effort to the Pocantico Roundtable 
and included 16 of the 25 original members (see Appendix 12 for full list). The groups that chose 
not to participate in the continued effort mostly included environmental and municipal 
representatives. From the mainstream environmental advocacy community, only two groups 
remained: Environmental Advocates represented by Val Washington and the Environmental 
Defense Fund represented by Jim Tripp. Four other mainstream environmental groups dropped 
out of the process. All of those groups were disillusioned with the Pocantico Roundtable process 
and had expressed misgivings throughout. They included: Paul J. Elston of the New York 
League of Conservation Voters, Andrew Goldberg/Mike Livermore of New York Public Interest 
Research Group, Mark A. Izeman of the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Anne Rabe, 
Citizens’ Environmental Coalition. 
All of the local municipal interests declined to participate in the Brownfields Coalition 
effort including the New York Conference of Mayors, The New York City Mayor’s Office of 
Environmental Coordination, and representatives from the cities of Rochester and Binghamton. 
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Of the reason why he did not participate, one municipal representative stated, “I did go to some 
of those meetings but at that point because they had lost the environmental side, the 
environmental group side of it and with the history of the [State] Assembly, it was sort of a how 
much effort do I put into this when it’s unclear whether the [State] Assembly would ever go 
along with this?” Only one business interest, the New York Business Council, declined to 
participate in the Brownfields Coalition. 
The Brownfields Coalition was a very different process from the Pocantico Roundtable. 
The organizers decided that they would build the membership to include as many interests as 
possible and not impose a consensus rule on the document that the group would create. The 
programs and ideas developed within the Pocantico Roundtable were carried over to the 
Brownfields Coalition. As the report states, “This Coalition Report starts where the Pocantico 
Roundtable left off, and it owes all of its good ideas to the Roundtable process.”
128
 The stated 
purpose of the group was, “the elimination of the barriers to the cleanup and redevelopment of 
brownfield sites.”  
The interests that came to be represented in the Brownfield Coalition were strongly 
weighted toward business and community development. The strategies put forth in the report 
primarily represented the community development goals of balancing environmental protection 
with creating favorable conditions for private developers to perform cleanups. As of the 
publishing of the Brownfield Coalition Final Report in 1999, the group included 24 
representatives of the business community, 14 representatives of the community development 
sector, 3 environmental groups, and 1 urban planning group. This organizational structure was a 
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reflection of the fact that Jody Kass had moved from the role of organizer to leader. Her 
background and connections were largely reflected in the Coalition’s makeup. 
The effect of the new membership structure was evident in the recommendations for 
resolving the cleanup standards issue. The Brownfields Coalition recommended that a technical 
advisory panel be appointed in order to establish appropriate rules and regulations governing 
cleanups. This same strategy had been rejected in the Pocantico Roundtable. However, the 
critiques offered during Pocantico were not lost on members of the Brownfield Coalition. The 
makeup of the proposed panel would ensure that whatever political manipulations occurred 
would benefit community development interests. The report states: 
The panel shall be composed of a multi-disciplinary cross section of experts that [sic] are 
representative of the variety of viewpoints…Nominees must come from…the following 
constituencies: environmental groups, businesses, community-based organizations, 
environmental justice groups, non-profit and for-profit land developers and local 




The community development interests essentially stacked the panel membership in their favor. In 
order to achieve the representation called for, there would be 4 members from each of the 
constituencies, plus three political appointees. This meant that mainstream environmental 
groups, business interests, and local government would each receive four members. Then there 
would be four community-based organizations, four environmental justice groups and at least 
one (but likely more) non-profit affordable housing developers. As a result, between nine and 
eleven members of the 27 seats on the advisory panel would be occupied by someone from the 
community development world.  
 The proposed structure of the panel is a reflection of the bitter feelings that the Pocantico 
Roundtable created between the community development and environmental interests. Many 
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community development representatives commented on the fact that they felt as though the 
environmentalists acted unreasonably and refused to see their perspective on the need to enable 
redevelopment. One environmental justice activist involved in both efforts commented that, 
“These environmentalists go back to their homes in the suburbs, but we live in these 
communities. We have to live with these sites. They don’t see the day-to-day.” 
As a result, when the Brownfields Coalition developed its response to the cleanup 
standards issue, it was clearly done with minimal expectation of good will on the part of 
environmentalists. The community development activists involved in the conversation did not 
trust the environmentalists. Thus, while community development interests knew that resolution 
of the cleanup standards issue would not be possible without including environmental interests 
on the advisory panel, they sought to ensure that the same impasse that had occurred at Pocantico 
could not re-occur.  
 The bulk of the Brownfields Coalition work, though, focused on creating what at the time 
was called the Land Reuse Opportunity Areas (LROA) program. The LROA program, which 
was the second iteration of what later became BOA, sought to enable communities “to identify 
the range of activities necessary to address the social, economic, environmental and 
infrastructure needs that presently inhibit private investment in brownfield impacted 
communities.”
130
 It called for pre-planning grants to be provided on a competitive basis to areas 
that wanted to apply for formal LROA status. If designated as an LROA, the sponsoring 
community-based groups would work in partnership with municipalities and be eligible for 
funding to pay for a full planning process, site acquisition, and environmental testing. As part of 
LROA, a wide range of specialized loan and grant programs were designed to enhance the ability 
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of sponsors to direct remediation in LROA areas according to community-based plans. Finally, a 
series of tax incentives for developers to build according to LROA plans were devised. These 
included tax credits, tax increment financing, and tax exemptions. 
 The Brownfields Coalition Report was issued on 3 June 1999, the day after the 
Governor’s Superfund Working Group Report was officially released. The LROA was developed 
in detail in the Brownfields Coalition Report and a similar BRA program was spelled out in the 
Superfund Working Group Report. The Superfund Working Group called for a tiered risk-based 
standards approach to cleanups and the Brownfield Coalition called for an advisory panel to be 
appointed in order to set the proper standards for cleanup. The “purist” environmental position 
which favored strong and absolute standards requiring pre-contamination conditions was absent. 
All environmental groups dissented at least in part from the Governor’s Working Group and few 
environmental interests remained through the transition from the Pocantico Roundtable to the 
Brownfield Coalition. Community development and environmental interests remained divided 
despite extensive efforts to bridge the gap between them. This left the environmental lobby on 
their own to push for strong cleanup standards. Even achieving the specific modifications to the 
tiered system that protected residential communities near industrial areas and gave DEC 
discretionary control over the process would be difficult from such a position.  
The community development groups, on the other hand, got their main program 
represented in both of the leading policy documents that would guide discussion about 
brownfields legislation. A draft proposal for legislation was written from each report. The 
Governor issued his draft based on the Superfund Working Group’s report on 15 June 1999. The 
Brownfields Coalition released their draft bill with much more detail than the Governor’s on 4 
August 1999. Both bills contained specific programs for area-wide planning and community 
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participation. The community development aspect of both approaches was substantially the 
same, though the Brownfields Coalition called for much greater funding for their programs. The 
cleanup standards remained very different in the two bills and the environmentalists largely 
opposed both strategies (for more on the two bill proposals see Gerrard, 1999; Sturm, 2000; 
Cady Brown, 2004). 
  
6.7| The Bill and Early Implementation 
 The two draft proposals ensured that brownfields would be on the legislative agenda in 
New York State. The Governor endorsed the Superfund Working Group report and members of 
the Brownfields Coalition organized an active lobbying campaign. Despite these efforts, it took 
four more years of negotiation in the State Senate for a brownfields bill to get passed. The issue 
had a lot of constituencies. By 2002, there were “13 different bills related to brownfields 
remediation, reuse, and financing…percolating in the state legislature” (Citizens Housing and 
Planning Council, 2002, p.3). The Governor’s draft bill had been amended to exclude New York 
City from many of the financial benefits, a move which caused a number of powerful business 
interests to oppose his proposal. As a result of the rising protest, Governor Pataki dropped his bill 
from his 2002 legislative agenda. The Brownfields Coalition draft bill, though, survived as a 
result of continuous lobbying led by Jody Kass and Mathy Stanislaus. By 2002 it was the key 
proposal to which all other approaches had to respond. Due to the increased lobbying efforts that 
brought community development leaders to Albany on a regular basis, all the major proposals 
included a targeted program for area-wide planning in distressed communities (ibid.). The 
community development voice had clearly grown into an important constituent with regard to 
brownfield legislation.  
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 Community development activists, though, faced competition in the effort to pass the bill. 
Several versions of the legislation were debated over the course of three sessions. Development 
interests, state agencies, and local governments all lobbied individual legislators. Members of the 
Brownfield Coalition made regular trips to the capital in Albany to show continued support for 
their bill. One respondent said of this period: 
So we did regular you know, events up in Albany. We took CBOs and took it up to 
Albany, it was so important that the legislators saw community faces. You know, I 
believe that was one of the most important reasons why the Brownfield bill worked… we 
walked right in the Environment Committee meeting, it was exclusively representatives 
that were white, we brought in the black and brown faces. It had an impact.   
The legislation finally passed in October 2003 and was entitled the Superfund and 
Brownfield Reform Act (commonly referred to as the Brownfield Law). The law represented the 
culmination of many years of debates about financing, cleanup standards, and planning for 
brownfield redevelopment. Typical of contentious legislation in New York State, the final 
portions of the bill were crafted at the last minute and sent out for review with barely enough 
time for legislators to read them before the vote. The overall bill that finally passed contained a 
delicate balance of agendas from competing interests. As one respondent commented: 
This was truly a compromise piece of legislation created by the private and the public 
sector working together. It took us seven years to create this law…And there was no 
question that one piece, if one piece is taken away then the…then the sort of the puzzle 
falls apart.  
  
 
6.7a: The Slow Growth of BOA 
 
The Brownfield Law included a provision for the creation of a “Brownfield Opportunity 
Area” (BOA) program. BOA is an area-wide brownfield remediation strategy that builds on the 
ideas formed at the Pocantico Roundtable and that the Brownfields Coalition ratified. The 
program allows municipalities or community-based organizations located in areas with high 
concentrations of brownfields to apply for planning and technical assistance grants from the 
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State. The BOA grants are to be used for inventorying brownfields within the designated area 
and engaging in a participatory planning process for redevelopment that engages residents and 
land owners in the area.   
BOA was structured in three steps. Step 1, the pre-nomination study, provides funds for 
accepted applicants to do preliminary analysis of the land use and environmental conditions in 
order to establish a BOA boundary for their area. Step 2, the nomination study, involves 
developing a plan based on a thorough and detailed analysis of sites, market trends and reuse 
potential for the BOA study area. Finally, Step 3 is the implementation phase where strategies 
for implementation are developed and state funds that will aid in the process are identified and 
allocated.
131
 The focus by the state agencies on creating full land use plans for BOAs was not 
necessarily reflective of what all members of the Brownfields Coalition had in mind: 
I did not think BOA as a separate plan was supposed to be this, what is equivalent 
in…land use law to a master plan. I thought it was supposed to be essentially a big fat 
report but of environmental information about the nature of those sites that make them a 
brownfield and a much more simplistic designation process whereby there would be this 
line drawn. And then the people would get the money for the investigations and get 
preference and priority. DOS [Department of State] has made it into a mandatory master 
plan. 
 
Some respondents, in fact, expressed deep reservations about making the BOA program a typical 
land use planning process: 
But what I’ve seen over the years in terms of plans, including local waterfront 
revitalization plans, if they’re too detailed in terms of this building and this height should 
go here and this building and that, you know, kind of building should go there, and the 
developers don’t like it?  Nothing happens, okay. The planning process can hurt 
development. So it’s very tricky. These things are very tricky you know.   
 
Initially, the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC) shared responsibility for administering the BOA program. This caused 
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confusion and slowed down the process for BOA applicants. One very common observation was 
that the BOA program has moved forward very slowly as a result of the way it was initially 
structured. The release of money for the program and approvals of BOA plans both took several 
years to get started. Some representative comments were: 
It’s been slow. It's been a slog. I think there are a lot of well-intentioned efforts.  And I 
think we're sort of getting there. But I, I think it could and should have been much 
shorter.   
 
The disenchantment with the BOA program came in its rollout and implementation. The 
issues with the structure of the, between DEC and Department of State and more 
specifically the problem with the memorandum of agreement within the legislature on 
issuance of the grants.  You go out and it takes a fair amount of effort with the 
community to create the momentum for a good application and for the commitment 
needed to support an application, and then to tell them two and a half years later, well we 
still don’t have the money. Well, you know, people move on, the community changes.   
 
As a result of such complaints, in 2005 DOS took control of the program. However, despite this 
change, it took seven years for the first BOA to reach Step 3 and most have not passed Step 2. 
Many BOA participants have complained about changing and unclear directives from the DOS. 
As one respondent commented, “I don’t know why it’s taking that long. It’s, you know, a lot of 
people have been in step two for a very, very long time, the nomination study step.  And I don’t 
know why they’re not getting out.” 
 
6.7b: The abuse of tax credits 
The implementation of the Brownfield Law was plagued almost immediately by an abuse 
of the tax credit incentives for redevelopment. The tax credit established in the initial legislation 
was a dollar-for-dollar write-down of a developer’s state tax liability. As well, if a tax credit 
awarded to a developer for a project exceeded the developer’s overall tax liability to New York 





 Because the amount of tax credits that a project was eligible for depended upon 
the cost of the development, very expensive high rise constructions could potentially receive 
many millions of dollars in tax credits. As one respondent said of the initial program: 
What happened is right after the bill passed, I remember reading it thinking, wow. This is 
really good…Can the state of New York afford this?  This is really good…I mean, you 
know, I think I could definitely sell this program you know.  But oh, yes, and at the time 
the state could afford it okay.  And it really was intended, he thought, and we all thought, 
to drive policy in the state of New York away from Greenfield development…but a few 
not so good people who I unfortunately got to know told every developer he knew in 
Manhattan, you know. You find a little bit of contamination. You go into the 
program…Developers when they saw that tax credit program I have to admit said to me, 
wow.  Are you kidding me?  This is really good.  I mean you’re kidding me.  I’ll go out 
and buy ten brownfields. And that is what they did okay?  You know but that’s what it 
was supposed to do.  
 
As a result, a number of very expensive developments, such as the New York Times office 
building in midtown Manhattan (completed in 2007), were the first to apply for the credits in 
2004. These sites had minimal environmental contamination but very expensive project costs and 
qualified for tens of millions of dollars in tax credits. The intention of the bill was to provide 
substantial financial incentives to the smaller, difficult-to-develop sites, but the effect was to 
provide a huge subsidy for projects that did not need them (see Cady Brown, 2004). 
Importantly, the tax credits were written during the final push to get the bill done. As one 
environmentalist said, “the tax credits were not vetted.” According to respondents involved in 
the final lobbying for the bill, the initial tax credit proposal was written by a staff member at the 
Business Council of New York. The credits were modeled on programs that other states had 
constructed, but the incentives provided in New York ended up being far more favorable for 
developers. As one respondent involved with writing the Brownfields Coalition bill said:  
The tax credit piece of the legislation none of us were qualified to write. None of us 
understood enough about tax law to know how to write that section. So we didn’t write it. 
But we all agreed there should be significant, not insignificant, but significant tax 
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incentives. So it was written by [a staff member at the Business Council of New York]. 
He…looked at every…other state Brownfield Program and created the best Brownfield 
tax credit program in the country. And that was what I thought we all wanted.  
 
Not all members of the Brownfield Coalition who participated in drafting the legislation agreed 
that the program as written into law represented the conversation about the group’s intent, or 
even that it represented what came out of the Business Council’s draft. One member present 
during the final discussions about the tax credits said: 
When we were talking about tax credits and so on it was more the view to 
having…having some kind of an economic credit benefits program that could apply in 
the BOA areas, these lower income areas. It sort of morphed into something where 
everyone got a big piece of the pie. 
 
One member of both the Pocantico Roundtable and the Brownfield Coalition pointed to a last 
minute behind-closed-doors deal made to sweeten the tax credit for development interests: 
What I heard was effectively that it was done at four AM in the morning when our 
legislature does its best work. And that it was essentially the lobbyists representing [a 
large development firm]… nobody else did it that way. It came out of nowhere…And I 
think [the large developer’s] effort was actually worse than cynical. Not only didn't he 
care, I think he actually delighted in damaging the program. I think he is an anti-
environmentalist…You know when you think about the people who benefited, they must 
have lobbied for it. 
 
Others shared the impression that the development lobby stepped in at the last minute to 
manipulate the bill: 
If you really look at who testified at that point, everyone just kind of gave up ownership 
to some extent. And then, and that’s when we saw the developers come in. That’s when 
you saw – and the revisions to the law totally benefitted the developers. So maybe in 
hindsight they were waiting for the law to come together. They actually probably were a 
part of the written legislation. 
 
Despite the intention on the part of some to narrowly link the tax credits with the BOA 
program, such a link was never established. Instead the credits covered a substantial portion of 
development costs for all projects built on brownfields regardless of location, levels of 
contamination or cost of cleanup. That is, whether a project was within a BOA or not had no 
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bearing on the level of available incentives. As such, the most generous credits flowed to 
projects outside of BOA areas where real estate values were higher (see Cady Brown, 2004). 
Without any direct zoning power attached to the plans and without any financial incentives 
linked to them, BOA faced serious implementation challenges. Developers had few reasons 
beyond altruistic desire to comply with community wishes to actually build projects that aligned 
with BOA plans. As one respondent said: 
We could have BOA for the next fifty years but BOA on its own will not get brownfields 
redeveloped…Because as I said from the beginning there’s no…there’s not enough 
incentive in that program for an owner and/or developer to come in and do anything in 
that area since it is so complicated to do anything in that area.  
 
This lack of incentive for owners to comply with BOA, the supporters of the program knew, 
would be problematic. However, by 2003, most interested parties were ready to get something on 
the books in New York State and continue the political battle after a law had been passed. As 
such, rather than press the issue further and possibly jeopardize the law, advocates representing 
the Brownfields Coalition chose to support the law and fight for improvements through the state 
agencies and new legislation.  
As the number of projects filing for brownfield tax credits increased, it began to be clear 
to many that the program was unsustainable. In the first five years, the program enrolled over 
200 sites eligible for hundreds of millions of dollars in tax credits. In order to rein in this expense 
and strengthen the incentive for developers to remediate sites to the highest level, Governor 
David Patterson signed an amendment to the Brownfield Law in 2008 that capped the overall 
subsidy for a single site, tied tax credits to cleanup costs only, and provided higher subsidies for 
higher levels of cleanup (Tarquinio, 2008). As well, the State Department of Environmental 
Conservation sought to retroactively reduce the credits that already approved projects were 
eligible to receive. This action on DEC’s part led to a number of lawsuits wherein developers 
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that had built their financing on the expected level of subsidy argued that it was unfair and illegal 
for the state to remove it after the approvals had been given. At this point, what good will across 
parties had been gained in the Pocantico and Brownfields Coalition process began to erode:  
No one’s talking to each other anymore…Once the litigation happened and all bets were 
off there was no more conversation…What I found that is so sad about this thing is 
that…what Pocantico accomplished I’m not sure would ever happen again. And yet we 
need a Pocantico process again. 
 
 
6.7c: The Limited Institutional Arena for BOAs 
The BOA program requires applicants to adopt one of two basic institutional set-ups: 
either a community-based structure wherein the BOA is sponsored by a community organization 
or a city-led structure wherein the municipal government serves as the sponsor. Within New 
York City, where most BOAs are led by community groups, rather than the municipal 
government as is the case in upstate New York, three types of groups sponsor BOAs. These are: 
community based organizations (CBO), community development corporations (CDC), and 
quasi-municipal agencies such as the New York City Economic Development Corporation 
(EDC).  
 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of the Three Types of BOAs in New York City: The CBO-led BOA is the only one 










Organizational Type Prior link with state Primary Goal Number 
CDC  Federal funds>locally 




CBO Community Local Advocacy and 
Service Provision 
4 
EDC City>private developer Economic Development 1 
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Figure 6.1. Locations of all Approved BOAs in New York City in 2010. Source: NYC Office of Environmental 





Each of the three organizational types employ different strategies for connecting 
community, private development, and public interests in order to create new developments in 
cities that respond to community needs and ensure that contaminants are cleaned up. Each 
organizational type has a different primary function coming into the BOA. The CDC- and EDC- 
led BOAs have an embedded private development function (affordable housing and economic 
development respectively), while the CBO-led BOA does not. CBO-led BOAs have more direct 
connection to the community through the historic organizing function of the sponsors. CDCs 
primarily use federal subsidies to develop affordable housing. The EDC directs private 
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development toward the city’s economic development agenda in neighborhoods. The CBO 
model is largely an advocacy approach which increases the political capacity of local 
communities, but is not necessarily based upon an established relationship with government or 
private development interests. Table 6.1 above shows the organizational qualities of BOAs in 
New York City.  
The BOAs that have advanced the most in the program in New York City are those that 
have a business orientation. This reflects the fact that organizations most aligned with typical 
private development models perform the best. Business interests are essentially leading the effort 
and municipal interests retain a great deal of control. This difference was highlighted by a 
number of respondents. Some commented: 
I can see, for example, [a CDC-led BOA] … has had great, you know, significant number 
of housing, many of them public/private ventures, you know, has a lot of experience and 
judgment. …And similarly [another CDC-led BOA] had a lot of experience with 
different kinds of things. They are moving along well. But some of the groups like [a 
CBO-led BOA] never deal with a developer. So I can see where the experience would be 
very, very different. 
 
I think it's a function of scale and history. You know the smaller, newer, very close to the 
community ones that have not had a lot of experience. You know most of them, it's hard.  
They don't know developers and they're very leery of them. 
 
BOAs with stronger prior connection to private developers are moving through the 
process faster and performing better. A number of respondents pointed to the necessity of 
forming the connections with private developers in order to implement the BOA plans. Several 
people commented: 
From my point of view the good thing about some of these community groups were they 
clearly wanted to have a voice but they also tended to be rather realistic. You know I 
think actually the continuing challenge for the BOA program is to engage private 
developers. You know do they see the BOA program as being one more layer of, you 




There’s also this provision in the law that says you really have to talk to the owners, 
right. It’s right in the law.  
 
What are the implementation strategies to how we’re actually going to get this pretty plan 
implemented in the real world? And I think people aren’t getting there, maybe people 
aren’t getting there because it’s a really hard thing to figure out what you’re going to do 
you know. Because now step three is really you got to talk to the owners, you got to 
figure out really what you’re going to do, and how are you doing to do it and how are you 
going to get the property owners that are…that end up being uncooperative, either out of 
there or to cooperate…I think a lot of these projects are getting stuck in step two because 
the real hard part is just too hard you know.    
 
The question for environmental justice advocates is whether BOA can be used to catalyze 
institutional change for those groups that do not have private development experience and do not 
wish to sacrifice their ability to address the social goals that connect them to their communities 
in order to gain it. Is this the proving ground for the creation of socio-ecologically just 
governance structures that include communities within the decision-making process and protect 
ecological functions or rather a justification for business as usual? That is, to what extent does 
each of these different types of organizations carve out an alternative institutional space which 
both empowers local communities to plan for redevelopment of their areas and to retain power 
over land use decisions in their areas after periods of disinvestment have subsided?  
 
 
6.7d: The New Partners for Community Revitalization 
 
 The program is faced with the challenge of bringing the sometimes divergent 
development agendas of CBOs, CDCs, and municipal agencies together within a single stated 
goal of effectively remediating brownfields. The New Partners for Community Revitalization 
(NPCR) is a crucial actor in this process as it connects all BOA leaders and operates across CDC, 
CBO and municipal BOAs. NPCR implicitly recognizes in its work that governance networks do 
not form out of a blank slate. Rather, these networks must operate within an existing institutional 
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structure characterized by an existing set of relations. NPCR seeks to shape these relations 
toward greater power for communities in deciding the outcomes for brownfield redevelopment.  
The one constant in the implementation process has been the effort to improve the 
legislation and implementation that has come from the organization founded by Jody Kass and 
Mathy Stanislaus in 2002. The New Partners for Community Revitalization (NPCR) was initially 
funded by the foundations that supported the Pocantico Roundtable process and was housed at 
the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development. Kass’s organization 
connects community development groups with the other interests concerned with land use 
regulation in New York State. They hold annual forums and issue regular reports advocating for 
improvements to the Brownfield Law. Eventually, Stanislaus left the organization to work on 
developing an area-wide brownfield policy at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Since 
then, Kass has led NPCR and the organization has developed a stable and independent source of 
funds. 
 The mission of NPCR is “to advance the renewal of New York’s low and moderate 
income neighborhoods and communities of color through the redevelopment of brownfield 
sites.”
133
 NPCR seeks to achieve this mission by serving as an intermediary between community 
development, environmental, private developer, state government and local government 
interests. The organization’s staff has technical engineering, planning and legal backgrounds, and 
advocates for better brownfield policies at the state capital. The group has a long-established 
relationship with local community organizations especially New York City, allowing them to 
communicate well with interests involved with brownfield redevelopment from all sides of the 
issue. 
                                                 
133
 See NPCR Mission Statement at: http://www.npcr.net/about_us/mission.html, accessed 10 January 2012. 
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NPCR has been important in providing community development organizations with new 
institutional arenas in which to operate. The staff members were described by a current BOA 
sponsor organization representative as “political buffers” who can “go out on a limb on an issue 
without any one entity having to take the risk of being attached to it [referring to making critical 
statements about how the city government was handling brownfield policy].” As another 
respondent stated: 
So even though the community groups came to NPCR and said, "Hey, we want to do this."  
NPCR actually put in the man-hours and they sent out the invitations as, you know, "Well, this is 
what we do statewide. We are a technical assistance to both groups. We support this work, you 
know, all, you know, all the way to the north down through Long Island. So we can convene."  
And it just looks like this is what we always do. And it didn't look specifically like any one group 
was targeting the city and trying to wring its neck. 
 
 In essence, NPCR ensures that community development interests remain a part of the 
conversation around brownfield redevelopment. One important victory that NPCR has had was 
to convince the state legislature to pass a linkage requirement between the revised tax credit 
program and the BOA program in 2008. Now, developers that conform to BOA plans are eligible 
for a 2% of project cost bonus above what they would be eligible for outside of BOAs. While 
NPCR continues to fight for an increased percentage, this was a crucial step forward for the 




In all, both environmentalists and community development interests were heavily limited 
in the extent to which they could affect brownfield policy due to the actions of private developer 
and local government representatives during the final negotiations around the 2003 bill. BOA 
passed, but as one respondent commented, “We’re not even close to being done in this state.” 
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Rather, BOAs have been in an ongoing struggle to get not only the funding that was allocated to 
them within the law to do planning, but also the funding incentives for developers to follow 
BOA plans. Without such incentives, the innovative area-wide planning program that was 
developed in New York will likely have little effect upon what is actually built in cities.  
The environmental and community development interests never found common ground in 
the New York case. The institutional divide between the two sides could not be bridged because 
the pragmatic shift that took place within the community development organizations aligned 
them with economic development interests. Environmentalists saw this as an affront to their 
interests and the “purist” position refused to participate. The two sides never effectively 
discussed how cleanup standards might be incorporated into the BOA planning process. As such, 
the platform for political mediation that arose around regional planning in California never 
















Chapter 7: Synthesis 
Institutional Change in Urban Environmentalism 
 
7.1| Comparison of Cases 
The observable differences in the legislative processes of each case can be understood 
through the lens of heterarchic governance. In California, for a brief moment—and it did not last 
long—there was a temporary alignment amongst interests competing over land use goals. New 
climate change policies in the state, coupled with the specific political circumstances around SB 
375, created a high degree of uncertainty for all of the organizations involved. In response, they 
formed a heterarchic governance structure that was labeled “the impossible coalition.” This 
structure, though, was different than a coalition. It was a moment when the normal power 
hierarchy around land use flattened and institutional norms were open for discussion. 
In the New York case, a heterarchic governance moment did not arise. A comparable 
level of uncertainty was present due to the demand for brownfield policy in the state. However, 
the stakeholders splintered within the various policy formulation efforts. Despite the uncertainty 
created by the demand for new legislation, economic development interests saw no reason to 
sacrifice their traditional power within urban land use decision-making processes. Ultimately, as 
was the norm, they made the new legislation work primarily for their interests. While most 
BOAs are still in the planning phase, and thus development outcomes cannot be measured, a new 
pattern of growth which combines social and environmental goals is unlikely. 
Despite the different outcomes, the basic conditions for heterarchic governance were 
present in both cases. These conditions include organizational diversity, rivalry amongst 
interests, the presence of “tags” (i.e. sustainability and smart growth) that enable cross-cutting 
projects, and a general context of uncertainty over established institutional norms. This chapter 
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asks, given the presence of all of these conditions, why heterarchic governance emerged in 
California but not in New York. As well, it examines how the heterarchic governance moment 
that formed in California relates to larger processes of institutional change. 
In the sections that follow, I first examine each of the four basic conditions for heterarchy 
within the cases. Second, I describe the different political motivations for heterarchy with a focus 
on the role played by community development and environmental interests. Next, I discuss what 
this analysis demonstrates about the role of consensus as it relates to heterarchic governance. In 
any policy area with an entrenched hierarchical power structure, such as land use, there can be no 
consensus without a heterarchic governance moment. I use the case findings to develop this 
point. Finally, I contextualize the heterarchic governance moment that occurred in California 
within larger processes of institutional change, by which I mean transformation of the norms 
associated with, in this case, land use.  
 
7.2| The Basic Conditions of Heterarchy 
The heterarchic governance literature argues that moments of “crisis” wherein established 
norms are threatened create uncertainty, which can encourage private market actors to give up 
autonomy in decision-making and state actors to give up top-down authority (see Powell,1990; 
Stark, 1996). In doing so, organizations within a heterarchic governance moment have “more 
than one way of evaluating worth” which provides an increased capacity to solve complex 
problems (Stark 2000, p. 13). There are, though, a number of conditions that are needed to create 
heterarchy. 
Organizational diversity is an essential characteristic identified within the heterarchic 
governance literature because it provides multiple perspectives on which possible solutions can 
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be based (see Stark 2000, p. 13). A wider set of perspectives than are normally represented create 
the possibility for different, and potentially better, answers to emerge. This is also the stated 
motivation for bringing a diversity of interests into any participatory governance process. In both 
cases, the originators of the policy formulation processes engaged a diversity of organized 
interests because the problems that had to be resolved were too complex for them to handle on 
their own. The expertise needed was too great for any single interest to possess.  
In the political negotiations around SB 375, the bill sponsors had to align housing and 
transportation policy within diverse regional land use planning regimes. The complexity of the 
legislative challenge forced the sponsors to bring a number of lobbying groups into the 
conversation including private developers, local governments, affordable housing advocates, 
environmentalists, and numerous community development groups. Transportation advocates, 
public health advocates and regional planning agencies also played a role in the discussions. The 
stakeholders that were a part of the Pocantico Roundtable in New York were essentially the same 
as in the California case. They were identified by the organizers of the roundtable as private 
developers, businesses, local governments, environmentalists, and community development 
interests. Foundations were also important supporters of the consensus process. The 
organizations involved in both policy discussions represented a wide set of perspectives on the 
proper role for land use regulation and thus met the diversity criterion for heterarchic 
governance.   
Rivalry amongst organizations is a likely outcome of organizational diversity. Rivalry 
leads each of the groups to hold the others accountable according to multiple logics and values 
and to reflexive questioning of “the assumptions of one’s own organizational behavior” (Grabher 
2001, p. 354). As such, rivalry is an important quality which allows inter-organizational problem 
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solving to achieve better solutions than would a hierarchic bureaucratic or individual market 
process.  
Similar conditions of rivalry were present in both cases. For example, affordable housing 
and environmental interests in the California case had been at odds for decades over the proper 
location for new affordable housing construction. Local governments and builders generally 
sought to play these interests against one another in state-level land use politics. In the New York 
case, decades of impasse between local government, development, and environmental interests 
over the best way to regulate brownfields made New York among the last highly industrialized 
states to pass such legislation. In both cases, the wide range of perspectives amongst organized 
interests over the proper role of land use clearly related in a rivalrous fashion.  
In addition to organizational diversity and rivalry, Grabher (2001) argues that “tags” such 
as “smart growth” and “sustainable development” are needed to generate discrete projects that 
cut across institutional boundaries. Tags are discursive mechanisms of integration necessary to 
create the intellectual justification for diverse groups within a heterarchic governance 
assemblage to pursue a common goal. They are often characterized by common understandings 
of broad goals incorporated into simple ideas and phrases, communicated because they 
seemingly resolve differences of opinion and interests, at least on the surface (see also 
McGlennan, 2004 for a related concept which he labels “vehicular ideas”). Of the role played by 
climate change as a rhetorical tool for enabling the creation of the impossible coalition in 
California, one member of the negotiations argued, “So climate in a sense has provided kind of a 
new tool to achieve a goal that had never been possible before.” Climate change served as the 
intellectual justification for the need to change existing land use outcomes. Strong public support 
for climate change policy led all interests to want to be perceived as supporting such efforts. This 
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intellectual justification with wide public support reduced the force with which local 
governments and the building trades supported a status quo model of growth.  
Smart Growth served as the “tag” in the New York case. The Brownfield Coalition report 
stated that one goal was, “Preserving the maximum number of greenfield sites in New York 
State, preventing continued sprawl and environmental degradation and supporting sustainable 
development and smart growth for the state’s cities, suburbs and rural areas” (1999, pp. 24-25). 
Smart growth was a new concept at the time and the tag was used by all interests including those 
represented on the Superfund Working Group, the Pocantico Roundtable and the Brownfield 
Coalition. It served as a conceptual frame for a disparate set of goals. Of course the real 
differences between interests had to be sorted out in the political process, but smart growth, like 
climate change, performed the role that Grabher points to in providing a tag that justified projects 
which cut across institutional boundaries. 
The literature argues that the primary precondition for heterarchic governance is the 
uncertainty that arises from a crisis within the established institutional structure. Pervasive 
uncertainty leads all interests involved to perceive greater benefit in cooperation than in 
contestation (Stark, 1996; Jessop, 1997). This is the case because groups realize that it is in their 
own self-interest to negotiate terms rather than risk losing out altogether. For example, Stark and 
Bruszt (1998) demonstrate that property regimes in postsocialist Hungary were transformed, 
establishing rights for the property-less, because the interests formerly in power saw greater 
benefit in giving up some of their centralized control rather than potentially losing it all.  
In the California case, the shift to climate change policy as the framework for land use 
regulation attached the negotiations around VMT reduction and CEQA reform to a perception of 
political crisis for lobbying interests concerned with CARB’s role in land use regulation. The 
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political crisis stemmed from the perception on the part of some interests—especially those of 
local governments and the building trades—that they would be ignored in the regulatory process 
defined by CARB, and thus a legislative compromise was preferable. However, even within the 
legislation, there was a great deal of uncertainty about what role CARB would actually play. As 
well, the public perception of a climate crisis created a strong political demand for legislation. As 
a result of these dynamics and the fundamental shift in the focus of the bill that occurred halfway 
through the negotiations, what at first looked like a typical environmental lobbying process that 
faced heavy opposition from economic development interests became a legislative program with 
broad support. 
In several respects, the level of uncertainty around brownfield legislation in New York 
was comparable to the dynamics associated with SB 375. The need for a legislative answer to the 
issue of brownfield remediation was clear to all involved at the time that the Pocantico 
Roundtable was proposed. The existing Environmental Restoration Program created from the 
Brownfield Bond Act was only meant to last for a limited time. It ran out of money in 2008. As 
well, most developers, community development interests, and environmental advocates alike saw 
the Voluntary Cleanup Program as too uncertain with regard to liability and remediation 
standards. As one respondent pointed out, “there were rumblings within the environmental 
community that there was no statutory basis” for the program, meaning its existence could be 
challenged at any time. As well, when Governor Pataki created the Superfund Working Group, 
he signaled that environmental remediation policy would be at the top of his legislative agenda. 
It was generally believed that Governor Pataki intended to include new recommendations for 
state remediation policy in his next budget proposal for the 1999 session. Despite the uncertainty 
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about what the new bill would look like and concerted efforts to build consensus, no real 
alterations to the typical political process around land use occurred. 
The cases demonstrate that uncertainty is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
explaining the emergence of heterarchic governance in the context of urban environmental 
planning. There must also be a political motivation for those in power to address the uncertainty. 
In the California case, the motivations for local government and the building trades to cooperate 
did not arise until the community development and environmental interests bridged the 
institutional divide between them. At this point, those actors that are typically at the top of the 
power hierarchy began to feel uncertain about whether their interests would be represented in the 
legislation that was created. This motivated the building trades and local governments to 
compromise and support SB 375. A similar political motivation did not arise in the New York 
case. The explanation for this difference is explored in detail in the section that follows. 
 
7.3| Heterarchic Governance in Urban Environmental Planning 
Efforts to bridge the institutional divide between community development and 
environmental policy were not present at the outset of the policy initiatives, but they became a 
central dynamic in both cases. California’s regulatory structure largely mirrors that of the federal 
government with regard to the institutional divide around land use. Issues of land use regulation 
have pitted community development and environmental activists against one another for decades 
(see Chapter 5) and have been at the center of state-level struggles to develop effective urban 
environmental policies. Affordable housing advocates in California have fought since the 
creation of the state housing law in the 1960s to fund more affordable housing in the distant 
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suburbs where they argue demand is the greatest because the schools and resources are the best. 
Environmentalists have opposed this strategy because it fuels sprawl development.
134
 
As a result of disagreements over how far-reaching the planning mandates in SB 375 
should be, the first year of the negotiating process looked very much like a typical environmental 
land use bill. The environmental groups directly lobbied state legislators to achieve their 
traditional goals of habitat protection and resource preservation. They were blocked by local 
development interests including the building trades and local governments. The process was also 
typical in that there was an effort to position the affordable housing community against the 
environmental lobby. Local development interests argued to the affordable housing groups that 
the proposals for land use planning coming from the environmental community would limit the 
ability to build affordable housing. Far from the unique experience implied by the “impossible 
coalition” language that came to be used after the bill was passed, year one of the negotiations 
ended acrimoniously.  
During the second year of negotiations over SB 375, though, a “paradigm shift” occurred 
within the environmental community which bridged the institutional divide with community 
development activists. At this point, the affordable housing interests were wary of the effects that 
the initial environmentalist proposal for regional planning would have upon the ability to build 
affordable housing. However, as a result of the ongoing discussion with regional planning 
interests and recognition of the political opportunity presented by Senator Steinberg’s elevation 
to a leadership position, a shift occurred within the environmental lobby’s view on housing 
construction in the state. Whereas the former position of most environmental interests “had a 
strong no-growth flavor” in the words of one observer, the environmental groups that supported 
                                                 
134
 Several respondents in the interviews commented on this long-standing tension between the two interests. See 
also Landwatch (2011). 
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the bill pushed for a strategy that favored growth “in the right place.” This was a move toward 
the regional planning strategy that the Blueprint process in Sacramento exemplified.  
Planning played an important political role at this point. The environmental interests that 
were interviewed cited a “continuous learning process” with regard to regional planning as a 
major cause for the paradigm shift in their position on development. This learning process, 
coupled with the political opportunity presented by the elevation of Steinberg to Senate Pro Tem,  
was the initial move toward heterarchic alignment of competing interests. The influence of the 
Sacramento Blueprint process infused a more nuanced vision of regional growth and planning 
than in the early drafts of the legislation. This newly-embraced regional growth model became 
fertile ground for environmentalists and community development activists to formulate a 
common picture of what goals would best serve both sides within the proposed planning 
strategy. In doing so, regional planning served as the political bridge between community 
development and environmental interests.  
The “pro-development in the right place” shift on the part of environmentalists created an 
opening for affordable housing interests to shift their position. Now that environmentalists had 
backed away from their “no development” position, the affordable housing interests had to 
decide if they would also compromise on their push to put housing in all localities, especially in 
far-flung suburbs. This discussion focused on changes to the application of the Regional Housing 
Needs Assessment (RHNA) in order to align it with SB 375’s regional planning goals. The 
affordable housing interests recognized the political opportunity that SB 375 represented and 
decided to compromise on the application of RHNA. The pragmatic shift on both sides enabled 
the institutional divide between environmentalists and the community development advocates to 
be bridged and removed the capacity of opponents to play the two sides against one another. This 
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was the spark which created the political motivation for a heterarchic alignment powers in the 
normally entrenched hierarchy around land use. 
The shift toward alignment of community development and environmental interests 
which created the political motivation for the creation of heterarchy in the California case 
resulted from a pragmatic move on the part of community development and environmental 
activists. At least for a brief while, the institutional divide between them was removed and the 
potential for the two interests to be combined within a single urban environmental banner was 
present. The coming together of community development and environmentalism was one of the 
key levers that forced the broader “impossible coalition” into existence. Even if the local 
governments and building associations wished—in typical fashion—to align against the bill, they 
no longer had the ability to play the affordable housing interests against the environmental 
interests. Regardless of Steinberg’s position in the Senate, this might have remained an available 
tactic if the environmental community did not shift their position on regional planning. The 
historic model of organizational relations which gave local governments and private developers 
greater power in the land use regulatory regime in California was fundamentally altered.  
In the New York case, a similar shift in position within the environmental community did 
not occur. The facilitators of the Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields argued 
that the process should be about “leveling the playing field” and that full consensus was needed 
in order to make that possible. However, the process faced intractable problems to which 
innovative solutions did not arise. A similar learning process as the one that occurred within 
discussions about regional planning models never took place. Planning in the New York case 
was confined to discussions over area-wide development.  
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While early efforts to align the interests of environmental and community development 
groups held up within several of the working groups, the connection broke down over the 
discussion of cleanup standards that took place within the Standards and Institutional Controls 
group. In the debate over cleanup standards, community development interests were largely 
aligned with the position of business and municipal interests who sought a more flexible system 
for the smaller brownfield sites than the stringent Superfund criteria provided. This meant that 
the “paradigm shift” for environmental advocates that participated in the Pocantico Roundtable 
would have to be toward an alignment with the needs of economic development goals rather than 
toward a wider planning framework as was the case in California. 
As a result of the inability of community development and environmental interests to 
bridge the divide between them, the alignment of interests in the New York case was one-sided. 
Community development interests favored a system for cleanup and redevelopment that 
responded to the concerns of developers and local governments. In doing so, they radicalized the 
environmental position. Certain representatives of the environmental community on the 
Pocantico Roundtable were especially opposed to any shift away from strong absolute cleanup 
standards. Fiszel-Bieler (1999, p.67) observed that Anne Rabe of the Citizens Environmental 
Coalition strongly objected to what she saw as an affront to the priorities the group had 
expressed early on. She saw the discussion “leading toward a complete paradigm shift in the way 
New York State initiates cleanups and that the members were viewing the brownfield discussion 
as an economic issue and not as an environmental one.” As such, Rabe opposed such a shift. 
While several members disagreed with Rabe’s assessment and identified her position as extreme, 
the planning model which resolved environmental and community development concerns did not 
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arise in New York. The initial steps toward heterarchy that took place in California did not occur 
in New York.   
In California, the hard line no-growth position was altered via the development of land 
use planning strategies that took advantage of the political opportunity that SB 375 represented. 
This opportunity both emerged and was created. It emerged from the fortuitous elevation of the 
bill’s sponsor to a leadership position in the State Senate and the overall uncertainty over climate 
change policy. It was created by the pragmatic shift toward a negotiated vision of regional 
planning on the part of environmental and affordable housing interests. Given the institutional 
history and entrenched hierarchy of interests, heterarchic governance in land use will always 
require that the uncertainty over future directions of policy be augmented with the creation of 
political opportunities via the formation of bridges across the divide between environmental and 
community development interests.  
In New York, the political opportunity was not created at Pocantico or afterward. While 
the BOA program was an innovative land use planning approach to brownfield redevelopment, it 
was never seen as a possible solution to the cleanup standards issue. Rather, cleanup standards 
served as an effective wedge between community development and environmental interests such 
that the question of a common planning approach to the problem was never possible. As a result, 
mainstream environmental and community development interests remained at odds and the 
institutional divide between them was not crossed. 
In his assessment of the underlying tension that existed in the Pocantico Roundtable 
process, Jim Tripp of the Environmental Defense Fund argued that the real divide was between 
those interested in cleanup and those interested in redevelopment. He argued that an urban 
brownfield program should seek redevelopment while a Superfund program focused on the 
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largest and worst offenders should focus on cleanup (Fiszel-Bieler, 1999, p. 91). In reality, what 
the participants in the Pocantico Roundtable were learning is that these two issues were much 
easier to resolve when they were kept in separate regulatory silos. However, as was evident in 
the tensions that built throughout, this meant that community and environmental interests could 
be easily played against one another in order to further economic development goals. Once 
planning strategies began to be made concrete, consensus broke down.  
 Tripp was incorrect in his assertion that cleanup associated with the Superfund sites and 
redevelopment associated with brownfields are separate processes. In fact, many Superfund sites, 
such as the Gowanus Canal and the Hudson River in New York City, are linked to long-term 
redevelopment and many brownfields have serious questions about the right type of cleanup. The 
community development and environmental aspects of the issues simply could not be easily 
separated within urban areas, and this was the real conflict. Tripp was observing that the working 
groups at Pocantico wanted to separate the issues; they wanted to consider them in isolation. But 
when they did so, the overall strategy was incommensurable with either enabling redevelopment 
or ensuring high quality cleanups.  
Community development and environmental groups both suffered in the New York case 
as a result of the failure to find a planning solution that would bridge the institutional divide 
between them. The environmental position on cleanup was largely absent from the legislative 
proposals that were developed. As well, while community development interests did win passage 
of the BOA program, they did not get enough resources to fully develop or implement their 
plans. Not only were incentives not tied to BOAs, BOA lobbying was used to legitimate a clearly 
illegitimate structure of tax credits which developers rapidly abused until the state was forced to 
remove all financial incentives. This left BOAs with few resources for implementation. The 
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person accused of creating this situation by lobbying behind the scenes to inflate the tax credits 
was described as an anti-environmentalist developer. Clearly, community development activists 
and environmentalists face common challenges in the process of creating urban environmental 
policy and both sides suffer when they do not bridge the institutional divide between them, 
eliminating the possibility for a heterarchic governance moment. 
 
7.4| Heterarchic Governance and the Role of Consensus 
The relationship between heterarchy and consensus was inverted in each case. In New 
York, the organizers of the Pocantico Roundtable employed consensus building processes in the 
beginning before the questions of power within the political arena were addressed. In California, 
the sponsors of SB 375 employed consensus building only after the open political negotiations 
over the right direction for the bill were complete. While it is possible to flatten power 
hierarchies within formal consensus processes, this study demonstrates that organized efforts at 
consensus building are not necessarily better at creating the heterarchic governance conditions 
necessary for effective urban environmental policy than open political negotiations. At the 
Pocantico Roundtable, the confines of the formal consensus process limited community 
development groups from going outside of the discussions in order to address their concerns. As 
such, open political negotiations would have been a better format for community development 
interests wherein they might have resolved their concerns before they escalated to full conflict. 
This, in fact, was the structure that the Brownfield Coalition adopted.  
The consensus-building process that Pocantico employed brought everyone to the table, 
but it could not make them leave behind the wider institutional context of land use regulation in 
New York and it could not affect external processes. The flattening of the traditional power 
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structure associated with heterarchic governance did not happen prior to negotiations in 
Pocantico. Rather, the traditional business and government alignments were strengthened by the 
creation of the Governor’s group. As a result, the dynamics that pit environmentalists against 
community development activists remained. This was evident especially in the moves by CEC 
and NYPIRG to undo any hope of consensus toward the end of the second Pocantico retreat. The 
Brownfield Coalition which ultimately shaped the BOA program and carried it forth in 
legislation was representative rather than transcendent of the pre-existing institutional divide 
between environmentalists and community developers. As well, the implementation process for 
BOA remains challenging as a result because the groups are still dealing with this issue; BOAs 
that do not have strong development capacity are doing worse than those that do.    
The Pocantico Process at the beginning of the brownfield legislation negotiations can be 
compared with the marathon consensus-building sessions held to decide the final language of SB 
375. Before Senator Steinberg made his final push to create a document that would express a 
compromise position from all interests, the political negotiations around SB 375 had been going 
on for a year-and-a-half. The various interests had all agreed to support the concept behind SB 
375. Only at this point did Steinberg engage in a serial negotiation process where he called each 
set of interests into his office to discuss terms and then called the next until he spoke with 
everyone. He did several rounds like this until some form of agreement was reached. He then sat 
everyone down together and explained the points of agreement. This led to a draft bill that all of 
the competing interests supported.  
Heterarchic governance is a pre-condition for successful consensus over land use policy.  
In certain circumstances, formal consensus building processes can create these conditions. They 
can temporarily flatten power hierarchies by seeking accommodation of all interests through the 
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process of building mutual understanding. But they cannot pretend that hierarchies are not 
present. What the formal consensus building process could not do in the New York case is 
control circumstances outside of the Pocantico Roundtable. For this reason, most practitioners of 
consensus building recognize that the process is not useful in all circumstances (see Innes and 
Booher, 2003). This is especially the case where power hierarchies are deeply entrenched. Unless 
some political motivation for those at the top to give up their authority is devised, the consensus 
process cannot be effective. Open political negotiations do not have any guarantees of being able 
to reduce hierarchies, but they are sometimes more appropriate for doing so. 
 
7.5| Heterarchy and Institutional Change in Urban Environmental Planning   
In both of the cases analyzed, community development and environmental interests were 
comprised of “purist” and “pragmatist” views. One environmentalist described the positions 
within the discussion of cleanup standards in the New York case:  
There was within the environmental community…a divergence of view between what I 
call…the pragmatists and the purists. And…the purists wanted… the most stringent 
possible cleanup standards, everything cleaned up, the groundwater cleaned up.  
 
The respondent went on to describe the pragmatists as more willing to discuss standards that 
would balance the need to redevelop brownfields in a timely manner with the need to achieve 
safe levels of remediation.  
 Likely, all of the interests involved with the policy discussions analyzed here had a 
“pragmatist” and “purist” camp. Community development activists in both cases described 
divides amongst their constituencies over whether or not they should engage with the proposed 
pieces of legislation. Regional planning interests in California described a similar internal 
division. The California case, though, provides an example of how relations across these two 
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camps shape processes of institutional change. Heterarchic governance in the California case was 
essentially an alignment of the pragmatist positions, but it opened up new opportunities for the 
“purists” to affect regional planning. A close examination of the early implementation phase in 
California demonstrates how urban environmental activists are both supporting certain aspects of 
existing institutional norms and creating new opportunities for progressive interests to change 
existing norms. 
 The move to form a regional planning bridge between the institutionally divided 
community development and environmental activists in the California case was driven by the 
pragmatic camp of the California environmental advocacy community. The shift from a “no 
growth” to “growth in the right place” position on the part of the pragmatists was an essential 
pre-condition for the creation of a heterarchic governance moment. It led to urban environmental 
interests being considered on equal footing relative to local governments and private developers 
when it came to the goals of land use planning. As a result of this activity, SB 375 has created 
new opportunities for grassroots social equity groups that represent the “purist” side of the 
environmental and community development worlds (e.g. community based organizations, 
environmental justice groups, and local public health groups). These groups were not a part of 
the policy negotiations around state land use policy but have been given a new institutional arena 
in which to be heard.  
For example, the call for inclusion of social equity as a criterion in developing regional 
greenhouse gas reduction targets came from the newly-formed ClimatePlan. The ClimatePlan 
coalition is comprised of groups from various interests across the state (see Appendix 9 for a full 
list). It was formed immediately following the passage of SB 375. Its stated goal is to advocate 
for the creation of urban environmental policies in California that “protect our climate, our 
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health, our communities, and our environment.” Its priorities include “building and supporting 
diverse coalitions in key regions”, “developing a stronger, broader movement for sustainable 
transportation and land use in California,” and pushing for strong implementation of SB 375. 
The ClimatePlan coalition was active in advocating for a strong directive from the 
Regional Targets Advisory Committee (RTAC) for high targets to be set. It also sought to ensure 
that the regional models being developed to measure the expected greenhouse gas reductions 
were robust and reflected considerations such as the social equity impacts of land use 
interventions. As well, ClimatePlan and other grassroots groups have been active in the new land 
use planning efforts around the creation of regional Sustainable Communities Strategies. In all, 
the RTAC, the regional modeling process, and the SCS have been new institutional arenas for 
“purist” voices to shape urban environmental planning efforts across the state. 
“Purist” demands within the new institutional arenas are setting the conditions for future 
pragmatic shifts. In this way, land use institutions are changed. The pragmatic shift which 
enabled heterarchic governance to form represents the immediate move toward a new set of 
institutional norms. It was not a revolution, but a re-alignment of powers within existing 
institutions that created opportunities for a new set of institutional norms to be supported. The 
“purist” actions in the new institutional arenas that were created by the pragmatists’ newly 
aligned agendas offer a future trajectory for change. Thus institutional change understood as the 
combination of heterarchic governance moments and the new institutional arenas that those 
moments open up contain a mechanism for immediate changes to the institutional norms and a 
future path for new directions of institutional change. As such, heterarchic assemblages support 
the view that institutions tend toward change because “any society that is organized along one 
order of worth is inherently fragile” (Velthuis, 2009, p. 1010). 
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Of course, the types of changes which this process creates can be either progressive or 
conservative. Urban environmentalists must engage this meso-level force for institutional change 
that combines pragmatic and purist tendencies through the creation of heterarchic alignments that 
open up new institutional arenas for action. If they do not, the more conservative forces that seek 
to shape land use policy certainly will. Urban environmental planners must carve out their own 
space between dominant institutions and contentious political movements. They do so by 
combining organizational infrastructures across multiple movements and institutions. The actions 
of urban environmental planners, then, work at the boundaries of the existing institutions 
associated with land use. Urban environmental planners need to embrace this liminal institutional 

















Chapter 8: Conclusion 




8.1| Summary of Findings 
 
This study was organized around three questions: (1) What is the extent of the 
institutional divide between community development and environmentalism? (2) Why do 
alliances form across community development and environmental interests in land use 
policymaking and what are the barriers to such alliances? (3) How do these alliances alter land 
use institutions? It focused on how contemporary organizations form bridges across the 
institutional divide between community development and environmental interests. These bridges, 
it is argued, have the potential to affect the structure of the organizational fields that normally 
direct land use regulation. As a result, they can create longterm institutional changes that reflect 
the goals of urban environmental planners.  
The purpose of the case study analysis was to understand better how community 
development and environmental groups dealt with the institutional divide between them. The 
political dynamics observed in these cases are reflective of a decades-old effort on the part of 
planning interests to leverage the capacity of states to regulate land use in a more comprehensive 
manner. Throughout the postwar growth period this focus has not been prominent for state 
governments, which have sought instead to increase economic development. The emerging 
intellectual frame for urban environmental planning, though, is creating an opportunity to compel 
legislators to rein in the expansion of ecologically and socially destructive land use patterns. In 
the sections that follow, I review the results for each question, outline some of the limitations of 
this study, and offer some directions for future research. As well, I contextualize the findings 
within a larger set of research interests. 
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8.1a: The Institutional Divide 
What is the extent of the institutional divide between community development and  
environmentalism? 
 
In order to discern the extent of the institutional divide between community development 
and environmentalism, this study utilized archival analysis of documents related to the 1970s 
debate over national land use policy. The proposed National Land Use Policy Act and competing 
bills put forth in various forms between 1970 and 1975 would have required that states take an 
active role in limiting the negative social and environmental impacts of suburban sprawl. As 
well, the land use regulatory directives of the federal agencies involved with community 
development and environmental policy would have been clarified. In the end, though, an 
effective model for bringing these two issues together within a single land use planning program 
was not forthcoming.  
Weir (2000) argued that urban interests viewed environmental interests as potential 
competitors for federal resources and largely saw the National Land Use Planning Act as an 
environmental bill which might usurp HUD’s regional planning capacity (pp. 203-204). This 
study largely supports Weir’s assertions about the dynamics behind the National Land Use 
Policy Act, but adds archival details that describe the internal position of HUD and the Nixon 
administration. As well, this study expands upon Weir’s argument. It finds that the failure to pass 
legislation was representative of a more fundamental quality of land use institutions. It solidified 
a divided institutional structure for urban and environmental policymaking that became 
entrenched at all levels of government. This division remains a major challenge for state-level 
efforts to create urban environmental planning initiatives. 
The analyses of HUD and Nixon administration documents demonstrate the extent to 
which community development and environmental agencies and legislators that were shaping 
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federal policy in the 1970s had little interest in combining the two issues. As a result, the old 
divide between urban and environmental issues got solidified at the federal level and replicated 
at the state and local levels. This outcome has meant that state and local governments have had to 
devise their own strategies for developing effective urban environmental policy. While lower 
level governments do have autonomy in the land use policies that they create, the existence of an 
institutional divide between community development and environmental interests has been a 
difficult challenge to overcome.  
 
8.1b: Heterarchic Governance 
 
Why do alliances form across community development and environmental interests in land use 
policymaking and what are the barriers to such alliances? 
 
The heterarchic governance literature finds that competing organizations align their 
activities in response to conditions of uncertainty. This study supports this finding, but also finds 
that, in the context of land use policymaking, uncertainty is not enough. Community 
development and environmental interests must bridge across the institutional divide between 
them in order to create the political motivation necessary for those at the top of the entrenched 
power hierarchy around land use to collaborate. Therefore, this study adds to the heterarchic 
governance literature a focus on the specific reasons for the initial flattening of hierarchy beyond 
general conditions of uncertainty. 
In both cases, there were conditions of organizational diversity, rivalry, and uncertainty 
within the context of cross-cutting projects. There were also boundary-crossing “tags” that 
created an intellectual justification for collaborative action. Additionally, there was a general 
sense of institutional crisis around regional planning and brownfield redevelopment. The 
ideological tension between “pragmatists” and “purists” was also present in both cases. These 
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conditions, though, were necessary but not sufficient to create heterarchy. The first year of 
negotiations around SB 375 and the entire process of negotiating the New York brownfield law 
demonstrated this fact.  
In the SB 375 negotiations, the coalition between community development (e.g. 
affordable housing) advocates and environmentalists combined with fortuitous political 
circumstances to create an alignment of competing interests around land use laws. The shift 
toward climate change policy as a means for addressing VMT reduction in the state attached the 
environmental planning effort that came to be expressed in SB 375 to the prior legislative 
mandates of AB 32. AB 32 empowered the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to regulate 
all sectors of activity that generated emissions. The potential entrance of CARB created a crisis 
for all stakeholders in the land use regulatory community who began to see changes to the status 
quo as inevitable.  
However, it was not until the coalition between environmental and community 
development interests fueled the sense of inevitability that local governments and developers 
actually altered their normal position with regard to land use policy. During the first year of 
negotiations, despite the connection with AB 32, local governments and developers effectively 
opposed SB 375 and forced it to become a two-year bill. At the start of the second year, though, 
community development and environmental interests shifted their positions in order to align their 
interests. The coalition was a key factor that motivated the building trades to make a deal which 
then forced the local governments into support for the bill. The organizational dynamics that 
arose opened up a wider range of possible outcomes for land use policy than in the past.  
In removing the normal hierarchical dynamic wherein the community development and 
environmental interests could be played against one another, the connection across the two sides 
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changed the relationship among all other stakeholders. The “impossible coalition” that resulted 
was comprised of private developers, local governments, affordable housing advocates, 
environmentalists, and numerous community development interests, among others. In the end, it 
was both the general sense of uncertainty created by the entrance of CARB in the land use 
regulatory community and the specific political motivation created by the bridge that formed 
across the institutional divide between community development and environmental interests that 
allowed the “impossible coalition” to take shape. The California case, then, represents a 
heterarchic governance moment, and demonstrates the specific conditions under which such 
moments are created within the context of urban environmental policy. 
In the New York case, the Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields dissolved 
without producing a final document because of the inability to find common ground over the 
issue of cleanup standards. In the end the only alignment that occurred was between private 
development and community development interests. This alignment was reflected in the one-
sided membership and recommendations of the Brownfield Coalition. Because the institutional 
divide between community development and environmental interests was not bridged, heterarchy 
was not possible. 
There were conditions of uncertainty in both cases but heterarchic governance is a 
specific political moment that also requires concerted political action. For urban 
environmentalism, heterarchy is contingent upon community development and environmental 
coalitions in order to re-align land use governance networks toward a flattening of the traditional 
power hierarchy. In such a circumstance, judgments over the values that should be expressed in 




8.1c: Institutional Change 
How do these alliances alter land use institutions? 
Heterarchic governance describes how organizations manage processes of institutional 
change. It is not in itself the mechanism that makes change happen. In order to create 
institutional change which alters the building culture of cities toward a more sustainable form, 
the heterarchic governance process must be combined with new institutional arenas for action. 
In the California case, social equity-oriented coalitions such as ClimatePlan were 
empowered to affect land use planning through the SCS and RTAC processes. As well, 
numerous social equity groups have begun to advocate for and negotiate around the creation of 
new variables for the regional travel demand models used to estimate greenhouse gas emissions. 
Additionally, the use of CARB as a final arbiter for whether the SCS mandates enough 
greenhouse gas reductions creates a new mechanism for environmental interests to affect land 
use. Taken as a whole, the heterarchic governance moment and the new institutional arenas that 
it opened up formed a force for institutional change in California. 
In the New York case, the shift toward heterarchy never occurred. The “pragmatists” 
within the environmental and community development advocates did not find common ground. 
As a result, they were played against one another and no political motivation for developers or 
local governments to flatten the existing power hierarchy arose. The new institutional arenas that 
were created within the BOA process did not reflect the same wide set of interests that the 
flattened power structure enabled in California. They provided little opportunity for progressive 
interests to enact new programs that went outside of established norms. Rather, the BOAs still 
reflected the focus on economic development that local governments and developers sought to 
maintain. In short, no counter-institutional force arose. 
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This study argues that urban environmental planners must embrace a counter-institutional 
position which ensures the continued operation of certain aspects of existing institutions and 
forms the basis for larger processes of institutional change. What results from this research, then, 
is a model of institutional change wherein the “pragmatists” create the shifts toward heterarchy 
that then open up new opportunities for the “purists” to change practice. This more specific 
model of institutional change and the actions that will lead urban environmental planners toward 
it is the primary addition to the urban environmental planning literature that this study provides.  
 
 
8.3| Limitations of the Study 
 
This study examines policymaking processes in two states with highly urbanized 
populations that favor environmental regulations more so than most areas of the country. As 
such, support for statewide urban environmental policy is likely higher in these states than 
elsewhere. While this perhaps limits the generalizability of the findings, the case studies do 
establish the minimum necessary conditions for successful state-level urban environmental 
policymaking. If a policy approach is unsuccessful in these cases it is unlikely to be successful 
anywhere. 
 As well, the analysis of the cases is limited in its theoretical scope. My focus is upon the 
role of heterarchic governance and the importance of bridging institutional divides within 
specific organizational fields defined by the stakeholders. There are several limitations and 
challenges to this analytic frame. First, the role of race and class in structuring the social 
relations that are embedded in the institutions that I analyze is peripheral to my analysis. 
Certainly, the middle-class and mostly white status of the environmental movement as opposed 
to the more non-white community development field has long-represented deeply embedded 
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tensions over these issues. The goal of this study, though, was to outline the extent of the divide 
between community development and environmental institutions in terms of the formal 
governmental apparatus that represents them. As any good history of these movements explains, 
race and class dynamics are inherent to the creation of the governmental agencies in the 1970s. 
However, this study sought to focus on the final expression of these dynamics within the formal 
policymaking process. 
 The heterarchic governance frame is also largely removed from the role of leadership. 
There were important figures leading each of the policy efforts. These figures had prior positions 
relative to the stakeholders involved that shaped the possibilities for action. The role that these 
leaders played in creating the alliances that led to heterarchy is an important issue to consider, 
though outside of the scope of this analysis.   
As well, the use of the organizational field as a unit of analysis has limitations in terms of 
the knowledge of social processes that can be derived. Bruno Latour (2005) has argued that 
rather than classifying actors as part of a pre-given class—i.e. as operating within a certain 
predefined set of norms, or within a given structure such as capitalist society, or a given analytic 
classification such as a field—that analysts should simply observe the associations of actors and, 
from the empirical reality of these associations, derive the social dynamics at work. For Latour, 
use of the organizational field— and of any unit of analysis other than the individual actor—
limits the types of associations that can be observed.  
Because the cases presented here are defined by a specific policy formulation and 
implementation cycle, the organizations that are a part of these cycles are specified in advance. 
Their associations, as Latour asserts, comprise the most important variable to understand in 
analyzing processes of institutional change. However, for the sake of delimiting an analytic focus 
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that will be of use to urban environmental policymakers, the organizational field of actors was 
specified. The associations, though, between actors are not the only relevant factor. It is also 
important to understand how existing land use institutions have encouraged and discouraged 
associations in the past, and the extent to which that has changed.  
Latour’s critique relates to the method of analysis used to understand the existing 
structure of community development and environmental institutions. Throughout the national 
land use debates that occurred between 1970 and 1975, there were a number of interests beyond 
those of the federal agencies and President Nixon’s administration. This study does not closely 
analyze the role played by advocates, lobbyists, local organizations, and campaign donors in 
shaping the national land use policy debates. These interests clearly were a part of the discussion 
and inclusion of their perspective would likely make the motivations of the agency staff appear 
less uni-dimensional. However, the goal of the historical review in this study was to delineate the 
extent to which the community development and environmental institutions were divided in the 
wake of the 1970s birth of this regulatory structure. As such, the agency perspective is the most 
relevant with regard to the formal policy structure that took shape at the time, regardless of the 
motivations for the priorities that were decided.  
A more complete analysis of the historical period would include a wider set of actors and 
would avoid the a priori designation of agency staff as representing a certain position. That this 
study does not follow this path is a symptom of time, resources, and limited space, but also of its 
narrow purpose. I sought to use the history only to set the institutional context for the case 
studies that follow. In all, the limitations of the theoretical and historical analysis point to the 




In addition, this study does not account for the role of local and municipal policies in 
urban environmental planning. The focus within this study has been on the state as an important, 
but neglected level for creating land use policies. However, numerous cities have developed 
urban environmental policies in recent years. The aggregate effect of such policies is likely to 
have a noticeable impact on the way cities are built.  
 
8.4| Directions for Future Research 
 
Overall, this study informs several new directions for research. First, the findings 
presented here would benefit greatly from comparison with a wider set of cases. There is a need 
for comparison with other state policies in less supportive political environments and across a 
wider set of urban environmental planning issues. Second, there are a number of additional 
theoretical frames that could be used to analyze these cases. For example, the role of charismatic 
leaders could be analyzed. As well, the established frames of urban political science including 
the “growth machine” and pluralism perspectives could also be useful. Additionally, it would be 
possible to view these cases as instances of “civic innovation” as outlined in recent literature on 
governance. 
As well, within the cases there are a number of issues that remain unexplored. In the 
California case, the Sustainable Communities Strategies that are being developed as part of the 
mandate from SB 375 contain several processes that are important for urban environmental 
planners to understand better. First, the use of travel demand models in the process of estimating 
greenhouse gas emissions from each region presents a number of issues. A common adage for 
such models is that they are only as good as the data that is put into them. Regions throughout 
the state are currently standardizing the methods that they use for estimating the travel and land 
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use demands. As well, a number of planners are interested in using the models to increase public 
participation in regional planning processes. They hope to make the models more than just 
sophisticated tools for developing estimates of regional growth, but also a means for visualizing 
and sharing various scenarios for growth with the public to help them make informed decisions 
about desired regional planning regulations. Related to this effort, a number of social equity 
advocacy groups are learning about the regional modeling process and are seeking to affect the 
types of variables that are included. They are asking how these models might reflect social equity 
goals and what kinds of variables are needed to do so. All of these efforts are important for the 
planning field to understand better and all are worthy of further analysis. 
 Also in the California case, the SCS process itself is in need of closer scrutiny. This study 
focused on the policy formulation process, but the outcomes of the policy are only briefly 
touched upon. The process around the regional SCS plans needs to be analyzed with regard to 
what interests are involved in the process and how they reflect the dynamic established in the 
formulation phase. It is also important to analyze how public participation, which was not 
specifically outlined in the law, is used within each region. The differences in terms of planning 
outcomes and processes across the regions needs to be explained in order to understand better 
how the legislation operates within the various political contexts throughout the state. 
Additionally, the role of co-optation in social movements (see Piven and Cloward 1977 
as a key example) must be resolved for the California case. As one interviewee noted, this is 
related to the question of whether “real change” has occurred. It is difficult to know how 
effective the policies will be with regard to changing the building culture of cities in California. 
The policy is still in the early implementation phase and it remains to be seen whose interests 
will be the most served in the end. Selznick (1949) argued that co-optation generally occurs 
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within the context of larger institutional processes, but that is not the only result. Rather, it is a 
part of the institutional changes created. It is likely that this mixed result will also occur here. At 
least in California, it seems most likely that there will be a shift in the way that land use is 
decided, but the climate change program will also be co-opted by pro-growth interests to serve 
their ends. It remains for future research to decide which side benefits the most.  
In the New York case, the networks of organizations that each BOA utilizes need to be 
better understood. This study analyzed the organizational networks of the earliest BOAs 
designated in New York City. Since the research was completed, 12 more BOAs have been 
designated in New York City and many more have been designated throughout the state. Further 
analysis of the changes in organizational networks for BOA groups would allow for a better 
understanding of the long-term effects that the policy will have on the ability of local community 
based organizations to affect brownfield redevelopment. The New York Case also raises issues 
for public participation. How each of the BOAs engaged differently with processes of public 
participation needs to be better understood. 
 Both case studies are in the early implementation phase. As such, they provide 
opportunities to follow the actual development effects that are seen as a result of the planning 
processes. Future analysis of the actual development that occurs in both cases would allow the 
overall impact of each policy to be concretely understood. Ideally, knowledge of observed results 
for development in the two states would be coupled with the understanding of the institutional 
arrangements that led to each program on which this study focuses. 
 The historical analysis of the 1970s debate over national land use policy also presents 
several opportunities for further research. The role of the interests beyond those represented in 
the federal archives need to be better understood. The question of how specific actors from the 
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advocacy and lobbying world impacted the legislative process would fill out the storyline 
presented here. As well, the role of community development and environmental groups in other 
federal policies with a land use component would complement the study presented here. Policies 
including NEPA and the FWPCA contain substantial land use regulatory roles for federal 
agencies. It would be useful to understand if community development and environmental 
interests positioned themselves differently in these policy debates. 
   
8.5| Recommendations for Policy 
This study demonstrates that state-level urban environmental policymakers need to shape 
their policies in two ways: (1) they need to empower “new entrants” in the land use regulatory 
arena and (2) they need to create incentives for the institutional divide between urban and 
environmental interests to be bridged. The first goal requires that urban environmental policy be 
thought of in a wider frame than is typical for land use planning. The second strategy requires 
that urban planning be used as a tool for political mediation and that the federal roots of the 
institutional divide between urban and environmental interests be addressed.  
In order to create “new entrants” in local land use regulatory structures, urban 
environmental planners need to work in arenas outside of land use planning that have implicit 
land use goals. For example, in the California case, SB 375 was built upon a greenhouse gas 
reduction policy that had no specific requirements for altering land use. State-level urban 
environmental policymakers in California began from a much wider base of justification for their 
policy actions than narrow land use goals such as transit-oriented development or brownfield 
redevelopment permit. The potential threat that this agency represented was the single most 
powerful policy tool that urban environmental planners had in the process of formulating SB 
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375. The tool was created through a policymaking process around greenhouse gas reductions that 
made no mention of land use, but implicitly contained land use goals.  
Urban environmental policymakers must primarily work to create the types of 
foundations for action within the land use regulatory structure that AB 32 enabled. Of course, 
AB 32 is not possible in all states. California is a unique policy environment and is the only state 
with such a forceful set of laws focused on addressing climate change. However, there are 
numerous climate change laws being created in other states and localities. Policymakers creating 
these laws, even if they are not as robust as California’s, could build the “new entrant” strategy 
into their formulation. That is, beyond the typical list of greenhouse gas reduction goals, good 
climate change policies should seek to create regulatory powers for new or existing agencies that 
would allow them to cross over into the land use arena. This would help to create the conditions 
of uncertainty that drive land use regulatory interests toward heterarchic governance moments. 
However, heterarchic governance is about more than uncertainty. The specific political 
motivation for urban and environmental institutions to be bridged must also be present. The 
presence of a motivation for community development (i.e. urban) and environmental interests to 
combine their goals rather than compete hinges on the type of land use model proposed. In the 
end, any urban planning model must simultaneously embrace the pragmatic and progressive 
aspects of land use goals. The land use model must appeal to the “pragmatists” on both sides. 
This allows for a pragmatic shift which, if linked with a heterarchic governance moment, can 
create new institutional arenas for the “purists” to push for more progressive changes to the 
institutions that guide land use. Thus, the planning model employed during the policymaking 
process should be focused on finding pragmatic connections between community development 
and environmental interests. The urban planning model that follows once the new institutional 
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arenas are created from this pragmatic shift must be focused on pushing the pragmatists further 
so that the next alignment of interests moves toward more progressive planning goals. In doing 
so, policymakers can direct processes of institutional change around land use.  
If either the pragmatic or progressive model for planning is missing in the policy 
conversation, then the results will be either institutional growth or stasis. Institutional growth 
may serve the interests of community development or environmental advocates, but it will not 
lead to new norms for city building that reflect both social and ecological goals. Thus, 
policymakers working toward state-level urban environmental policy need to use planning as a 
political tool which balances the pragmatic and purist perspectives on both sides. In the regional 
planning model that was employed in the California case, this occurred because the shift toward 
development “in the right place” on the part of the environmentalists allowed the pragmatic 
representatives of community development to align with them. It also helped to create a policy 
that opened up new institutional arenas within the SCS planning process for “purist” interests to 
be heard.  
Ultimately, it is necessary for urban environmental policymakers to sort out the 
institutional divide that separates community development and environmental interests at the 
federal level. Currently, transportation policy is the main driver of regional planning in the 
country. The Department of Transportation (DOT) requires that regional planning agencies 
create transportation plans in order to receive funding. However, there are very loose 
requirements on the powers that these agencies must have. Housing and community development 
policy is controlled by HUD. Environmental policy is controlled mostly by the EPA. Recently, 
DOT, HUD and the EPA have begun to align their work within the Partnership for Sustainable 
Communities program. This effort, though, has been given limited funding and remains a very 
320 
 
small portion of the agencies’ activities. As well, the staff that work on the Partnership for 
Sustainable Communities remain in each of the separate agencies. There is no joint infrastructure 
for dealing with the combined issues of transportation, housing, community development, and 
the environment within a single regional planning framework at the federal level. The 
Partnership for Sustainable Communities is a small step in that direction. In order for the states 
to create urban environmental policies that truly combine social and environmental goals, 
support for such policies must come from the federal government. This infrastructure must be 
made more robust. 
In the end, state-level urban environmental policy can either be a new title for existing 
development patterns or a new strategy for building cities that incorporates both social and 
environmental interests. The former approach uses the rising popularity of urban environmental 
planning and the “tags” associated with it as justification for “re-branding” the current model of 
growth; the latter changes the current model of growth. Marcuse supports this argument in his 
critique of sustainability. He argues that the promotion of “sustainability” may simply encourage 
the sustaining of the unjust status quo” (1998, p.103). He presents several examples from 
housing and urban development where policies labeled “sustainable” furthered inequitable 
treatment of residents. If urban environmental policymakers do not find ways of creating 
institutional change which reflects both social and environmental goals, then all that will result is 
a hollow form of sustainability. 
 
8.6| Concluding Remarks 
For some, urban environmentalism is an oxymoron. This is because urbanization and 
environmentalism are difficult forces to reconcile in the context of American industrialization. 
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Urbanization has provided many benefits for people that live within cities, but it has also been a 
physical expression of social inequities. It potentially enables large populations to live with a 
minimal impact on the environment, but also fuels mass production systems that simultaneously 
foul countless acres of raw nature and support expansive development into sensitive habitat 
areas. Community development and environmentalism were founded as social movements that 
sought to minimize the negative aspects of urbanization, realizing its positive potential. In the 
minds of many working to develop land use policy today, the dialectical relationship between 
“urban” and “environment” is leading to a synthetic position. This position seeks to enhance the 
sustainable aspects of city life and respect natural processes. Within it, force and counterforce are 
part of the same effort. 
Urban environmental planners have developed numerous technological solutions for 
reducing the ecological impact of cities, but the ability to implement these solutions on a wide 
scale remains limited. This has been the case because the urban environmental challenge is not 
about changing one aspect of the quality of life within cities, as with a typical reform effort, but 
about changing the whole of the U.S. building culture in the name of ensuring a quality of life for 
all. In its ideal form, urban environmental planning alters the “the coordinated system of 
knowledge, rules, procedures, and habits that surrounds the building process in a given place and 
time” (Davis, 2000, p. 5). Its paradigms for action are meant to create more compact growth 
patterns that restore urban ecosystem services (e.g. water filtration and microclimate regulation) 
and are supported by transit, low impact building technologies, and renewable energy 
infrastructure. This new framework for urban development would produce a new building 
culture that leads to “buildings, millions of them, that are…understood and predictable” within 
the context of urban environmental planning goals (ibid.). 
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Increasingly grassroots activists and planning scholars recognize that one difficulty faced 
by urban environmental planning is the divided institutional structure of land use regulation 
which repeatedly pits community development and environmental interests against one another. 
The “policy silos” that have kept these two sides in distinct institutional arenas block efforts to 
create ecologically sound and socially just cities. Too often, activists seeking greater social 
equity and community empowerment are played against activists seeking to protect the natural 
environment. Increasingly, though, planners have sought to create strategies that allow them to 
leverage the power of coalitions in order to strengthen the position of both groups within 
governance processes.
135
  The broad goal is to develop a coordinating framework for land use 
decisions that accounts for social and natural impacts of urbanization (see Miller and de Roo, 
2004, Chapter 1).  
However, there is no way to talk about changing the relation between cities and natural 
resources without talking about changing the system which drives urbanization. The city-specific 
nature of most urban reform efforts and the non-urban focus of conservation-oriented 
environmental groups allows the veil between cities and wider systems of resource extraction to 
be maintained. To leave the gap between community development and environmentalism 
unaddressed serves a pragmatic purpose for these groups in that it does not force either side into 
the politically difficult position of questioning the basic values and practices embedded in the 
“progress” and economic growth of cities. While many urban reform organizations may not find 
such questioning to be problematic on a moral or philosophic level, it creates difficulties in the 
political context of competitive resource dependence, as exemplified in the 1970s battle over 
control of national land use policy. As such, advocates must find ways of minimizing the 
                                                 
135
 For example, in New York community based organizations have sought to direct environmental regulation 
related to brownfield redevelopment and in California environmentalists have sought to connect their interests with 
community development advocates in order to link land use planning with air emission controls. 
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political risk of such a position by creating heterarchic governance moments around urban 
environmental policy initiatives. In doing so, they spread the burden of reshaping the building 
culture of cities across a wider set of interests and increase their ability to create institutional 
change. 
With so much at stake, planners cannot rely on the hope that more environmentally 
conscious cities will effortlessly arise from new ideas (or repackaging of old ones), or worse, that 
maintenance of the existing norms of the built environment is acceptable. It is clear that a new 
building culture is required. Planners need a specific idea of how their work connects to 
processes of institutional change in order to bring that about.  
The 1960s and 1970s saw a push toward realizing the goal of using land use planning as a 
means for answering both social and environmental problems in cities. However, the series of 
federal and regional agencies created at the time are in need of updating. HUD, the EPA, and 
regional Councils of Governments (COG) all have the potential to increase the role of 
metropolitan planning. This study demonstrates that there is room for urban environmental 
planning research to analyze the shortcomings of these agencies and devise the next generation 
of institutional structure that is required to create a more sustainable building culture in 
American cities. 
By arguing for an institutional focus in research on urban environmentalism I am not 
discounting the utility or correctness of the other existing perspectives on urban environmental 
practice. Rather, especially when it comes to the issue of market-based technological innovations 
versus larger structural changes, I am trying to carve out a synthetic position between these 
perspectives. The goal is to direct the focus of the field toward the meso-level of social practice 
that allows us to understand precisely how new innovations are translated into institutional 
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structures. In doing so, the field of urban environmentalism can move forward with a dual 
agenda of improving the technologies used to build cities and improving the capacity to 
incorporate those technologies on a wide scale. 
This goal has application beyond urban environmentalism. The model of institutional 
change offered here which links heterarchic governance processes with the creation of new 
institutional arenas for action is useful for analysis of any area that must work across policy silos. 
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APPENDIX 1. Interview schedule for semi-structured interviews for the two case studies. 
Interview Schedule 
 
These questions are meant to draw out the general context of the discussions around the policy 
and the position each organization took. They are semi-structured prompts for the main issues of 
concern. Respondents will be asked to elaborate on points that they raise as being of concern or 
important to the context. This first part of the interview is expected to last roughly 45 minutes. 
The first part will be followed with a request that each respondent fill out a structured survey 
(attached). The survey is meant to provide standardized formal data on who each organization 
worked with and how that changed within the policy formulation process. The survey portion of 
the interview is expected to last 10 to 15 minutes. The survey data is suitable for formal network 
analysis while the semi-structured interview data provides the essential context for the dynamics 
observed within the networks. 
 
 
1) How did you first come to be involved with this legislation? 
2) What were you hoping to accomplish through your involvement?  
3) How does this legislation affect your organization’s broader goals? 
 
4) Can you tell me about the strategy used to formulate this bill? 
5) Who took the lead in the policy formulation process? Did you work much with them? 
6) Were there specific concerns from community organizations? Can you offer an example? 
7) Were there specific concerns from environmental groups? Can you offer an example? 
8) What was the role of government agencies? Can you offer an example? 
9) What was the role of private developers? Can you offer an example? 
 
10) Who had the strongest disagreements about what the bill should contain? How were they 
resolved? 
11) Did you have any conflicts with specific groups in the process of formulating this policy? 
How were they resolved? 
 
12) Once the bill was formulated, what was the general strategy used to get the legislation 













APPENDIX 2. List of public meetings attended for the New York state case study. 
 
April 27 & 28, 2009: NPCR held its Brownfield Summit III in Albany on April 27 â€“ 28, 
2009.  
December 1, 2010: NPCR held its 3rd Annual Brownfields Forum entitled: Evolution of 
Brownfields: From Policies to Partnerships. 
June 6 & 7, 2011: Over 120 participants and representatives of 50 BOA communities from 
around the state participated in the 5th Annual Albany Summit 













































































































































































APPENDIX 9. Membership of Governor’s Superfund Working Group 
 
State Agency Interests (7 Members): 
John P. Cahill, Commissioner, State Department of Environmental Conservation (Chairman of  
the Working Group)* 
H. Carl McCall, State Comptroller 
Eliot Spitzer, State Attorney General 
Dennis Whalen, Executive Deputy Commissioner, State Department of Health* 
Charles Gargano, Chairman, Empire State Development Corporation* 
David Bradley, Acting Director, Governor’s Office of Regulatory Reform 
Robert Fischer, Member, New York State Superfund Management Board 
 
Local Government Interests (1 Member): 
Robert R. Gregory, Executive Director, New York State Association of Counties 
 
Environmental Interests (4 Members): 
John H. Adams, President, Natural Resources Defense Council* 
Paul J. Elston, Chair, New York League of Conservation Voters* 
James Tripp, General Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund*** 
Rhea Jezer, Chair, Sierra Club—Atlantic Chapter 
 
Business Interests (5 Members): 
Mark Alesse, State Director, National Federation of Independent Businesses 
Francis B. McKenna, Managing Director, Merrill Lynch 
Kenneth Pokalsky, Director of Environmental and Regulatory Programs, The Business Council  
of New York State, Inc.* 
Diana Hinchcliff, Executive Director, Alliance of Chemical Industries of New York State 




* Organization was represented on the Pocantico Roundtable 
** Organization was represented on the Brownfield Coalition 
















APPENDIX 10. Membership of Pocantico Roundtable for Consensus on Brownfields  
 
Business Interests (9 Members): 
Steven Ancona, Aqua Terra* 
Joan Bartolomeo, Brooklyn Economic Development Corporation* 
Barry Hersh, Dames & Moore/Brookhill Development Corporation* 
David King, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.* 
Ken Pokalsky, Business Council of New York State, Inc.*** 
Ira Rubenstein, Environmental Business Association of NYS, Inc.* 
Carol Trezza, Real Estate Board of New York* 
Linda Shaw, Esq., Knauf, Craig, Koegel & Shaw, LLP* 
Elizabeth Gunther Sanderson, New York Bankers Association*       
 
Municipal Interests (4 Members): 
Annette Barbaccia, New York City Mayor’s Office  
Donna Giliberto, New York Conference of Mayors 
Mark Gregor, City of Rochester 
Robert Murphy, Esq., O’Connor, Gacioch, Pope & Tate, LLP (Binghamton Corporate Counsel) 
 
Community Development Interests (5 Members): 
Yolanda Garcia, Nos Quedamos* 
Aaron Mair, Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corporation* 
Peggy Shepard, West Harlem Environmental Action* 
Ron Shiffman/Joan Byron, Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental 
Development* 
Mathy Stanislaus, Minority Environmental Lawyers Association* 
 
Environmental Interests (6 Members): 
Paul J. Elston, New York League of Conservation Voters**  
Andrew Goldberg/Mike Livermore, New York Public Interest Research Group 
Mark A. Izeman, Natural Resources Defense Council** 
Anne Rabe, Citizens’ Environmental Coalition  
Jim Tripp, Esq., Environmental Defense Fund*** 
Val Washington, Environmental Advocates 
 
Organizer (1 Member): 
Jody Kass, New York City Partnership*** 
 
Non-Voting Ex-Oficio Advisors: 
Erin Crotty, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation** 
Ronald Tramontano, New York State Department of Health** 
Tria Goodman Case, Empire State Development Corporation** 
Marjorie Buckholtz, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  
 
Non-Voting Facilitators: 
Allen Zerkin, Program on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at New York University 
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*Organization was represented on the Brownfield Coalition 
** Organization was represented on the Governor’s Superfund Working Group 
*** Organization was represented on both the Brownfield Coalition and the Governor’s 









































APPENDIX 11. Membership of Brownfield Coalition  
 
Business Interests (24 Members): 
Steven Ancona,  Aqua Terra Holdings/Aqua Terra Assessment Services Corp.* 
Leslie Lerner, Beechwood Organization 
Barry Hersh, Brookhill Redevelopment LLC* 
R. Randy Lee, Building Industry Association of NYC 
Jon Salony, Chase Manhattan Bank 
Ira Rubenstein, Environmental Business Association of NYS, Inc.* 
Peter Hornick, Environmental Property Group LLC 
Carlton Brown, Full Spectrum Building and Development 
Lisa Sotto, Hunton & Williams 
Linda Shaw, Esq.Knauf, Craig, Koegel & Shaw, LLP* 
Bruce-Sean, Reshen MGP Environmental Partners, LLC 
Elizabeth Gunther Sanderson, New York Bankers Association* 
David King, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.* 
Robert Barclay, North American Realty Advisory Services 
Carol Trezza, Real Estate Board of New York* 
Irving Cohen, OENJ Cherokee Corp. 
Mike Rooney, Novalex Contracting 
Vincent Riso, Queens County Builders and Contractors Association,Inc. 
Larry Schnapf , Schnapf Environmental Law Center 
Les Bluestone, Seavey Organization 
Stuart Suna, Silvercup Studios 
Livio Sanchez, Stow Contracting Corp. 
Henry Wan, Tri-Plus Construction 
Jody Kass, New York City Partnership* 
 
Planning and Economic Development Interests (2 Members): 
Joan Bartolomeo Brooklyn Economic Development Corp.* 
Ann M. Davlin, Regional Plan Association 
 
Community Development Interests (13 Members): 
Aaron Mair, Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corp.* 
Walther Delgado,  Audobon Partnership for Economic Development LDC 
John Fleming, El Puente 
Aaron Shiffman, Fifth Avenue Committee, Inc. 
John Steinberg, Greater Jamaica Development Corporation 
Mathy Stanislaus, Minority Environmental Lawyers Association* 
Gail Suchman/Eddie Bautista, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest 
Yolanda Garcia, Nos Quedamos* 
Ron Shiffman/Joan Byron, Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Dev.* 
Paul Lipson, The Point Community Development Corporation 
Elizabeth C. Yeampierre, Esq., United Puerto Rican Organization of Sunset Park 
Peggy Shepard, West Harlem Environmental Action* 




Environmental Interests (3 Members): 
Jim Tripp, Esq., Environmental Defense Fund*** 
Theodore W. Kheel, Earth Pledge Foundation 
Val Washington, Environmental Advocates* 
 
 
* Organization was represented on the Pocantico Roundtable 
** Organization was represented on the Governor’s Superfund Working Group 
*** Organization was represented on both the Pocantico Roundtable and the Governor’s 
Superfund Working Group 
